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GENERAL WILKINSON'S VENDETTA WITH GENERAL WAYNE: POLITICS AND COMMAND IN THE AMERICAN ARMY, 1791-1796*

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Near the end of a lifetime in Kentucky's political wars, Humphrey Marshall described his old enemy, James Wilkinson, as a man whom nature "had gratuitously furnished . . . with a passport," one "whose influence everyone felt; and which none would suspect, or scrutinize." Wilkinson's gift, Marshall remembered, was his manner and appearance: "A countenance—open, mild, capacious . . .; a gait—firm, manly, and facile; manners—bland, accommodating, and popular; an address —easy, polite, and gracious." "The combined effect," Marshall concluded, was "greatly advantageous to the general," but only "on a first acquaintance." "Further intercourse" invariably led to suspicion and finally distrust.[1]

Marshall's sketch was undoubtedly correct, because historians who have studied the large, jovial general—safe from the wiles of his charming personality—have judged only his actions, and their conclusions have been harsh. In all of the disputes over the various conspiracies in the West between the Revolution and the War of 1812, historians have agreed on one thing: James Wilkinson was involved. Frederick Jackson Turner set the tone in 1896 when he called Wilkinson "the most consummate artist in treason that the nation ever possessed."[2] But plots with foreign governments and with such adventurers as Aaron Burr were only a part of Wilkinson's career. At heart the man was

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driven by a relentless personal ambition. All his life he schemed for wealth and preferment, and nowhere was it more evident than in his five-year struggle to oust General Anthony Wayne and take over the command of the fledgling American army.

Wilkinson entered the service as a lieutenant colonel in the fall of 1791, a few weeks before the army under Arthur St. Clair was annihilated by a confederation of Indians in northwestern Ohio. The commission represented a new beginning; Wilkinson was failing in his business ventures, and in his plot to detach Kentucky from the United States and merge it into Spanish Louisiana.[3] The administration in Philadelphia suspected Wilkinson's conspiracy, but President Washington's policy since taking office had been to smother talk of secession by attaching leading Kentuckians to the national government.[4] And that summer Wilkinson had led a successful raid by frontiersmen into the Indian country, so he was a natural choice for an army smarting from defeat and long unpopular in Kentucky. In March 1792, after resignations by Generals St. Clair and Josiah Harmar, Wilkinson became a brigadier general, and the only general officer in service. From Ohio he watched and waited while the administration decided on a new commanding general, hoping and expecting that he would be named.[5]

Actually Wilkinson was considered, despite his dealings with the Spaniards. But the administration felt that while he was "brave" and "enterprising," there were too many "unapprovable points in his character."[6] The appointment itself put the administration in a ticklish spot. The position required an officer of high enough rank during the Revolution that former officers could serve in subordinate positions without compromising their "honor." But many of the former generals were either too old, too sick, or uninterested, and those who were available were being pushed so hard by friends in Congress that inevitably the final decision would hurt the administration politically. Wayne was a compromise. While he was suspected of being a drunk and a sledge-hammer tactician who was liable to suffer huge casualties in elementary situations, he was the least of all evils. As Washington explained to Henry Lee, the Governor of Virginia and an old friend who had also been in the running, "I was never more embarrassed in any appointment," but "to attempt to please everybody is the sure way to please nobody."[7]

If Wilkinson was bitterly disappointed, he kept it to himself. Through 1792, as the army was rebuilding, he stayed on the frontier while Wayne remained near Pittsburgh, organizing the new recruits and beginning the painful process of molding them into a combat army. Outwardly, relations were friendly, but Wilkinson tried to erode Wayne's authority almost immediately. As the ranking officer on the

frontier, Wilkinson corresponded independently with the War Department, ostensibly to give Secretary of War Henry Knox a direct and speedy channel of communication coordinating frontier defenses and supervising the peace feelers then going to the Indian tribes. Wilkinson used this correspondence, however, to bombard the Secretary with complaints, proposals, and questions about supplies, strategy, and all the myriad details of army organization.[8] Wayne caught on quickly. Wilkinson's letters to him, while polite, were arrogant and overbearing, and on several occasions Wilkinson used Wayne's distance to question or modify specific orders. In November, Wilkinson sent the general a twenty-seven page letter describing the forts near Cincinnati as a separate district and requesting additional prerogatives for himself. Wayne decided to go directly to Knox to confirm Wilkinson's subordinate position.[9]

Besides attempting to carve out an independent command, Wilkinson used other ploys to undermine Wayne. He carefully maintained cordial relations with important politicians, especially his old Kentucky friends, feeding them confidential information about the government's plans and openly criticizing military strategy.[10] But his most serious attempt to embarrass Wayne involved splitting the officer corps and compromising the loyalty of the officers under his immediate control in Ohio. From the beginning Wilkinson spoke disparagingly of Wayne to other officers.[11] With grace and charm the Kentuckian soon gathered a small coterie of close friends and confidants. Some who resisted his overtures or refused to compromise their loyalty to the commander-in-chief were dealt with severely. In early 1793, Wilkinson literally forced Captain John Armstrong, a competent officer of nearly ten years service in the peacetime army, out of the service, evidently because Armstrong had served with Wayne during the Revolution and refused to become Wilkinson's ally.[12]

In the spring of 1793, when Wayne moved the bulk of his forces from Pittsburgh down the Ohio to Cincinnati, the dissension increased. Wilkinson absented himself to Fort Jefferson, "to remove myself," he told Harry Innes sarcastically, "from daily and hourly scenes, which however ridiculous are extremely disgusting."[13] Quickly Wilkinson became a magnet for all the officers who disliked Wayne or had suffered the general's very formidable wrath. By fall, Wilkinson was known publicly as the most popular officer in the army.[14] The effect on the officer corps was disastrous. Through the winter of 1793-1794, the corps was in turmoil, and according to one officer, split into "two distinct parties."[15] Wilkinson's group openly criticized Wayne; one even wrote to a congressman, accusing the commander of being "ignorant, jealous, Partial, Rude, Ungentlemanly, and Unjust."[16]

Others, in open revolt, demanded furloughs, and when Wayne refused, submitted their resignations. The general summarily rejected them and threatened to jail any officer who left camp.[17] The result was a hostility so deep that in the midst of a march halfway into the Indian country, American officers were killing each other in duels.[18]

With the onset of spring in 1794, and the prospect of a hard campaign against the Indians, tempers cooled. But the split was irrevocable and left permanent scars on the army. Two years later officers were still quarreling and were identified—almost every one of them—as partisans of one general or the other.[19]

Wayne was partly to blame for this situation because some of the charges were true. Quick to jump to conclusions, stubborn, temperamental, secretive about his reasoning and his motives, Wayne rarely confided in anyone those first two years after taking command. He punished shirkers relentlessly, and even in cases where the guilt was unclear, he was abrasive and dictatorial.[20] As one veteran put it, "when he [Wayne] speaks, Heaven shrieks, and all stands in Awe."[21] Yet Wayne had inherited a defeated, dispirited army which had to be rebuilt with leadership, toughness, and discipline. From his standpoint, there was too much to be done to worry about wounded feelings, and as commanding general he owed explanations to no one except his superiors in Philadelphia. But whatever the justification, Wayne's personality and methods played into Wilkinson's hands perfectly. Long before the army left Pittsburgh for Fort Washington, where Wilkinson was stationed, the old comaraderie in the peacetime officer corps had changed into grumbling and mistrust.[22]

Of all the officers in the army, Wilkinson had the least grounds for complaint. Wayne pampered him from the start, asking his advice, allowing him extra command responsibilities, even the chance to choose his own duties and headquarters. Perhaps Wayne sensed his subordinate's disappointment at not getting the command, for never once did he respond harshly to Wilkinson's pompous, and sometimes patronizing, letters. But Wayne evidently began to view his second in command differently during the summer of 1793. The first suspicions may well have come with John Armstrong's court martial and resignation. While he was powerless to intervene, Wayne probably wondered at Wilkinson's sudden hostility toward Armstrong and his rough handling of the case.[23] And as the summer wore on, Wayne increasingly saw the discontent in the officer corps as a conspiracy against himself and the government. At the start of the advance into the Indian country in October 1793, Wayne suddenly found his logistical system in chaos, with supplies and transport utterly lacking for an extended foray into enemy territory. To the eager general, it smacked of

sabotage, and undoubtedly it was related to the rebelliousness among his officers.[24] Since no evidence existed to implicate Wilkinson, relations between the two remained friendly, though growing more formal and distant. Not for another six months did the open break occur.

In the spring of 1794, knowing a campaign was imminent, Wilkinson shifted his tactics and came out into the open. Realizing that his only hope for the command lay in ruining Wayne's reputation before a victory over the Indians made the commander invulnerable to criticism, Wilkinson began a whispering campaign in Cincinnati to the effect that Congress had lost confidence in Wayne's leadership.[25] Then in his most striking move yet, Wilkinson published anonymously a scathing newspaper attack on the general, blaming him for the dissension in the army and charging him with stupidity, waste, incompetence, favoritism, and every other form of malfeasance possible for a general officer. Specifically, he charged that Wayne had purposely disregarded a peace feeler from the Indians so that the war would continue and he could gain the glory of a smashing victory. In addition, Wayne had suppressed and overturned the findings of court martials, arrested officers on pretenses, and then confined them for months without trial, all the while screening "his pimps and parasites from justice."[26] The accusations were widely reprinted and Wayne soon learned their ultimate source.[27] But Wilkinson went even further. He made the same charges privately to the War Department and demanded that Wayne hold a court of inquiry to put down rumors that he, Wilkinson, had attempted to undermine the supply system or in any way injure the service.[28]

Wilkinson had made his first mistake. Since he had not pressed formal charges, the Secretary of War could assume that his letter was private and thus delay any action, pleading that an investigation would disrupt the army on the eve of battle.[29] Besides, the administration knew the accusations were motivated by a plot to ruin Wayne. After publishing a reply to the attack in the Federalist party newspaper, the administration let the matter rest.[30]

Less than two months later, Wayne defeated the Indians at Fallen Timbers. Now his methods, the discontent—all the charges—were irrelevant. But Wilkinson was prepared. He or one of his men kept a detailed diary during the campaign of all of Wayne's activities, describing the tactics of the battle, the orders given, and the intelligence from spies and prisoners about the effects of the defeat.[31] Starting a week afterwards, in long letters to his political intimates and to several congressmen, Wilkinson derided the whole conduct of the campaign and Wayne's leadership.[32] Wayne, he claimed, had directed none of the fighting. Furthermore, the battle itself was a "puny victory" which

would not crush Indian power in the Northwest because Wayne had not followed elementary tactics or pursued the enemy. "The whole operation," Wilkinson insisted, "presents us a tissue of improvidence, disarray, precipitancy, Error and Ignorance, of thoughtless temerity, unseasonable cautions, and shameful omissions."[33]

Wilkinson's new charges finally forced the administration to act, for until he was silenced, the whole military establishment was in jeopardy. During the upcoming session of Congress, the legislation on which the army was legally based and which had authorized the enlistment of the troops was due to expire. The administration hoped to quietly gain congressional approval for continuing the army at full strength, as much to perpetuate the national military establishment as to insure successful peace negotiations with the Indian tribes. A full-fledged investigation of the army and the campaign would only rekindle the old arguments about the merits of regulars or militia in Indian fighting, and encourage longstanding efforts by the Jeffersonians to reduce or even abolish the military establishment. So Secretary of War Knox tried to settle the dispute between the two generals privately. In December, just as the session was beginning, he asked both of them to compromise their differences and work together. To Wilkinson, Knox wrote formally, telling the Kentuckian to forget his charges unless he could produce specific facts to warrant an official investigation.[34] Wayne responded angrily to Knox's request, explaining how he had indulged "the Brigadier" for over a year, how false the charges were, and how the whole dispute stemmed from Wilkinson's character ("this vile assassin") and from the deep-laid conspiracy by anarchists to ruin the army and subvert the government.[35] Wilkinson quieted down. From the tenor of Knox's letters, Wilkinson guessed correctly that the administration would protect Wayne, so he abandoned executive channels and did not press the matter further. Instead he consolidated the group of officers around him and began to work through Congress.[36]

For the next year, nothing happened. The army settled down to garrison life in the line of forts north of Cincinnati, while Wayne patiently negotiated a final settlement with the Indians. Most officers kept their differences in check, although the dispute still flared occasionally between embittered partisans of one general or the other. The generals themselves avoided each other. Wilkinson spent most of his time on routine matters and private business, which still included secret machinations with Spanish officials in Louisiana.[37]

But he was far from idle. Somehow, either through his own political contacts or through those of the officers who supported him, Wilkinson constructed a working relationship with the Jeffersonian party in Congress.[38] Certainly the elements for some sort of alliance were present.

Wilkinson wanted Wayne forced out of the service; the Jeffersonians wanted to attack the administration and cut back both the size of the army and the amount of money it consumed. Wilkinson was charging that the campaign had been mishandled, that Wayne was a wretched (though lucky) general, and as a Kentucky soldier, a Revolutionary war veteran, and an experienced peacetime officer, he could effectively claim that mounted frontiersmen could have defeated the Indians more quickly and more cheaply. In private letters to Wayne, to the War Department, and to his Kentucky friends, Wilkinson had argued the superiority of raids by irregulars for years.[39] His arguments fitted perfectly with the Jeffersonians' strategy. By boosting James Wilkinson, they could embarrass the administration and undermine the Federalist argument that Fallen Timbers proved the ultimate worth of a regular army.

By early 1796, the pressures in Congress for reducing the army had become irresistible. The Treaty of Greenville had been signed, the Indian situation in the Southwest was quiet, and Jay's Treaty, then being debated throughout the country, promised to resolve the differences with Britain which had brought the nation so close to war in 1794. Furthermore, the Jeffersonians were stronger in Congress than they had ever been before, and pointing to the lack of any military threat and the need to reduce the federal budget, they succeeded in reorganizing and reducing the military establishment.[40]

The hottest battle came over Wilkinson. In the House of Representatives, where he was strongest, Wilkinson won a major victory. His friends convinced the House to omit the rank of major general and the major general's staff from the new establishment on the grounds that money would be saved and that a smaller army could be just as efficiently commanded by a brigadier. Federalists were aghast. They as well as the Jeffersonians knew Wayne would resign before accepting the insult of a cut in rank. "The true object," one Federalist lamented, "is to get rid of Genl. Wayne and place the army in the hands of a Jacobin and what is worse a western incendiary."[41]

In the Senate, Wilkinson's victory evaporated. There Wayne's friends and administration stalwarts agreed to pare down the army, but categorically refused to accept Wilkinson as commanding general. For a week the legislation shuttled between the two branches, thoroughly deadlocked.[42] Major Thomas Cushing, Wilkinson's chief lieutenant who was then in Philadelphia, tried to pressure the Senate with another newspaper blast at Wayne, loudly proclaiming that the administration was covering up for the general and blocking a court of inquiry.[43] But the Senate, while it compromised most of its other differences with the House on the legislation, would not budge on the question of command.

Finally, to save the legislation and prevent the army from continuing at its wartime size and organization, the Jeffersonians relented. For another year, the army would be commanded by a major general with full staff.[44]

For Wilkinson, it was the last straw. Well before the final compromise, he guessed that the Senate and the President, who could always veto the bill, would never agree to axing Wayne "after his victories and his treaties."[45] In frustration and despair, Wilkinson decided to force the administration into a court of inquiry and settle the dispute once and for all. "I am truly sick of the service," he confided to one of his allies in the army; "I would not give five guineas for the choice."[46] In April he reworked his accusations into legal form, sent them to the War Department, and for the first time demanded a formal investigation of Wayne's conduct.[47]

The administration procrastinated until the military establishment bill was safely through Congress. Then, goaded by Cushing's newspaper attack and Wilkinson's formal request, the President asked the cabinet to suggest some course of action that would finally resolve the struggle. The problem now was wholly legal. The articles of war contained no provision for courts for the commanding general. Only he had the power to convene them, and any officer who sat in judgment would be his subordinate, a ticklish position. If a jury member voted "guilty" and the general was exonerated, the officer's career would be in jeopardy. Faced with such a legal tangle, the administration simply procrastinated again.[48]

This time, however, Wilkinson refused to be put off. With all his stratagems exhausted and his position as Wayne's subordinate increasingly untenable, Wilkinson was prepared for a showdown even though it might destroy his career. In the fall he left Fort Washington for Philadelphia, not only to press his "allegations," he explained to Innes, but also "to defend my own fame against a vanity of foul and infamous imputations."[49] Once there, he forced the administration into action by threatening to take the matter directly to Congress for investigation.[50] As a result, in a tortured review of the Constitution and the articles of war, Attorney General Charles Lee ruled that Wayne could be tried if the President—as commander-in-chief—so ordered.[51] The showdown was approaching.

Less than a month after Lee's ruling, the feud came to an end with an abruptness and finality that no one, least of all James Wilkinson, expected. On his way to establish winter quarters at Pittsburgh, Wayne suffered another of his recurring attacks of gout—then fever and intestinal pains—and died. The administration, with only a few weeks left in office, had no grounds for removing Wilkinson, and because

the rank of major general was to expire on March 4, 1797, the President could not very well appoint a replacement for Wayne. And to try to renew the rank of major general would only rekindle the controversy, and reward Wilkinson, since the pressure was already intense to give him the command. A few diehard Federalists adopted Wilkinson's own tactic and tried to legislate the rank of general out of existence altogether, but since a scant six months earlier these same men had argued that a major general was necessary, the House hardly considered the proposal.[52] So after five years of bitterness and recrimination, James Wilkinson had won.

Wilkinson's long struggle to wrest control of the army from Anthony Wayne was not an event that significantly shaped the course of history. Yet it was no mere byplay in the development of the military establishment. Almost singlehandedly, Wilkinson convulsed the officer corps, polarized it, and in the process politicized the army. How great an effect this had on either Wayne or the campaign against the Indians is unclear, but it obviously made Wayne's task more difficult and the campaign more hazardous. In Congress, Wilkinson's machinations distorted the whole process of military policy in 1796 and very nearly destroyed the reorganization legislation that created the nineteenth century military establishment. Moreover, the feud revealed a maturity in the army that it had never before possessed. In one sense the contest was a classic bureaucratic struggle, the kind that has racked the army throughout its history. The struggles between Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor during the Mexican War, between Fred C. Ainsworth and Leonard Wood at the turn of the twentieth century, between Peyton C. March and John J. Pershing after World War I, and between the MacArthur and Marshall factions during the Second World War were never as crude and usually involved issues of much greater national importance. But all involved the same quest for power and prestige, the same jealousy, and some of the same tactics—charges and countercharges, disputes over battles, the use of political contacts in the government—that Wilkinson pioneered in the 1790's.

In a long career of scheming and intrigue, of rumors, accusations, and trials, James Wilkinson somehow always escaped. Never once did his enemies quite succeed in ruining his reputation or forcing him out of office. Yet in a more profound and final way, James Wilkinson was the loser. Before the bar of history and opinion, he was the most infamous American of his time. While Humphrey Marshall's characterization of the man was honest, it is not how Wilkinson is remembered. Perhaps Anthony Wayne was really the victor in the end, for it is his description of Wilkinson that has endured:

> To draw his portrait needs no pencil nice
> For all his composition is vice on vice.[53]

FOOTNOTES

[1] Humphrey Marshall, *History of Kentucky* (Frankfort, 1824), I, p. 165.

[2] Frederick J. Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," *American Historical Review*, III (1897), p. 652. For the literature on Wilkinson, see James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson* (New York, 1938), the best but by no means a definitive biography. Francis S. Philbrick, *The Rise of the West, 1754-1830* (New York, 1965), has recently tried to absolve Wilkinson of many earlier charges, but he concentrates on whether or not Wilkinson was legally "guilty" of treason and not on assessing the man or his activities. See pp. 176-184, 197-200, 234-252.

[3] General James Wilkinson, *Memoirs of My Own Times* (Philadelphia, 1816), II, pp. 108-114. For a review of the literature on the Spanish conspiracy, see Philbrick, *Rise of the West*, pp. 176-184; Temple Bodley, introduction to *Reprints of Littell's Political Transactions . . .* [Filson Club Publications, No. 31] (Louisville, 1926).

[4] The government was tipped off by Thomas Marshall. See Marshall to George Washington, Feb. 12, 1789, in T. M. Green, *The Spanish Conspiracy* (Cincinnati, 1891), 250n-253n.

[5] See John Brown to Harry Innes, Apr. 13, 1792, Harry Innes Papers, XIX, p. 91, Library of Congress; Wilkinson to Capt. John Armstrong, Jr., May 24, 1792, John Armstrong, Jr. Papers, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis; John Heckewelder, travel diary, July 14, 1792, Paul A. W. Wallace, *Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder* (Pittsburgh, 1958), p. 274.

[6] Cabinet notes, Mar. 9, 1792, Thomas Jefferson Papers, LXXII, p. 12433, Lib. of Cong.

[7] Washington to Henry Lee, June 30, 1792, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington . . .* (Washington, 1931-1944), XXXII, p. 77. For the history of the appointment, see Richard H. Kohn, The Federalists and the Army: Politics and the Birth of the Military Establishment, 1783-1795 (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Wisconsin, 1968), pp. 277-281.

[8] Knox to Wilkinson, Feb. 11, 1792, July 17, 1792, James Wilkinson Papers, I, pp. 10, 15, Chicago Historical Society; Wayne to Wilkinson, Nov. 18, 1792, Anthony Wayne Papers, XXIII, p. 38, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Wilkinson to Knox, Nov. 3, 1792, James Wilkinson Letters, Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort.

[9] Wilkinson to Wayne, Nov. 13, 1792, Wayne Papers, XXIII, p. 9, Hist. Soc. Pa.; Wilkinson to Wayne, Sept. 12, 1792, Anthony Wayne Papers, William L. Clements Library, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Knox to Wayne, Jan. 19, 1793, Richard C. Knopf, ed., *Anthony Wayne . . . . : The Wayne-Knox-Pickering-McHenry Correspondence* (Pittsburgh, 1960), p. 175.

[10] Wilkinson to Harry Innes, Oct. 18, 1792, Jan. 5, 1793, May 18, 1793, June 29, 1793, Aug. 20, 1793, Oct. 3, 1793, Innes Papers, XXXIII (part 1), p. 5226, (part 2), pp. 5246, 5249, 5262-5263, 5268-5269, 5273, Lib. of Cong.; Wilkinson to Isaac Shelby, Apr. 11, 1793, June 24, 1793, Shelby Family Papers, II, pp. 854-855, 874-875, Lib. of Cong.; Wilkinson to Shelby, June 21, 1793, Shelby Family Papers, University of Kentucky Library, Lexington; Wilkinson to Edward Hand, Aug. 20, 1792, Emmet Collection, #4381, New York Public Library, New York City; Wilkinson to John Brown, Aug. 17, 1792, Wilkinson Letters, Ky. Hist. Soc.

[11] Wilkinson to John Armstrong, May 24, 1792, Armstrong, Jr. Papers, Ind. Hist. Soc.

[12] See the correspondence between Armstrong, and Wayne and Wilkinson, Oct. 1792 through Apr. 1793, and especially Armstrong to Wayne, Mar. 23, 1793, all in the Armstrong, Jr. Papers, Ind. Hist. Soc. Also see the *Centinel of the North-Western Territory* (Cincinnati), Aug. 30, 1794.

[13] Wilkinson to Innes, June 14, 1793, Innes Papers, XXXIII (part 2), p. 5255, Lib. of Cong.

[14] John Preston to Francis Preston, Aug. 8, 1793, Preston Papers, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.

[15] Lt. Campbell Smith to O. H. Williams, Nov. 16, 1793, Otho H. Williams Papers, box 8, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore.

[16] Maj. Thomas Cushing to Jeremiah Wadsworth, Mar. 15, 1794, Joseph Trumbull Papers, I, p. 22, Connecticut State Library, Hartford. Also see Cushing to Capt. John Pratt, Nov. 2, 1793, Jan. 13, 1794, John Pratt Collection, Conn. State Lib.

[17] Lt. Campbell Smith to O. H. Williams, Nov. 16, 1793, Williams Papers, box 8, Md. Hist. Soc.; Wayne to Knox, Nov. 15, 1793, Henry Knox Papers XXXIV, p. 149, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

[18] Armstrong to _____, n.d. [1793], Armstrong, Jr. Papers, Ind. Hist. Soc.

[19] Diary of Dr. John Carmichael (transcript), Sept. 12, 1795, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus; diary of Dr. Joseph G. Andrews, Nov. 12, 1795, Peter Force Collection, Lib. of Cong.

[20] One example of Wayne's treatment of his officers was an incident in 1795, when the general exiled an army doctor to Fort Jefferson for a minor indiscretion. See the diary of Dr. John Carmichael (transcript), July 22, 1795, Ohio Hist. Soc.

[21] Erskurius Beatty to Capt. John Armstrong, Jan. 5, 1793, Armstrong, Jr. Papers, Ind. Hist. Soc.

[22] *Idem;* Caleb Swan to Armstrong, Feb. 6, 1793, *Ibid.*

[23] Wilkinson arrested Armstrong without any warning just as Armstrong was leaving on furlough. Until the arrest Wilkinson had been friendly and helpful to the captain. During the proceedings, Wilkinson did not allow Armstrong to challenge members of the court or to delay the proceedings until his witnesses could appear. See Armstrong to Wayne, Feb. 18, 1793, Mar. 1, 1793, Mar. 23, 1793, *Ibid.*

[24] Wayne to Knox, Oct. 23, 1793, May 30, 1794, Knopf, ed., *Wayne Correspondence*, pp. 278-279, 334-335; Wayne to Knox, Nov. 15, 1793, Knox Papers, XXXIV, p. 149, Mass. Hist. Soc.

[25] *Centinel of the North-Western Territory* (Cincinnati), Apr. 12, 1794, May 17, 1794, June 7, 1794, June 14, 1794; Armstrong to Wayne, June 8, 1794 Miscellaneous Collection, Ohio Hist. Soc.

[26] "Stubborn Facts," *Gazette of the United States* (Phila.), June 25, 1794.

[27] New York *Minerva*, July 23, 1794; Armstrong to Wayne, June 8, 1794, Misc. Collection, Ohio Hist. Soc.; Wayne to Knox, Jan. 25, 1795, Wayne Papers, Clements Lib.

[28] Knox to Wilkinson, July 12, 1794, Knox Papers, XXXV, p. 165, Mass. Hist. Soc.; Wilkinson to Wayne, June 8, 1794, Simon Gratz Collection, Hist. Soc. Pa.

[29] Knox to Wilkinson, July 12, 1794, Knox Papers, XXXV, p. 165, Mass. Hist. Soc.

[30] Washington to Edmund Randolph, Oct. 6, 1794, Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of Washington*, XXXIII, p. 521. Charles Scott, who commanded the Kentucky volunteers during the campaign, told Knox that Wayne's leadership had been excellent. See Scott to Knox, Apr. 30, 1794, Charles Scott Papers, Univ. of Ky. Lib. For the administration's rebuttal, which included extracts from Scott's letters, see "A Friend to Truth," *Gazette of the United States* (Phila.), July 19, 1794.

[31] See the diary in the John Pratt Collection, Conn. State Lib. The author of the diary is unknown, but some of it appears to be in Wilkinson's handwriting. And parts of Wilkinson's letter to John Brown (Aug. 28, 1794, M. M. Quaife, ed., "General Wilkinson's Narrative of the Fallen Timbers Campaign," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XVI [1929], 81-90) were obviously copied from the diary.

[32] Wilkinson to Brown, Aug. 28, 1794, *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, XVI (1929), pp. 81-90; Wilkinson to Brown, n.d. [after Aug. 1794], Wilkinson Letters, Univ. of Ky. Lib.; Wilkinson to Harry Innes, Oct. 13, 1794, No. 10, 1794, Innes Papers, XXIII, pp. 5211-5212, 5213-5214, Lib. of Cong. Wilkinson to Jeremiah Wadsworth, box 141, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford.

[33] Wilkinson to Innes, Nov. 10, 1794, Innes Papers, XXIII, pp. 5213-5214, Lib. of Cong.

[34] Knox to Wayne, Dec. 5, 1794, Knopf, ed., *Wayne Correspondence*, p. 364; Knox to Wilkinson, Dec. 4, 1794, Dec. 5, 1794, Innes Papers XXIII, pp. 5317-5318, XXXIII (part 2), pp. 5319-5320.

[35] Wayne to Knox, Jan. 21, 1795, Jan. 25, 1795, Wayne Papers, Clements Lib. See also Wayne to Capt. Henry De Butts, Jan. 29, 1795, Wayne Papers XXXIX, p. 37, Hist. Soc. Pa.

[36] Diary of Dr. John Carmichael (transcript), Sept. 12, 1795, Ohio Hist. Soc.

[37] Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, pp. 146-152.

[38] There is almost no evidence about Wilkinson's activities in 1795, but by early 1796 he was in close communication with Speaker of the House Jonathan Dayton and congressman Josiah Parker. See Dayton to Wilkinson, Apr. 15, 1796, Parker to Wilkinson, May 21, 1796, Wilkinson Papers, I, pp. 49, 62, Chicago Hist. Soc.; Wilkinson to Capt. William Henry Harrison, Apr. 2, 1796, William Henry Harrison Papers, 1st ser., I, pp. 35-36, Lib. of Cong. Wilkinson also used Senator John Brown, his old Kentucky colleague. Several of Wilkinson's men had contacts in Congress. Harrison, for example, was the son-in-law of John Cleves Symmes, who had intimate connections with New Jersey politicians. Campbell Smith was related to congressman William Smith (Md.). And Wilkinson used every contact he could, even if the politician was a Federalist. See Maj. Thomas Cushing to Dwight Foster, Nov. 17, 1796, Mellen Chamberlain Collection, Boston Public Library.

[39] For his letters after Fallen Timbers, see note 32, *supra*. In the letter to Brown (Aug. 28, 1794), Wilkinson claimed that 1500 mounted volunteers in 30 days could have accomplished the same results as the whole army. For some of his earlier statements, see Wilkinson to Winthrop Sargent, Aug. 26, 1791, Frederick S. Allis, Jr. and Roy Bartolomei, eds., *The Winthrop Sargent Papers* (microfilm ed., Boston, 1965), reel 3; Wilkinson to Wayne, July 12, 1792, Wayne Papers, Clements Lib.; Wilkinson to Edward Hand, Aug. 20, 1792, Emmet Collection, #4381, N.Y. Pub. Lib.

[40] Joseph Gales and W. W. Seaton, *The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States* (Washington, 1834-1856), V, pp. 151-154, 241, 905-913, 1025, 1264, 1281, 1293, VI, pp. 2926-2931; Timothy Pickering to the Committee on the Military Establishment, Feb. 3, 1796, James McHenry to the Committee, enclosed in McHenry to Abraham Baldwin, Mar. 14, 1796, Baldwin committee report, Mar. 25, 1796, Walter Lowrie and Matthew Clark, eds., *American State Papers* . . . (Washington, 1832-1861), Military Affairs, I, pp. 112-115.

[41] Chauncey Goodrich to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., May 20, 1796, Oliver Wolcott, Sr. Papers, IV, p. 71, Conn. Hist. Soc.

[42] *Annals of Congress*, V, pp. 1418-1423, 1428-1430.

[43] "The Truth," *Aurora* (Phila.), May 19, 1796; "Perseverance" [Maj. Thomas Cushing] to Wilkinson, June 4, 1796, Wilkinson Papers, I, p. 67, Chicago Hist. Soc.

[44] *Annals of Congress*, V, pp. 102, 103, 105, 110, 111, 1418-1423, 1428-1430, 1462, VI, pp. 2926-2931; Wilkinson to Isaac Shelby, June 16, 1796, Isaac Shelby Papers, The Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.

[45] Wilkinson to Maj. William Winston, Apr. 22, 1796, Isaac Joslin Cox, ed., "Selections from the Torrence Papers, V," *Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, IV (1909), p. 95.

[46] *Idem*.

[47] Wilkinson to Innes, Apr. 16, 1796, Innes Papers, XXXIII (part 2), p. 5374, Lib. of Cong.; James McHenry to Wayne, July 9, 1796, Knopf, ed., *Wayne Correspondence*, p. 498.

[48] Washington to James McHenry, July 1, 1796, Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of Washington*, XXXV, pp. 108-109; McHenry to Pickering, July 5, 1796, James McHenry Papers, box 2, Clements Lib.; McHenry to William Vans Murray, July 16, 1796, Chamberlain Collection, Boston Pub. Lib.

[49] Wilkinson to Innes, Sept. 4, 1796, Innes Papers, XXXIII (part 2), p. 5379, Lib. of Cong.

[50] Capt. Thomas Lewis to Wayne, Dec. 2, 1796, Northwest Territory Collection, Ind. Hist. Soc.

[51] Charles Lee, opinion, Nov. 22, 1796, James McHenry Papers, 2nd ser., III, pp. 635-638, Lib. of Cong.

[52] *Annals of Congress*, VI, pp. 1966-1969.

[53] Wayne to Capt. Henry De Butts, Jan. 29, 1795, Wayne Papers, XXXIX, p. 37, Hist. Soc. Pa.