

Slavery, Civilians, and Guerrilla Warfare in Kentucky's Bluegrass Region

J. Michael Rhyne, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Urbana University

Governor Thomas Bramlette and his allies in the Kentucky state legislature repeatedly petitioned for cooperation from Washington, both in the form of payment for public and private reparation claims resulting from Morgan's raids and in the form of support for raising a large state militia to defend against any further such raids. Additionally, Bramlette personally asked for Stephen G. Burbridge, a brash thirty-two year old Scott County slaveholder who had proven himself a capable field officer, to be appointed as commander of the Military District of Kentucky. But by September of 1864, no payment of claims was forthcoming, and he had lived to regret his endorsement of Burbridge.¹ In a strident letter to President Lincoln, he laid out his principle complaints, and in so doing alienated himself from both Burbridge and the Lincoln administration for the rest of the war. Above all, he challenged the administration's role in shifting the Civil War from a fight to restore the Union to a war to end slavery:

We are for the restoration of our Government throughout our entire limits regardless of what may happen to the negro. We reject as spurious, the Unionism of all who make the Status of the negro a sine qua non to peace and unity. We are not willing to imperil the life liberty and happiness of our own race and people for the freedom or slavery of the negro. To permit the question of the freedom or slavery of the negro, to obstruct the restoration of National authority and unity is a blood stained sin. Those whose sons are involved in this strife demand, as they have the right to do, that the negro be ignored in all questions of settlement, and not make his condition-whether it shall be free or slave, an obstacle to the restoration of national unity & peace. Such are the sentiments of the loyal masses of Kentucky. Why therefore are unequal burdens laid upon the people of Kentucky?²

Numerous of Bramlette's constituents chafed under both martial law and tight regulations on commerce imposed by federal agents, collectors, and boards of trade. Further, many "loyal"

Unionists became increasingly frustrated with federal policy regarding the status of Kentucky slaves. Following on the heels of the Second Confiscation Act, President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, although it did not apply directly to Kentucky, set a precedent for federal interference with slavery. Either believing that Lincoln, in the form of federal troops stationed throughout the Commonwealth, was trying to liberate them, or perhaps simply looking to take advantage of a new opportunity to free themselves, growing numbers of slaves flocked to Union lines, particularly to camps throughout the Bluegrass Region. Though some commanders rigorously turned them away, others welcomed any and all, and defiantly vowed not to return them to slavery, regardless of the loyalty of their legal owners.³ Indeed, some federal officers, particularly those from states to the north and northwest of the Ohio, seemed to believe that the liberation of slaves was a major component of their mission in Kentucky, a state at least some of them deemed part and parcel to the South.⁴

Both slave owners and slave hunters followed regiments from Michigan, Illinois, and elsewhere, trying to regain their property even as the troops sought to shield known runaways both from civilians and local authorities.⁵ To the further ire of Bluegrass slaveholders, in August 1863, the commander of the Military District of Kentucky called for six thousand slave laborers to be requisitioned, or "impressed", from the counties of Bourbon, Boyle, Clarke, Fayette, Garrard, Harrison, Jessamine, Lincoln, Marion, Mercer, Nelson, Scott, Washington, and Woodford, within which the federal army was building or improving railroads with the long-term goal of establishing a continuous rail line from the shore of northern Kentucky to Knoxville. These slaves, all male from age sixteen to age forty-five, were to make their way to Camp Nelson, and from there they would be organized into work gangs for this massive road project, with pay minus expenses going back to their owners. As the project got underway, slaveholders

protested, both actively and passively. Quotas invariably came up far short of military expectations as masters refused to contribute their male slaves. Additionally, the nature of the construction project changed, and most impressed slaves were diverted either to work on wagon roads in the same area or to serve as teamsters. In the resulting confusion, particularly regarding the status of teamsters who had been removed all the way to Tennessee, some slaves were even mistaken as free black wage laborers and thus personally received their pay.⁶

When the federal government began recruiting black troops in 1863, Kentucky received an exemption, a clear sign of the government's desire to retain the loyalty of Unionist slaveholders. Initially, many slaves in southern and western Kentucky simply ran away to Tennessee to join the ranks of the USCT, while some slaves from central and northern Kentucky made their way across the Ohio to enlist in Ohio and Indiana. Though Kentucky slaveholders and their political allies vigorously protested, recruiting officers in neighboring states appear to have ignored them. Additionally, some white Kentuckians, especially non-slaveholders without the means to buy their way out of the draft, looked favorably on black enlistment as a way to fill the state's quota. Even as pressure built within the state to allow recruitment of Kentucky slaves, Bramlette and other prominent Kentuckians, including Colonel Frank Wolford, remained vehemently opposed. In March 1864, Congress, not of a mood to continue handling Kentucky slaveholders with kid gloves, simply amended the Enrollment Act to include slaves in the draft, thus clearing the way for full-scale recruitment in the Commonwealth.⁷

Initially, recruitment focused on western Kentucky, where slaves were enlisted for artillery regiments slated for garrison duty in key river forts in the Mississippi Valley. But in April 1864, General Burbridge reluctantly opened the door to slave recruitment throughout the Commonwealth. White Kentuckians had not been forthcoming in sufficient numbers to fill

quotas, and so Kentucky's district commander sought to make up the difference with a carefully controlled enlistment process for black soldiers. He attempted to appease slaveholders by decreeing that only free blacks and those slaves who had permission from their masters would be accepted at recruiting stations. Slaves who showed up without proof of permission would be sent back home, ostensibly to obtain it. All black enlistees would count toward county quotas, as well, a happy note for the numerous white Kentuckians who by 1864 wanted no part of Lincoln's war. Further, assistant provost marshals would oversee the process to make sure that Kentucky slaveholders had no cause for complaint and were duly compensated for the slaves they allowed to enlist. Finally, all new black recruits would quickly be removed from the state for equipping and training, thus sparing white Kentuckians the terrible sight of armed black men marching through their communities and thus encouraging still more slaves to join their ranks.⁸

In May, many runaway slaves who attempted to enlist were returned to their masters because they did not have adequate proof of permission to join the army. A provost marshal stationed in Lebanon, Marion County, reported that a group of some seventeen African Americans were turned away from the recruiting office in that town for not having permission. Given passes to assure their safe passage back to their farms, they nonetheless came under attack by a mob of local citizens who "seized them and whipped them most unmercifully with cow-hides." Similarly, reports from Nelson and Spencer counties stated that some African Americans had been severely beaten and a few killed for trying to enlist. Finally, the provost marshal reported that even ostensibly loyal Kentucky troops, namely the 13th Kentucky Cavalry, had openly opposed efforts to recruit black soldiers. At one point, this provost marshal actually came under fire from a would-be assassin, a portent of things to come in the southern Bluegrass. He concluded that "the treatment of the slaves in Ky, during the summer of 1864, the indignities

offered the executors of the law of the land; the denunciations of the President and the machination of slave holders for the benefit of treason during the same time, admirably exemplified the barbarities of slavery.”⁹

For his part, Burbridge quickly amended his policy and by June 1864 virtually any young male slave who reached a recruiting station received a warm welcome. While many Kentuckians still remember Burbridge as a dictatorial, cold-blooded brute, in reality he was an unconditional Unionist who did everything in his power to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, as did a number of other loyal Kentuckians. Although he attempted to protect slavery, he became enraged at what he considered disloyal behavior on the part of numerous slaveholders. Additionally, he recognized the vast untapped military resource embodied in Kentucky’s slave population, a resource that would allow him to protect his native state from the draft and thereby preserve at least a semblance of peace in his district. By late summer, approximately 14,000 African Americans had enlisted under Burbridge’s more lenient policy. By war’s end, that number would swell to nearly 24,000.¹⁰ As recruiting for black troops hit full stride, the guerrilla war in Kentucky escalated, suggesting a causal relationship between the two. By this stage of the war, many guerrillas in the Bluegrass had little real connection to the Confederacy, other than a common hatred and bitterness toward the federal government. These guerrillas, by all appearances, also possessed an abiding hatred of unconditional, and unapologetic, Unionists, whom they blamed for remaining loyal to the Union even as it waged war on the institution of slavery. Finally, some embittered proslavery Unionists no doubt tacitly, and in some cases actively, supported these guerrillas in their campaign, sharing with them a common ideology.¹¹

At this point, according to one historian, “differences between regular forces, partisan rangers, guerrillas, and civil resistance melded,” and thus “broke down finely constructed legal

walls.” Indeed, in 1865 two prominent Morgan lieutenants, Jerome Clarke and Henry C. Magruder, would be hanged in Louisville for their actions as guerrilla leaders, including numerous murders of African Americans, both armed and unarmed, committed by their men in 1864 and 1865. Such was the bitterness surrounding this irregular conflict that even legitimate units such as the 10th Kentucky Cavalry (CSA) came to be considered as part of a class of outlaws subject to the severe consequences outlined in “Lieber’s Code,” specifically Sections IV and V on partisans and spies. Most raiders and guerrillas, if caught, could be deemed spies and summarily executed along with any non-combatants rendering them aid or comfort. Property could be seized, suspected collaborators arrested, and, on occasion, prisoners executed in reprisal for guerrilla depredations, particularly the murder of Unionists. As commander of the Military District of Kentucky from February 1864 to February 1865, Burbridge was on occasion ruthless in his application of this federal policy, though he proved utterly ineffective at properly coordinating his command and making an end to the costly guerrilla war.¹²

Despite their shortcomings, federal authorities sometimes took fairly radical steps in their efforts to combat guerrillas, including formation of mounted units of Colored Troops. At Camp Nelson, the 5th United States Colored Cavalry Regiment was organized for the express purpose of helping bring these guerrilla bands to ground, and its companies would now become more active in recruiting, as well. These units, like anti-guerrilla Home Guard units, would have to rely on requisitioning for their horses. Military requisitioning was an absolute necessity, but some federal authorities and many practitioners perceived it as a means by which to punish suspected Confederate sympathizers. Policy called for receipts to be written, so that Kentuckians who remained loyal to the Union could be reimbursed for their horses at war’s end. Despite General Burbridge’s efforts to police the practice, requisitioning became bitterly contested.¹³

Many Kentuckians cherished their horses, and it mattered little even to the most loyal owners that they stood to receive what the military deemed fair compensation for their pets at war's end. Besides, "loyalty" among Kentuckians was more a matter of opinion and perception than a discernable fact, as is illustrated by the siblings of the Bullitt family. One of Kentucky's oldest families, the Bullitts had owned Oxmoor, a sprawling farm in Jefferson County, since 1787, and they owned another farm down in Henderson County, as well as property in Louisville. Thomas W. Bullitt, like numerous scions of prominent Kentucky families, had chosen to fight for the Confederacy. He served as a captain under John Hunt Morgan, but he had been captured and imprisoned, first in Columbus, Ohio, then in 1864 in the officers' prison at Fort Delaware, on the eastern seaboard. His brother Joshua, chief justice of the Kentucky court of appeals and a Unionist Democrat, remained in Louisville, but in 1864 he ran afoul of federal authorities for his alleged connection to a group called the "Sons of Liberty" that supposedly was plotting against the Union. His greatest crime may have been his strong stance as a Peace Democrat, but nonetheless Burbridge had him arrested and banished to the Confederacy. He managed to return to Louisville in late 1864, only to be forced by an irate Burbridge to flee to Canada for the duration of the war. Their sister Sue, a self-proclaimed "good Union" person, described her dilemma in trying to protect her beloved horses: "You would laugh to see me hiding them one week from the Federals, & the next from the guerillas." She urged Thomas "to proclaim to all rebeldom that they must be saved. I would give up every possession I have sooner than my bays." She also wrote of a boy in her household who had commented that he was glad he was a boy and not a horse, only to realize in horror that someday he might be drafted. Dixon reportedly had no other complaints with federal authorities, even when two hundred "negro troops" were quartered in her community.¹⁴

In spite of pervasive guerrilla raiding, and no doubt in a few cases in order to insure its continuation, many Bluegrass residents protested mightily against the federal levies of horses and mules. Further, they were outraged by retributive executions of prisoners, a tactic employed by General Burbridge and supported by United States Provost Marshal Joseph Holt, also a native Kentuckian. For example, on July 27, 1864, Captain J. E. Merritt was ordered by the Provost Marshal's Office to procure two coffins, proceed with two prisoners, G. Wooten and William Woods, to the vicinity of Georgetown, and execute them by firing squad in retaliation for the murder of a man named Robinson in that Scott County community. Holt, in a letter to Secretary of War Stanton, argued that such executions "cannot fail to produce the happiest effect in mitigating these atrocities." Additionally, when Burbridge wrote the proposal for organization of the 5th and 6th Colored Cavalry with mounts secured from known Confederate sympathizers, Holt happily endorsed it. According to the Provost Marshal, "These regiments, composed of men almost raised, as it were, on horseback, of uncompromising loyalty, and having an intimate knowledge of the topography of the country, would prove a powerful instrumentality in ridding the State of those guerrilla bands of robbers and murderers which now infest and oppress almost every part of it." Unfortunately, the raising of such regiments only exacerbated the problem.¹⁵

General Burbridge failed to maintain some semblance of control over both the hiring and enlisting of Kentucky slaves. At the same time, he continued to prove unsuccessful in combating the roving bands of guerrillas that plagued the Commonwealth. On October 14, the *Paris Western Citizen* reported an attack on the vital Kentucky Central Railroad in which guerrillas led by Pete Everett tore up track and then stopped, robbed, and destroyed the morning train bound south from Covington to Lexington. H. H. Haviland of Harrison County corroborated the paper's account of Everett's attack in a letter to his sweetheart, and he also noted, "the Guerrillas

are keeping us in a perfect boil of excitement.” Haviland, his brother, and numerous other citizens of Havilandsville were robbed “very politely,” as was the local general store. Additionally, he reported that virtually every male slave in the community had already enlisted in the USCT. Harrison County, with well over three thousand slaves in 1860, listed over six hundred enslaved men between the ages of fifteen and forty. Perhaps Pete Everett was exacting some revenge on this community for letting so many of those men go off to join the USCT.¹⁶

More sinister were the growing numbers of murders committed by guerrillas and the district commander’s response to them. On October 26, Burbridge ordered, “Hereafter no guerrillas will be received as prisoners.” This was in effect license to kill any and all guerrillas who dared surface in his district. Those already captive also faced an uncertain future. On October 28, he ordered eight guerrilla prisoners to be executed, four in Henry County and four in Franklin County, in retaliation for the murders of a known Unionist and two “unarmed negroes”, respectively, in those counties. On November 2, he ordered four guerrilla prisoners “to be shot nine miles from Bardstown, Ky., in retaliation for the murder of “two negroes,” and four to be shot at Midway, Woodford County, in retaliation for the murder of a Unionist there. By late 1864, such tactics had generated an even more pervasive anti-Union backlash in the Bluegrass, the brunt of which would be felt by the victims of guerrillas and vindictive slaveholders alike.¹⁷

On December 9, the editor of the *Western Citizen* wrote that a band of guerrillas had attacked two freight trains on the Frankfort and Louisville Railroad. Aside from destroying some rolling stock, the guerrillas attacked a recruiting officer and some twenty black recruits, killing fifteen. The editor also noted the murder of a lieutenant colonel of the Home Guard in Washington County, apparently in reprisal for the executions of several fellow guerrillas, as ordered by General Burbridge.¹⁸ This county appears to have been all but besieged in late 1864,

as J. A. Morrison of the 13th Kentucky Cavalry (US) reported: “The guerrillas are around here in several squads committing atrocious deeds of murder of citizens and soldiers. Thirteen citizens were murdered yesterday in the vicinity of Springfield.” Other reports indicated that these squads had also cut telegraph wires and otherwise disrupted lines of communication in the area. By all appearances, the guerrilla war was reaching a fever pitch as 1864 came to a close.¹⁹

Throughout the winter of 1865, guerrillas, including the so-called “girl guerrilla,” ravaged the Bluegrass. Looking feminine enough to be mistaken for a woman by some eye witnesses, Jerome Clarke had served as one of John Hunt Morgan’s lieutenants during the summer of 1864, after which he chose to stay in Kentucky as leader of his own guerrilla band. As Louisville *Journal* editor George D. Prentice’s Sue Mundy, he quickly gained infamy for his brazenness and brutality. On January 25, the editor of the *Journal* reported that Mundy’s band had attacked and scattered a herd of federal cattle near La Grange, in Oldham County, killing some thirty-five black enlisted men serving as drovers and guards, an incident for which two companies of the 12th Kentucky were dispatched to the area. Within six weeks Clarke would find himself standing on the gallows in Louisville, where he reportedly called himself “a regular Confederate soldier” who had captured “many Federal prisoners and have always treated them kindly.” His statement notwithstanding, during that January raid men under his command certainly took no black prisoners. All told, since mid-1864 Kentucky guerrillas had butchered dozens of black enlistees and recruits in similar fashion.²⁰ Kentucky’s guerrilla hunters imposed their own version of justice when provided an opportunity. A few days after the La Grange raid, a guerrilla captain, “the notorious Dick Taylor, who was the leader of the gang that killed the negroes a few days since below Simpsonville [Anderson County]” was killed in a savage fight with a Home Guardsman that ended in a clash of bowie knives.²¹

Black soldiers and recruits seldom received quarter from guerrillas, and numerous white Unionists were assassinated. Additionally, several reports mention captured guerrillas who were shot while trying to escape, likely meaning they were removed from public view and summarily executed by their captors. Burbridge had sanctioned such actions, issuing orders that clearly exempted guerrillas from the usual protection accorded to legitimate Confederate prisoners of war. In early February, guerillas in separate raids burned two Bluegrass train depots, robbing citizens in the process, and had federal authorities scrambling to hunt them down.²² Yet Burbridge saw fit to issue still another order for all state troops to be disbanded. Governor Bramlette had at this point had enough, railing in a telegram to Stanton against the “unwarranted assumption of power by an imbecile commander,” a move he believed had been initiated by “those who have long sought to provoke an issue with the State, and which I have prevented.” Burbridge had finally gone too far for the Lincoln administration, and so he received a hasty rebuke from Secretary of War Stanton, followed by orders effectively relieving him of command of the Military District of Kentucky by reorganizing it out from under him. Although some Unionists in Kentucky begged him to retain Burbridge, Lincoln named John M. Palmer of Illinois as commander over what would now be called the Military Department of Kentucky.²³

Both Thomas Bramlette and D. W. Lindsey, who had never really been able to establish a legitimate State Guard, deserved some of the blame for the turbulent state of affairs in the Commonwealth, along with the commander of the District of Kentucky. Still, the Home Guard had a few excellent companies of guerrilla hunters, and though Burbridge utilized that valuable asset from time to time, he failed to support efforts that might have resulted in a more coordinated defense of the state. His superiors concluded that, apart from being stubborn almost to the point of insubordination, he had been a poor manager of his military assets. Indeed, when

Palmer took over, inspection reports revealed that Burbridge's command was "in a disorganized and undisciplined condition, very much scattered, and so distributed as to be of little service, either to maintain domestic peace or afford security against the rebel military forces."²⁴ As Bramlette suggested, Burbridge seems to have been more intent on picking fights with leading Unionist Democrats, including the governor, than working with them to resolve internal conflicts. Palmer, a former Democrat who like Lincoln was a Kentucky-born, Illinois raised Republican lawyer, would have his own run-ins with the Bramlette administration.

The change in command in Kentucky certainly did not bring immediate relief for the families of soldiers of the USCT. Apart from risks and hardships suffered by refugees and soldiers, women who remained enslaved when their husbands enlisted often paid a heavy price at the hands of vindictive Bluegrass slaveholders. Patsey Leach's husband, Julius, enlisted in the fall of 1864 and became a member of the 5th USC Cavalry. Though he did not own Julius, Patsey's master nonetheless took his frustration out on her. On one occasion he beat her with a cowhide for "looking at them darned Nigger Soldiers", a reference to the fact that she had watched a company of Colored Troops march past her master's Woodford County home. Her husband, who had belonged to a Scott County resident, was killed in action at Saltville soon thereafter, and once again Patsey's master turned on her, whipping her on several occasions while expressing his hope "that the last one of the nigger soldiers would be Killed." Fearing for her life, Patsey finally took the youngest of her five children and ran away to Lexington, seeking to escape the man she called "a Rebel Sympathizer."²⁵ Whether true Rebel or disaffected Unionist. Patsey's master exemplified Kentucky slaveholders' violent resistance to federal wartime policy, particularly regarding recruitment of slaves for the USCT.

ENDNOTES

¹ Kyle S. Sinisi, *Sacred Debts: State Civil War Claims and American Federalism, 1861-1880* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 92-96, E. Merton Coulter, *Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky*, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1926), 194-196; Stephen I. Rockenbach, “‘War Upon Our Border’: War and Society in Two Ohio Valley Communities, 1861-1865” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 2005), 178-182.

² Thomas E. Bramlette to Abraham Lincoln, September 3, 1864, Letters Received Irregular, Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107 (hereinafter cited as RG 107) (National Archives, Washington, D.C.), reprinted with annotation in Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Thavolia Glymph, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series I, Volume I, The Destruction of Slavery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 604-606.

³ Marion B. Lucas, *A History of Blacks in Kentucky, Volume 1: From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891* (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1992), 151.

⁴ Christopher Phillips, “‘The Chrysalis State’: Slavery, Confederate Identity, and the Creation of the Border South,” in *Inside the Confederate Nation: Essays in Honor of Emory M. Thomas*, edited by Lesley J. Gordon and John C. Inscoe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 153.

⁵ Victor B. Howard, *Black Liberation in Kentucky: Emancipation and Freedom, 1862-1884* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 25-27, 43-44.

⁶ General Orders No. 41, Head Quarters, District of Kentucky, August 10, 1863, General Orders Issued, Entry 2177, District of Kentucky, RG 393; J. L. Donaldson to T. S. Bowers, March 9, 1864, Letters Received, RG 107, both reprinted with annotation in Berlin, et al, eds. *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series I, Volume I, The Destruction of Slavery*, 585-587; 596-598, respectively.

⁷ Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie Rowland, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 191-192; Coulter, *Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky*, 199-200; Howard, *Black Liberation in Kentucky*, 47-63.

⁸ General Orders No. 34, April 18, 1864, Headquarters, District of Kentucky, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols. in 128, Washington, D.C., 1880-1901) (hereinafter cited as *OR*) Series III, Vol. IV, 233-234; Berlin, et al, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience*, 193.

⁹ Captain James M. Fidler, historical report, enclosed in James M. Fidler to W. H. Sidell, June 15, 1865, Kentucky 4th District, Historical Reports, Entry 50, Provost Marshal General Central Office, RG 110 [roll 68], reprinted with annotation in Berlin, et al, eds., *Freedom: A*

Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience, 256-259.

¹⁰ Berlin, et al, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience*, 193, 197; Ira Berlin, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series I, Volume II, The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 629-636; Lucas, *A History of Blacks in Kentucky, Vol. I*, 152-160.

¹¹ This interpretation is strongly influenced by the provocative T. J. Stiles, *Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002); as well as Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Stiles argues that many Missouri guerrillas were adamantly proslavery and therefore just as ideologically motivated as partisan rangers or Confederate regulars. Fellman focuses on a specific class of Missouri guerrillas and notes their justification of brutality toward white male enemies as well as persons of color, male and female, while at the same time maintaining an air of civility and politeness, particularly toward white women. The arguments of both Stiles and Fellman seem highly applicable to a great many of Kentucky's guerrillas, particularly by 1864.

¹² B. Franklin Cooling, "A People's War: Partisan Conflict in Tennessee and Kentucky," in Daniel E. Sutherland, ed., *Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999), 123, 128-129; General Orders No. 100, April 24, 1863, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, *The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols. in 128, Washington, D.C., 1880-1901) (hereinafter cited as *OR*), Series III, Vol. III, 148-164; Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 112; James B. Martin, "Black Flag over the Bluegrass: Guerrilla Warfare in Kentucky, 1863-1865," *The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 86, 4 (Autumn 1988), 368-370. Martin attempts to separate the actions of partisan rangers and war-rebels from the worst guerrilla and outlaw depredations. See also Robert Russell Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 7-9, for an attempt to differentiate between "irregular warfare" in which legitimate, ideologically motivated Confederate units employed guerrilla tactics, and outright guerrilla warfare with accompanying banditry, pillaging, and murder.

¹³ Edwin M. Stanton to Stephen G. Burbridge, July 28, 1864, *OR*, Series III, Vo. IV, 557; General Orders No. 3, September 13, 1864, Headquarters, Military District of Kentucky, both in *OR* Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 2, 375.

¹⁴ Sue B. Dixon to Thomas W. Bullitt, May 9, July 6, November 9, 1864, and January 22, 1865, Bullitt Family Papers [Filson Historical Society, Louisville (hereinafter cited as FHS)]; Coulter, *Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky*, 185, 390-392. See also "Report of the Judge Advocate General on the 'Order of American Knights' or 'Sons of Liberty.' A Western Conspiracy in Aid of the Southern Rebellion," Bullitt Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁵ George Hamilton to J. E. Merritt, July 27, 1864; Joseph Holt to Edwin M. Stanton, July 28, (quote), and Joseph Holt to Edwin M. Stanton, July 31, 1864, all in *OR*, Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 2, 206-207, 208, 212-215; *Coulter, Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky*, 230-234; Lowell H. Harrison, *The Civil War in Kentucky* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), 76-78.

¹⁶ *Paris Western Citizen*, October 14, 21, 28, 1864; H. H. Haviland to Sue T. Scrogin, October 20, 1864, Scrogin/Haviland Collection [Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort (hereinafter cited as KHS)].

¹⁷ General Orders No. 8, October 26, 1864, Headquarters, Military District of Kentucky; J. Bates Dickson to N. C. McLean, October 28 and November 2, 1864, *OR* Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 2, 457, 491, 612, respectively.

¹⁸ *Paris Western Citizen*, December 9, 1864.

¹⁹ J. A. Morrison to J. S. Butler, November 28, 1864, *OR* Series I, Vol. XLV, Pt. 1, 1131; Speed S. Fry to J. S. Butler, December 2, 1864; W. L. Gross to Speed S. Fry, December 3, 1864; J. Bates Dickson to Stephen G. Burbridge, December 31, 1864, *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLV, Pt. 2, 28, 41, 454, respectively.

²⁰ J. S. Butler to Colonel Buckley, January 25, 1865; Butler to Speed S. Fry, January 26, 1865, *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 1, 582, 589, respectively; *Louisville Journal*, January 25, March 16, 1865.

²¹ D. W. Lindsey to E. H. Hobson, January 28, 1865, *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 1, 603.

²² Thomas A. Howes to S. B. Brown; Howes to Major Mahoney; February 2, 1865, *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 1, 634-635.

²³ Thomas E. Bramlette to Edwin M. Stanton; Stanton to Stephen G. Burbridge, February 7; Stanton to John M. Palmer, February 8; D. L. Price to Abraham Lincoln, February 11, 1865, all in *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 1, 667, 670-673, 698, respectively.

²⁴ Edwin M. Stanton to John M. Palmer, February 8; General Orders No. 1, February 18, Headquarters, Military Department of Kentucky; Stephen G. Burbridge to W. D. Whipple, February 18, 1865, all in *OR*, Series I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 1, 670-673, 741-742, respectively.

²⁵ Affidavit of Patsey Leach, March 25, 1865, Registered Letters Received, Assistant Commissioner's Office, Entry 3379, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Tennessee, Record Group 105, reprinted with annotation in Berlin, et al, eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience*, 268-269.