

MONOGRAPH

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN SI

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRED W. BUGBEE, INFA

MONOGRAPHS

THE A.E.F. IN SIBERIA

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Lieutenant Colonel Fred W. Bugbee, Infantry

I feel justified in saying that the object and mission of the American Expedition to Siberia was not generally known in the United States. There were also interested misrepresentations as to the expedition. The concealing of the real facts with reference to Siberia is detrimental to the commercial interests of our people. All wars and all expeditions are the results to a greater or less extent of commercial rivalry.

Siberia is an immense undeveloped country. The same reasons that induced us and the various governments to agree to the open door policy in China exists and has for some time existed in Siberia.

The differences that had arisen between nations as to the meaning of the words, phrases and sentences of the open door agreement naturally induced all nations to be cautious in agreeing to any step that might jeopardize their commercial interests in Siberia.

Every nation recognized that Siberia was bound up inextricably with the Far Eastern problem. All nations were anxious as to the effect the collapse of the Russian government in 1917 would have on their commercial interests as well as the outcome of the war.

Some nations undoubtedly hoped that the collapse of the Russian government would give them an opportunity for commercial and territorial expansion in the far east.

If only one nation were to send troops to Siberia to look out for the political and commercial interests of the other allies as well as their own, it would give this nation a great opportunity to secure commercial advantages over other nations. Therefore, it is probable that this caused the various nations to agree to make their action in Siberia a joint operation.

In July 1918 Major General William S. Graves, U. S. Army, then in command of the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, was directed by the War Department to proceed to Kansas City, Mo., for a conference with Mr. Baker, who was then Secretary of War. On arrival at Kansas City, General Graves was informed that he was to take command of an expeditionary force of U. S. troops for service in Siberia. At this time the following instructions, in the form of an Aide Memoire, were given him for his guidance.

"The whole heart of the people of the United States in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the allied governments and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it had no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence that, if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact.

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It is the clear and fixed judgement of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgement, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia

not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profited by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to constitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czech-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czech-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that this is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. But it owes it, to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from Vladivostok. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purpose here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to bear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting, its own activities it is seeking, even by implications, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its Associates.

It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czech-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny".

It will be seen that these instructions are inconsistent with the too prevalent idea that American troops were sent to Siberia to fight Bolshevism.

The mission of the expedition, therefore, was to assist the withdrawal of the Czech-Slovaks from Russia and to guard the military supplies in the vicinity of Vladivostok.

The Japanese statement as given out at the time. was as follows.

needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that this is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. But it owes it, to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from Vladivostok. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purpose here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.

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The Japanese statement as given out at the time, was as follows:

"The Japanese Government being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with their allies in this expedition have decided to proceed at once to disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. In adopting this course they reaffirm their policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects

above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from the Russian territories and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in its phases."

Doubtless announcements were made by the other allied governments.

On August 3rd, 1918, the War Department, by cable, directed the Commanding General of the Philippine Department to send to Vladivostok, Siberia, the 27th and 31st Infantry, one Field Hospital, one Ambulance Company and one signal company provided with equipment "C" and including clothing for winter service or as much of it as was on hand in the Philippine Department.

On July 17th, 1918, General Graves, then in command of the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, received telegraphic orders from the War Department, worded about as follows: "select and hold in readiness 5,000 Infantry, including 48 sergeants and 95 corporals of longest training, from your command, for service in Siberia; the men should be strong, hardy, fit for service intended and represent all parts of the United States. Although this is understood to be a sacrifice on the part of the 8th Division, military necessity demands trained soldiers be sent to fill the regiments from the Philippines to maximum strength as immediate campaigning is in prospect. If movement is ordered you will probably sail to Nagasaki or direct to Vladivostok, troops will therefore need winter outfits".

In addition to the 5,000 enlisted men taken from the 8th Division about 80 line officers of the 8th Division and 20 staff officers, one Field Hospital, one Evacuation Hospital, one Medical Supply Depot, part of a bakery company, Detachment of Q.M.C., and certain additional medical officers, clerks, etc., were assigned to the expedition.

The troops assigned to the expedition from the Philippine Department sailed from Manila, P.I. on August 7th, and 14th, and consisted of 98 officers and 2,916 enlisted men. These troops were landed at Vladivostok on August 15th, 16th, and 22nd, Colonel Styer, 27th Infantry, as ranking officer, assuming the command of the expedition pending the arrival of General Graves. (sailed)

Major General Graves and staff, 36 other officers, and 1889 enlisted men from San Francisco on August 14th and landed at Vladivostok September 2nd. On his arrival, General Graves at once took command of the expedition. Additional replacements were sent shortly afterwards so that by September 29th, 1918, we had a force of a little over 10,000 men in Siberia.

Before going further it is necessary to orient oneself as to the geography of Siberia.

GEOGRAPHY OF SIBERIA

Only such part of the geography of Siberia as is found along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and its branches will be considered in this monograph.

There are two routes to take from Vladivostok to Karamskaya, situated in the Trans-Biakal region. Both routes are the same to Nikol'sk where the road forks, one, the main traveled one, runs across Manchuria, the other (built after the Japanese-Russian War) running north from Nikol'sk and keeping entirely within Russian territory. These two lines which join again at Karamskaya west there is only one line until Omsk is reached, when the Trans-Siberian Railroad again forks.

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GEOGRAPHY OF THE COUNTRY ALONG THE MAIN LINE OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

Siberia being of such great extent naturally there are numerous varieties of terrain. From Vladivostok to Pogranichnaya on the Trans-Siberian Railway (town on border of Siberia and Manchuria) and from Pogranichnaya on Chinese Eastern Railway, to the vicinity of Harbin, a total distance of 483 miles from Vladivostok the region consists of low mountains and hills, a considerable portion of it being forested and except for population and improvements reminds one of the eastern part of the United States. From Harbin west the character of the terrain changes

abruptly, The Chinese Eastern running across the Gobi Desert for about 270 miles where the foothills of the Khingan Mountains come into view and the railroad crosses the mountains at the Khingan loop, altitude 3155 feet. After crossing the Khingan Mountains the country is rolling and sparsely covered with grass until Manchuria Station (on the Siberian-Manchurian border, 1664 miles from Vladivostok) is reached.

From Manchuria Station to the vicinity of Chita (distance of 300 miles from Manchuria Station) the country is still semi-arid, trees beginning to appear again in the vicinity of Chita.

The entire region from Manchuria Station to Irkutsk is called the Trans-Baikal Plateau. From Chita west to Irkutsk the country is very hilly and the mountains steeper with considerable timber. The railroad strikes Lake Baikal near Verkhne-Udensk and follows the shores of the lake practically to Irkutsk. This lake is 400 miles long and from 18 to 56 miles wide. Large pine and fir forests are encountered around the lake.

From Irkutsk (distance from Vladivostok 2,800 miles) to Krasnoyarsk, a distance of 672 miles, the country is still mountainous and hilly and well wooded. At Krasnoyarsk the great Siberian plain begins and settlements begin to get larger and before Novo Nikolayevst is reached the great wheat fields of central Siberia are encountered. The section from Novo Nikolayevst to Omsk is the most populous and important part of Siberia. Distance Omsk to Vladivostok 3706 miles. At Omsk the railroad branches, one line running to Petrograd and the other to Moscow. The plain extends from Omsk to Cheliabinsk and to Ekaterinburg, at the eastern base of the Urals. Ekaterinburg is 558 miles from Omsk and 4264 miles from Vladivostok. Compare this with the distance from San Francisco to New York and you get some idea of distance in Siberia. It should also be borne in mind that this distance is over the shortest route through Manchuria.

If you consider the route via the all Russian route via the Amur Railroad and Ussuri Railroad, instead of through Manchuria, the distance would be 4,824 miles.

On the northern, or all Russian route, the country along the Ussuri Railroad is rolling and wooded as is also that along the Amur River. The river valleys crossed in following the Amur River valley (the road is generally at quite a distance from the river) are marshy and in summer are practically impassible and practically closes the road for traffic during a portion of the summer months.

A coal road runs to the mines at Suchan. This road running from Ugolnaya to Suchan is a 5-foot gauge as far as Kangouz (60 miles) and is a narrow gauge from Kangouz to Suchan (about 20 miles) with several cable stations distributed along the narrow gauge to pull cars over the hills. About 50 miles from Ugolnaya along the railroad on the Suchan end, the country is hilly and rugged, some of the hills being high enough to call mountains.

POPULATION

The population of Siberia is small even along the railroad until the great plains of Siberia are encountered. A considerable number of Mongols and Buriats are encountered in the Trans-Baikal region.

CLIMATE

The climate of Siberia can be compared to that of northern Minnesota except for the Trans-Baikal Plateau. The climate here is extremely cold. However, it is a dry cold and there is very little wind. This is a region of constantly frozen ground as the ground never entirely thaws out. The 27th Infantry at Vladivostok

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RIVERS

The Amur is the only river of southern Siberia that flows into the Pacific Ocean, it forms the boundary line between Manchuria and Russia for several hundred miles and is navigable for river steamers for about 2,000 miles. At Habarovsk one of the longest railway bridges in the world spans the Amur.

The Ussuri joins the Amur at Habarovsk. From Harbin (in Manchuria) the Sungar River flows north and joins the Amur. This river is navigable for river boats from Harbin to its junction with the Amur. Other important rivers in Siberia all flowing north to the Arctic Ocean are the Irtysh, Angora, Yenesei and Obi Rivers, all of which are navigable for river steamers.

WAGON ROADS

Wagon roads, except in the great Siberian plain, are scarce and poor. United States transportation will not track as these roads are used by the Russian telega which has a much narrow tread.

The sincerity and good faith of our government on the Siberian question as shown by the instructions given General Graves cannot be impugned. Nevertheless there is good reason to believe that certain departments in Washington thought that the mission of the A.E.F. in Siberia was to fight the Bolsheviks and assist the reactionary government at Omsk, headed by Admiral Kolchak who, through the help of certain of our allies, was put in power in Siberia with headquarters at Omsk, under the title of "Supreme Ruler" on October 18th 1918.

The Bolshevik government of Siberia (the people of which were never decidedly Bolshevik) was overthrown just after the Czecho-Slovaks commenced fighting in 1918. The All Russian Constituent Assembly was formed at this time. It was a socialistic form of government but not extreme socialistic, the people of Siberia, that is, in the territory around Omsk and eastward from Omsk were not as extremely socialistic as those in the vicinity of Samara and Ekaterinburg. Also a large number of refugees of the noble and monarchist class had gone to Siberia after the Bolsheviks got in power. This government was overthrown on November 18, 1918, as previously stated, and Kolchak was placed at the head of "The All Russian Government" under the title of "Supreme Ruler". The allies, that is Japan, England, France and the Czecho-Slovaks had a great deal to do with making Admiral Kolchak supreme ruler.

The Czechs, together with soldiers of the Omsk government, which later became Admiral Kolchak's government, established a line on the western front, i.e., in Eastern Russia, and fought the Bolsheviks. A Czech officer informed me that the allies had agreed to their being separated from Austria with an independent government, and that the allies would see that they were put on their feet in getting government started. That in return for this the Czech Army was to fight the bolsheviks and prevent German and Austrian prisoners from returning to their country, that the allied would see that the Czech Army was supplied with clothing, arms, and equipment.

The Czechs fell in with this and fought the Bolsheviks. The telegram that started this was sent to Major Guinet, French Army, on June 24th, at Cheliabinsk, and was as follows, "The French Ambassador makes known to Commandant Guinet that he can thank the Czecho-Slovaks for their actions, this in the name of the allies. They, (the Allies) have decided to intervene the last of June, the czecho-Slovaks' Army, and the French mission forms the advance guard of the Allied army must come Recommendations respecting the occupation and the organization of a double "point," "political and military". Perm 18, June.

About June 27th Major Guinet of the French Military Mission issued a statement through the Czech and Russian press, based on this telegram, stating that the allies were intervening in Russia at the end of June, and that the French were with the EM Czechs in this movement.

The Czech's offensive commenced immediately.

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The Czech is very democratic but not Bolshevik and as long as the new Siberian government was democratic they desired to help it out as well as themselves. However, after the armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers and after the overthrow of the Siberian Government by Kolchak and his followers, it soon became apparent to them that they were helping to put a new Czar on the throne of Russia. The Czechs soon began to balk at this. They saw the high handed manner in which Kolchak and his followers were running things and shortly thereafter withdrew all their troops from the support of Kolchak.

In view of the fact that the first Czecho-Slovak Echelon (by Echelon I mean train) had arrived safely in Valdivostok in April 1918, and by July 1st nearly half of their forces had arrived, that the city of Valdivostok was completely in their control and that the remainder of the Czecho-Slovak troops were in no serious danger and the war prisoner menace had not assumed alarming proportions, it must be assumed that the object the President had in mind when troops were sent to Siberia bore some relation to the public declaration of America's readiness to stand by Russia. This announcement must have been made with special reference to one of the Allied powers. The President, as shown in the instructions given General Graves, was opposed to sending troops to Siberia. He said he was afraid it would result in using Russia instead of helping Russia but acquiesced in the movement because he did not want to insist upon his ideas when they ran counter to the ideas of so many military men upon a military problem.

As Japan and the United States were the only nations fighting Germany that were in a position to send any effective force to Siberia there was an agreement between the United States and Japan to send about ten thousand troops to Valdivostok.

Japan approached the United States and asked on account of organizational reasons permission to increase her force to 12,000 men which was agreed to by the United States. Everyone who served in Siberia knows Japan disregarded this agreement.

In October 1918, the Commanding General, A.E.F., Siberia, made an inspection of American troops and during this inspection saw so many Japanese and knew of so many more in the Trans-Biakal region that upon his return he reported to Washington that Japan had 60,000 troops in Siberia, a closer examination showed that they had 72,000 instead of 60,000 in Siberia and on the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

The plans of some of the Allied nations and the Czechs were to arm the Russian soldiers (anti-Bolshevik) and with these soldiers, U.S. troops, Czech and allied troops from an eastern front under the command of General Knox (an English General) and attack Germany from the east. As shown by the instructions of the President given previously in this monograph, the President had informed the various allied governments that the United States would not join such a movement and if the allied governments insisted upon such a step after arrival in Siberia the United States might consider it necessary to withdraw its few troops from Siberia.

Notwithstanding the President's positive statement, I do not believe there is any question but what the representatives of some of the allied governments expected and hoped that the American troops would proceed to western Siberia under the claim of extricating the Czechs and become involved in such a way that the United States would have to send more troops to Siberia.

General Knox had authority from the British Government to arm, clothe and equip 100,000 Russians and if the conditions seemed to justify it he was informed that he could count upon arms and equipment for an additional 100,000.

I believe it is safe to say that even before the American troops arrived in Vladivostok with a view to carrying out the mission of our country it was evident that in so far as the execution of the mission coincided with the scope of the mission as publicly announced, it would differ from the actions and even intentions of some of the associated missions.

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General Otani in command of the Japanese forces was the senior allied commander. Soon after the landing of allied troops at Vladivostok began, General Otani addressed the following communication to the commanders of the allied forces. "I have the honor to inform you that I have been appointed the commander of the Japanese Army at Vladivostok by His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, and that I am entrusted unanimously by the Allied Powers with the command of their armies in the Russian territory of the Far East. I believe that this important mission will not be easy to fulfill on account of the present situation of Russia and of the Austro-German intrigues. Nevertheless I have no doubt that I shall be able to accomplish it perfectly through the agreement and coordination of the valiant Allied Armies. The cooperation and the friendship between our armies will easily permit, from the point of view of their command, of rapidity of action and of success without any

difficulty. I hope with all my heart that our armies will work together for the common aim.

(Signed) General Otani,
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies."

This document which you will admit is a rather remarkable one, was sent out about two weeks before the arrival of General Graves at Vladivostok.

All seemed very anxious to learn how General Graves would react to this. Colonel Styer, who was senior officer with our troops, prior to the arrival of General Graves, wrote General Otani and told him that American troops were subject to his orders. Soon after he arrived General Graves together with Admiral Knight, went to call on General Otani and was asked almost immediately if he (General Graves) had orders that American troops would report to him (General Otani).

General Graves informed General Otani that he had no such orders, but on the contrary had limitations placed upon him as to the use of American troops which would make it necessary for him to give his personal orders before American troops could engage in any action against the Russians. No indication was ever seen of General Otani trying to command troops of any power except Japanese troops.

I do not believe that this remarkable communication was originated by the Japanese but was probably issued with the approval of some of the other allied representatives with the hope that the Americans would fall for it and that then our troops could and would be used contrary to the desires and instructions of the President, as after once having become involved it might become difficult for the United States to back out.

After the signing of the armistice the Commanding General, A.E.F., took the view that the United States had no enemy in Russia and that American troops could not be used against any part of the Russian people except in self-defence and in protection of property entrusted to our care.

Criticism was immediately directed against that policy not only by certain Russians, but it was evident that England, France and Japan did not approve of it.

The 27th Infantry participated with the Japanese in an advance on Habarovsk from Sviaginaon the Assuri branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This advance started on August 29th, and troops reached Habarovsk on September 5th. Practically no casualties were sustained by our forces. The reason given by General Otani, (the highest ranking allied officer in Siberia), for the advance to Habarovsk was the relief of Czecho-Slovak troops west of Irkutsk the idea being to take Habarovsk then march up along the Amur River and clear the northern branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad of Bolsheviks, and thence west clearing the railroad and so extricating the Czechs.

American participation in allied operations in Siberia was commenced with the situation about as follows: a small force consisting of Czecho-Slovaks and Japanese detachments acting as a holding force awaiting the arrival of allied reinforcements to be gotten from troops arriving at Vladivostok had been handled rather severely along the Ussuri Railroad, and the 35th Japanese Infantry Brigade under Major General Oi had gone to their assistance. Shortly after this the advance on Habarovsk began.

A council of Allied Commanders was held on August 19th, 1918. Of this council Colonel Styer cabled the War Department as follows: "Lieutenant General Yuhi, Chief of Staff, representing General Otani, gave in detail an estimate of situation and plan of operation. First take Habarovsk, 15,000 armed enemy in this sector, then advance west by Amur and Manchuria. General Otani stated that in his judgment to Accomplish mission which was and remains solely the extrication of the Czechs west of Irkutsk between whom and us are 40,000 enemy forces and along double line of communications to make secure. The Czechs west of Irkutsk have little ammunition

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In view of subsequent events it is not out of place to state that this estimate of the situation was erroneous. Either the Japanese military intelligence service was absolutely incompetent, their staff in utter ignorance of the real military situation in Siberia, particularly that of the Czechs, or their statements were aimed to satisfy what they presumed to be allied desires, by exaggerating the magnitude of the military problem and recommending heavy reinforcements, yet proceeding to show, by announcing an immediate offensive that the much needed increase of allied forces could be safely depended upon to arrive after the Japanese (with their startlingly inadequate strength) had carried out the campaign and securely possessed the fruits of victory.

The actual movement on Habarovsk was not a difficult one consisting of little more than a series of skirmishes. The total Japanese casualties were only 77 killed of all ranks.

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As to 'grave dangers menacing' the Czechs "west of Irkutsk" and the threat of "40,000 enemies between us". It need only be said that by August 17th, 1918, the Czechs were in practically undisputed control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Ekaterinburg and Cheliabinsk eastward to a point beyond the tunnels at the southern end of lake Biakal. On August 20th Verkhne-Udensk was captured by the Czechs, and the only enemy of any importance consisted of an uncertain number of Bolsheviks and armed war prisoners based on Habarovsk and operating toward Blagovestckensk on the west and Ussuri on the south.

The war prisoners menace turned out to be practically no menace at all as only a small proportion of German and Austrian prisoners of war joined the Bolsheviks and of those who joined practically all were communists who recognized no claim of their government on their services.

Germany issued instruction to her troops that were prisoners in Siberia that under no circumstances were they to join the Bolsheviks.

The total number of Czech-Slovaks in Siberia was about 50,000. These numbers were given to me by General Chechek and I believe can be depended on as our intelligence service estimated the Czech forces as about the same.

During the winter of 1918-1919 the strength of the allied forces in Siberia were about as follows:

| | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| United States | 10,000 | Japanese | 72,000 |
| English-Canadians | 8,000 | French | 800 |
| Italians | 2,000 | Czecho-Slovaks | 50,000 |
| Chinese | one division approximately 12,000 | Poles | one division strength unknown |

Practically all of these troops were in the vicinity of Vladivostok except the Czechs, Japanese, Chinese and Poles.

During the winter of 1918-1919 the 27th Infantry was stationed at various points along the Ussuri River from Spasskoe to Habarovsk. The 31st Infantry at Vladivostok at various points along the Trans-Siberian Railroad between Vladivostok and Nikolsk and along the coal road from Ugolnya and at the Suchan mines, and two Companies at Spasskoe. The 27th Infantry had more or less trouble with Kalmikoff's Cossaks, a more bloodthirsty man than Kalmikoff with the possible exception of Semienoff never lived. The cruelties and murders committed by these two cossaks are spoken of elsewhere in this monograph.

For political reasons (more to show that American troops were in Siberia than anything else), one company of the 31st Infantry was ordered to and took station at Harbin in March 1919, and was brought back to Vladivostok in July, 6th companies of the 27th Infantry were stationed from April 1919.

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2 In April 1919, regimental headquarters and six companies of the 27th Infantry were moved from the vicinity of Habarovsk to Verkhne-Udensk and took over the sector from Verkhne-Udensk, to Mysivia near Lake Baikal. Considerable trouble was experienced with Semienoff's troops but no actual fighting took place in this sector except for one engagement at Posalskaya in January 1920.

On this occasion one of Semienoff's armored trains decided to attack our forces at Posalskaya. This force consisted of about 35 men under command of a Lieutenant quartered in Russian box-cars. The Lieutenant had been warned by a telegraph operator that the commander of this armored train had stated that he was going to get the Lieutenant's command. This young officer had his men lie down on the floors of the cars. When the armored train came up it turned loose several machine guns on the box car camp. The men got out of the cars, surrounded the train, some jumping up in the engine, and disabling it by throwing hand grenades in the fire box, while others got in dead space and tossed grenades in the armored car. The entire train with a complement of about 75 men, several machine guns and two six-pounders were captured.

late in May and the first part of June 1919, the partisans along the coal road from Ugolnya to Suchan (in 31st Infantry Sector) became very active for the reason that they considered that by stopping shipments of coal they could tie up the Trans-Siberian Railroad and thus prevent supplies reaching Kolchak's forces from Vladivostok. A platoon of our troops camped at Romanovka was attacked in June, and thereafter, until late in the fall, various portions of the 31st Infantry had a number of skirmishes with these partisans at various points along the line between Ugolnya and Suchan. Very seldom did we have more than two companies engaged in an expedition or in any one action.

One Platoon Company A, 31st Infantry mentioned in a previous paragraph strength two officers and about 75 enlisted in a fight at Romanovka, against greatly superior numbers, had 24 enlisted killed and one officer and 25 enlisted men wounded but held their ground and stood off the enemy until the Platoon received reinforcements.

Our losses in other engagements were very small. During the months from June to December 1919, organizations of the 31st Infantry were engaged with partisans at various places in the vicinity of the coal road running from Ugolnya to Suchan as follows: two Platoons, Company M, at Novitskaya on June 22, 1919, one Platoon, Company A, at Romanovka June 25, one Platoon, Company A, at Nova Nezhine June 26, Company D, Company C, (less 9 squads), one Platoon, Machine Gun Company and a 37 mm. section of Headquarters Company, at Sitza, June 26. Company C, (less one Platoon), Company M, one Platoon of Machine Gun Company, and 37 mm. section of Headquarters Company, at Novitskaya, July 2, Company C, (less one Platoon) Company M, Company D, one Platoon Machine Gun Company, 37 mm. section of Headquarters Company at Kazanska, July 3.

Companies D, M, one Platoon Machine Gun Company, one 37 mm. section of Headquarters Company, at Peryatina, July 5, one section of Company H, at Nowelitovskaya on August 8th. Various organizations participated in skirmishes at the following places during the month of July and August: Rechitsa, Dora Feiveka, Mamontova, Novo Vasilkovo, Burenka, Gordieka, Brovonichi, Krelovits, Shieovskaya, and a few other small skirmishes.

In addition Company C, was engaged in skirmishes on December 10th, 24th, 25th and 31st near Fanza and Sitza.

The advance guard formations used were similar to those in force for small bodies of troops before the world war and proved their worth.

In the fall of 1919, Lieutenant Ryan and 50 men of the 31st Infantry with four machine guns was sent as a guard with a trainload of rifles and ammunition for Kolchak with orders to turn them over to Kolchak's representative at Irkutsk and that under no circumstances was he to turn any rifles or ammunition over to anyone before reaching Irkutsk.

At this time we were having considerable trouble with Semienoff and the Command-General did not care to turn rifles and ammunition over to anyone that might afterwards use them against our forces. When this munitions echelon reached Chita,

Semienoff sent an officer with a reputed order from Kolchak to turn fifteen thousand rifles over to Semienoff. The Lieutenant informed the representative that it would be impossible to comply with the request as his orders prevented him from turning over any rifles or ammunition to anyone before he got to Irkutsk. Semienoff's representative went away and a few minutes later came back and informed the Lieutenant that if the Arms were not turned over to Semienoff by 10:00 A.M. the next morning that he (Semienoff) would come and get them. The Lieutenant immediately wired A.E.F. Headquarters of the happenings that had taken place and took what steps he could to prepare his force for defense. At this time Semienoff's troops with troops of a certain other power numbered several thousand in Chita and immediate vicinity consisting of several regiments of infantry and at least two regiments of artillery, together with several armored trains. It had also been quite definitely proven that Semienoff was in the pay of this other power. A.E.F. Headquarters immediately got in touch with the representative of this other power who was told the facts in the case and that it was also well known that Semienoff would do what he (the representative) told him and requested that Semienoff be called off as otherwise to say the least the result would present a very grave situation. Suffice it to say that a few minutes before 10 the next morning one of Semienoff's staff came to the Lieutenant and informed him that he could leave whenever he wanted to and that it was all a joke.

The disintegration of Kolchak's forces, commencing in June 1919, took place rapidly in the fall and early part of December of that year, and early in November all allied troops had withdrawn from Siberia except the Japanese, Czechs, Americans and Italians being prevented from leaving by a scarcity of transports. The disastrous failure of Kolchak in my opinion could have been avoided and his forces have put the Bolsheviks out of power if he had only adopted a democratic form of government with an able, human and conscientious staff around him. He did just the opposite, however, and was doomed to failure as anyone will see, when the actions of his followers are considered.

Ataman Semienoff and Ataman Kalmikoff at the head of Cossacks in the Trans-Baikal and Ussuri regions respectively, though giving adherence to the Kolchak government and responsible for Kolchak's communications, obeyed Kolchak when it pleased them and did as they pleased at other times. Of stores going to Kolchak, Semienoff took what he wanted and sent the rest on to Kolchak.

Kalmikoff and his officers were very dissolute and ran things with a high hand. Open clashes with our forces at Habarovsk during the winter of 1918-1919 were only narrowly averted. Whenever Kalmikoff needed money he proceeded to arrest and execute some rich merchant under the guise that the merchant was a Bolshevik and aiding and abetting Bolshevism and confiscated the merchant's money, goods and other property.

Armored trains pertaining to Kalmikoff's command destroyed towns under the guise that the inhabitants were Bolsheviks, killing old men, women, and children even, when fleeing for their lives.

If a young man was drafted and ordered to report for duty and did not show up his father and mother and other members of the family were mistreated and murdered.

Semienoff was not any worse than Kalmikoff as that would be impossible, but as he was in a more populous section of the country and on the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, his opportunities were greater. Nero himself could not have been worse than these two Cossack atamans. Colonel Morrow estimates that Semienoff's forces murdered at least forty thousand men, women and children in the Trans-Baikal region.

The entire region surrounding Tara was devastated, men driven off or killed and the women stolen by forces of Semienoff.

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The entire region surrounding Tara was devastated, men driven off or killed and the women stolen by force by officers and men. This expedition was under a Colonel Manke and was not composed of cossacks but of regular Kolchak troops.

The Russian has been down-trodden for centuries by the Russian autocracy. He has also been down-trodden by the Bolsheviki, but not to the extent of the former Russian autocracy, under which he was compelled to work for a certain small stipulated sum, whether he wanted to or not and had to live in a certain locality, where even his home was not sacred against the nobles, and where the definition of good discipline in the army was not as our own but in which a soldier to be well

Disciplined had to submit to his officers knocking him down, or slapping him without just cause and to get up smiling. Very little attention was paid to his wants or to see that he was fed. I have seen Kolchak officers strike down soldiers merely for the whim of the thing and have seen conscripts being trained in athletics, the men being trained in jumping over wooden horses with a Lieutenant standing by the horse with a whip similar to a cat of nine tails whipping each man that failed to get over the horse. From my observation of the Russian officer, he spends most of his time in cabarets or other places filling up on vodka. In Vladivostok large numbers of Russian officers with apparently nothing to do seemed to spend all their time on the main streets of the town and generally having a good time when their services were undoubtedly needed with their organizations.

In my opinion the average Russian in Siberia, was not, in 1919, a Bolshevik, but most of all he was not a reactionary and wanted a good democratic form of government. Rather than have a reactionary form of government similar to that under the Czar he would join any party that had a show of success against it. As the Bolsheviks were the only ones that had any show he joined them so as to drive the Kolchak government from power and with the hope that the radicalness of the Bolsheviks could be curbed in time and that then the people could settle down to a good constitutional democratic form of government.

The following statement made by Colonel Wickham, head of the British Military Mission, show how the ideas of some of the allies changed during the winter of 1919-1920; "In supporting Kolchak, a year's time has been lost. The only good has been that we can now realize once for all that the old regimists are incapable of establishing a government. Siberia must go through Bolshevism and the sooner a beginning is made, the quicker will many of the irrational theories of the Bolsheviks be tried out and cast aside".

In conjunction with other allied troops the 31st Infantry preserved order in Vladivostok during the Gaida revolution which took place in November 1919 and the revolution which took place on January 31, 1920. The latter revolution was practically a bloodless affair. However, the so-called Gaida revolution that took place in November (considering the number that took part) was quite a bloody affair. General Gaida, a young man about 28 or 29 years old, was a Major General in the Czech Army in 1918, and through his natural ability was made a Lieutenant General shortly in the Russian Kolchak Army, and commanded the Kolchak forces in western Siberia and eastern Russia. In the late spring of 1919 he began to disagree with the Kolchak government over political matters. In other words he could not see his way clear to support a government as reactionary and tyrannical as the Kolchak government had become. he was relieved of command of the Russian forces in June, 1919.

Early in the fall, Gaida came to Vladivostok and was at the head of the revolution that took place in November. His forces, amounting to about 2,000, were recruited from Russian deserters and some Czechs. In my opinion, Gaida was entirely too obsessed with his own importance. He opened a recruiting office within two blocks of the railroad station at Vladivostok, where he was attacked by the Kolchak forces, the fight lasting about 24 hours.

Gaida's troops were in an impossible situation and were easily defeated. Practically all prisoners, except Gaida, captured by the Kolchak forces were put to death within the next 24 hours, some five hundred being executed.

General Gaida was given up to the Czechs with the understanding that he would leave Siberia never to return. This was undoubtedly done to keep from having trouble with the Czechs.

The revolution in Vladivostok that took place on January 31st, 1920 was engineered by the social democrats under Krakavetsky and very shortly thereafter became closely allied with the Bolsheviks. Krakavetsky had previously been a member of the

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About January 1st, 1920, orders were received for the withdrawal of the A.E.F., Siberia, the organizations of the A.E.F. being ordered to the Philippine Islands for station. About January 15th, 1920, that portion of the 27th Infantry which was stationed on the Ussuri Railroad was withdrawn to Vladivostok and sailed for Manila on the Great Northern about January 15th. That portion of the 31st Infantry stationed along the coal road was withdrawn to Vladivostok about the middle of January 1920. That portion of the 27th Infantry stationed at Verkhne-Udensk and the Trans-Baikal

section commenced their withdrawal during January 1920. It took the echelons of the 27th Infantry an average of 28 days to make the trip from Verkhne-Udensk to Vladivostok. The sector from Vladivostok to Nikiisk Ussuriski was held by one battalion of the 31st Infantry with a machine gun platoon and one armored train attached, until all other American troops had passed enroute to Vladivostok and then was moved into Vladivostok.

General Graves with the last of the Expedition went on board the Transport Great Northern on March 31st, and sailed for Manila April 1st, 1920, thus terminating the A.E.F., Siberia.

In the fall and early winter of 1919-1920 replacements for the drafted men in the A.E.F., Siberia were received and the drafted men and those enlisted for the duration of the war were returned to the United States. About 95 percent of these recruits had had no prior service and had had no training whatever previous to their landing in Siberia. This created quite a problem for regimental and company commanders. These new men had to be given their basic training and least know some of the rudiments of marksmanship and given some range practice before they could be sent to the smaller out-lying stations. The situation in Siberia at this time was tense and it looked very much as though our troops would become engaged at any time. As a consequence our troops were engaged in elementary rifle practice during zero or near zero weather.

Only a portion of the drafted men were withdrawn at one time from an organization and new men sent to take their places. New men were given from three to four weeks training before being sent to out-lying stations though in some instances, due to force of circumstances, they were sent out with less.

CLOTHING.

The clothing issued the A.E.F., Siberia for winter wear was better suited to the climate than that issued by any other nation that had troops there, and was universally admitted by all allies to be the best and in my opinion could not be improved upon. The clothing issued individually for winter wear was as follows: Fur cap, fur mitts, wool gloves, heavy wool undershirts and drawers, O.D. shirts, O.D. coats and breeches, sheeplined overcoat, over-shoes, heavy wool socks, lumberman's socks, shoe pacs, and parka. The lumberman's socks, parka and shoe pacs were seldom worn, the socks only being worn in the coldest weather, as at other times the feet sweat profusely in them.

The parka was only worn by German and Austrian prisoners of war, and only for a short time by our troops as experience proved that the fur cap and sheeplined overcoat served the purpose better. Shoe pacs were not worn due to the fact that the soles of the pac were soft and the feet felt all the unevenness of the ground. Shoe pacs are probably good where the snow does not drift and where all the ground is covered with snow.

The fur cap with the adjustable front piece was an excellent protection against the lowest temperatures and strongest winds, the sheep-lined overcoat also gave protection against the lowest temperatures and the heavy wool drawers protected the legs below the over-coat.

The over-shoe was also excellent and stood the wear well, while the fur mittens when worn over wool gloves protected the hands.

SHELTER.

The majority of our troops were quartered in Russian barracks which are scattered all over Siberia in the larger towns. They are mostly substantial buildings made of brick and with good Russian stoves were quite comfortable. A portion of our

duration of the war were returned to the United States. About 75 percent of these recruits had had no prior service and had had no training whatever previous to their landing in Siberia. This created quite a problem for regimental and company commanders.* These new men had to be given their basic training and least know some of the rudiments of marksmanship and given some range practice before they could be sent to the smaller out-lying stations. The situation in Siberia at this time was tense and it looked very much as though our troops would become engaged at any time. As a consequence our troops were engaged in elementary rifle practice during zero or near zero weather.

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SHELTER.

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The Russian stove which you see in all Russian houses and barracks is built in the house and stands 3 to 10 feet high, is made of brick covered with sheet iron and takes about twenty four hours to get heated, thereafter, only a small amount of coal or wood is necessary to keep it going.

The stove in my room required only two scuttles full of coal a day, in the coldest weather and kept the room well heated.

Considerable trouble was experienced in keeping springs and wells open in the winter time. All commissaries going to small stations on the line were generally frozen. Along the narrow guage railroad all supplies were invariably frozen when received. I always thought that potatoes when frozen become unfit for consumption, however, if frozen and not allowed to thaw out until they are used they are very palatable.

TRANSPORTATION.

Freight cars of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (except a few American box and Gondolas) are similar to those in France. Wheel tracks on wagon roads are much narrower than those in the United States, due to the narrow tread of the Russian telega. Our escort wagons are not suitable for these roads and for that reason we generally used the Russian wagons or sleds. The narrow guage railroad mentioned heretofore in this monograph had four hills at different points on the line where the cars had to be hauled up by cable. The cable stations had been blown up and it was necessary for troops to fill two cars on the top of the hill with dirt and attach them to the cable in order to pull up the car loaded with supplies. Imagine the amount of work involved in getting a car that went all the way through, over four hills, requiring separate loadings with dirt and frozen dirt at that! However, after the cable stations were repaired there was no further trouble on this score.

CONCLUSIONS.

That the various allied nations had different reasons for joining in a military expedition to Siberia. The reasons can not, with propriety, be discussed by me.

In entering agreements with allies who do not speak the same language, great care should be taken that there is a thorough understanding as to the meaning of all words, phrases and sentences. That in dealing with an oriental race their peculiarities should be taken into careful consideration.

Was the mission accomplished?

Yes. The A.E.F. assisted the Czecho-Slovaks out of Siberia, no supplies fell into German hands, our troops did not become entangled with other government's, they did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian people and in my opinion prevented at least one foreign power from gaining a foothold in Siberia, thus allowing "The Open Door Policy" to continue in Siberia for our commercial interests to take advantage of.

In accomplishing his mission General Graves deserves the heartfelt thanks of his country. Beset by nations, interests, and individuals, trying to influence him to take a course contrary to the instructions given him, he paid no attention to them, did not swerve from his mission and carried it out in its entirety.

31ST INFANTRY SECTOR

VLADIVOSTOK TO NIKOLSK AND UGOLNYA TO SUCHAN.

SCALE

10 MILES

