

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, SIBERIA.

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

FILE NUMBER370.2 OPERATIONS

Report of operations of the 27th U. S. Infantry,
and incidents connected therewith, in the guard-
ing of the Railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia,
inclusive to Mysovaia, Siberia. From May 2nd, 1919,
to January 29, 1920.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 27TH U. S. INFANTRY,

AND THE INCIDENTS CONNECTED THEREWITH, IN THE GUARDING
OF THE RAILROAD FROM VERKHNE-UDINSK, SIBERIA, INCLUSIVE,
TO MYSOVAYA, SIBERIA, INCLUSIVE, FROM MAY 2nd, 1919, TO
JANUARY 29TH, 1920.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, SIBERIA.

January 29th, 1920.

From: Commanding Officer, 27th U. S. Infantry.

To: The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.
(Thru Military channels).

Subject: Operations of the 27th U. S. Infantry, and incidents connected therewith, in the guarding of the railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, inclusive, to Mysovaya, Siberia, inclusive, from May 2nd, 1919, to January 29th, 1920.

1. On April 14th, 1919, the Commanding Officer of the 27th U. S. Infantry, then stationed at Habarovsk, Siberia, received the following telegram from Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia:

"Vladivostok, April 14, 1919. Commanding Officer, Twenty Seventh Infantry, Habarovsk, Number two hundred seventeen period Paragraph one cancel our number two hundred thirteen period Send Wallace to Spasskoe, period Paragraph two map reference official forty verst period Section railroad VerkhneUdinsk to station Bakail City both inclusive assigned to you for guard period The Twenty Seventh Infantry less one battalion including the one company at prison camp to be left at Habarovsk under Shamotulski and the two companies of the first battalion now at Spasskoe under Wallace will prepare to move period Field Hospital number four with their field equipment will accompany regiment period Quartermaster here making arrangements for transportation communicate with him direct as to details period Take four months supplies period You will make all arrangements and assignments to stations comma keeping these headquarters fully informed as to movements and

stations assigned period Your command will have to go into camp as Miller was, unable to get quarters period Acknowledge period Robinson."

In reference to the remark, "The command will have to go into camp as Miller was unable to get quarters", this refers to the fact that Lieut. Colonel William C. Miller, with Companies A & B 27th U. S. Infantry, had been ordered to take station at Verkhne-Udinsk on March 17th, 1919. Colonel Miller had several times reported by wire to Headquarters at Vladivostok his inability to secure suitable quarters of any character at or near Verkhne-Udinsk, and had informed the Headquarters at Vladivostok that his command would be forced to go into camp at Verkhne-Udinsk.

2. In compliance with the above telegram the following forces prepared to entrain for Verkhne-Udinsk:

Headquarters, 27th U. S. Infantry,
Headquarters Company,
Machine Gun Company,
Supply Company,
Companies I, K, L & M
Medical Detachment, 27th U. S. Infantry,
4th Field Hospital.

The Command moved in seven echelons. The first echelon consisting of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company left Habarovsk on April 21st and arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk on May 1st. The seventh and last echelon arrived May 15th. Entire orders and instructions received by the Commanding Officer of the 27th U. S. Infantry in regard to the guarding of the railroad and the taking over of this sector, are contained in telegram Number 217 previously quoted in this communication.

3. On April 24th the following telegram was received:

"Vladivostok April 24th 1919. Colonel C. H. Morrow enroute to Verkhne-Udinsk care of Colonel Williams, Harbin. Number two forty seven line of demarkation Baikal City not clearly understood confer General Syrovoy representative from Czechs General Syrovoy at Irkutsk has been notified (Signed) King."

On arrival at Verkhne-Udinsk the Commanding Officer was furnished by Colonel Miller with a telegram from Major General Michaeloff, Commander of Military Transportation of the Siberian Region, citing authority of Admiral Kolchak, stating that existing guards in our sector must not be changed, that the Russians are increasing their guard in this sector by fifty per cent and the Americans are requested not to occupy barracks in the sector as the Russians require them. This information was communicated to Expeditionary Headquarters in the following telegram:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, May 3rd, 1919, AMEX, Vladivostok. Number two four six Major General Michaeloff commander military transportation Siberian region citing authority Kolchak states existing Russian guards in our sector must not be changed and that the Russians are increasing their guard in our sector by fifty per cent also that we occupy no barracks in this sector as the Russians require them period Request steps be taken to cause Russians to vacate our sector and all railway and guard barracks in our sector period I will work towards this end from here period However if the Russians want this most difficult sector suggest their retaining it while we remain here or take a sector further west containing Irkutsk period paragraph First section arrived May first second section May second without incident period Have excellen. camp site one and half mile from city with excellent storehouse facilities period paragraph Request that Companies C and D now at Spasskoe be directed to join their battalion here this for the general good of the regiment as at present half of its rifle companies are away from it period (Signed) Morrow.

This direct request not to take over the barracks in the sector Verkhne-Udinsk to Baikal City, and that the Russians were guarding the sector and would increase their guard by fifty per cent, and requesting that the Americans not move into this sector, created a situation of the greatest difficulty. The forces, other than the Americans, occupying Verkhne-Udinsk and vicinity at this time were as follows: -----

Major General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army, commanding a force of all arms of approximately 3000 men.

Major General Panchenco, of the Siberian Army, commanding about 1500 men, consisting largely of infantry and a small Artillery force in the same garrison.

In the City of Verkhne-Udinsk there were some 300 Siberian Infantry, and to the east of the city, across the Uda River at the Park Barracks (5½ versts east of Verkhne-Udinsk) was the Cossack garrison of approximately 450 men, commanded by Colonel Lvoff.

Major General Mejack, the Military Governor of the District, at his headquarters in Verkhne-Udinsk.

The barracks at Beresovka lay about seven versts north-west of Verkhne-Udinsk on the railroad line. The Commanding Officer at once conferred with General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army, who was then in command of the Japanese troops stationed at Beresovka. General Yoshie was fully informed as to the mission of the American command and agreed at once to move the Japanese troops, then stationed at Mysovaya, out of the barracks they then occupied, at any time the Americans requested them to do so. The Russian Military Governor, Major General Mejack, and the commander of the Russian garrison at Beresovka, Major General Panchenco, were both equally ignorant of the Allied agreement that the Americans would guard the railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk to Baikal City. They had received no orders to this effect from

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4. On May 3rd the regiment began the erection of the camp to accommodate

the entire command at a point in the woods one mile from Verkhne-Udinsk. (For plan and construction of this camp, see complete drawing attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A".) On May 6th the following telegram was received:

"Vladivostok, Siberia, May 6, 1919. Colonel Morrow, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number two forty eight secret period Pending negotiations do the best you can with General Michaeloff without causing trouble period We can do nothing in Vladivostok period Robinson."

Every endeavor had been made previous to the receipt of this telegram to locate General Michaeloff but he could not be found in Irkutsk, Chita or Verkhne-Udinsk, nor did anyone have the slightest idea where his headquarters might be. On May 12th, 1918, Mr. Harris, American Consul General for Siberia, passed through Verkhne-Udinsk on his way to Omsk. Following a conference with him the Commanding Officer furnished him with the following Memorandum:

"Headquarters Twenty-Seventh Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, May 12, 1919. Memorandum for Mr. Harris, American Consul General for Siberia. My orders on coming here were to take over the railroad guard from Verkhne-Udinsk inclusive to Baikal City inclusive. The Czechs and Japanese in this sector have signified their willingness to move out of their barracks upon my request. The three communications attached hereto are self-explanatory. The Russian forces occupying barracks along and pertaining to the railroad should be required by the Supreme Dictator to vacate these barracks. His representative at Vladivostok must have agreed to the sectors which were to be guarded by the different forces in Siberia. His forces alone violate the Allied agreement. In case there should be a serious misunderstanding between the Supreme Dictator and the Ataman Semenoff the presence of American troops in this sector might prove to be of the greatest value to the Supreme Dictator. I request you to use all possible means to clear up this situation. C. H. Morrow, Colonel, 27th Infantry, Commanding."

Under date of May 13th, 1919. the following telegram was sent:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, May 13, 1919. AMEX, Vladivostok. Number two sixty one Consul General Harris passed through here yesterday bound for Omsk period. I fully informed him of the situation relating to the railroad comma furnished him with complete file of communications comma telegrams and orders affecting the situation period He promised to take these matters up at Omsk in the most complete way as speedily as possible. period He approves camping here until situation is cleared period Everything here highly satisfactory period Morrow."

The following telegram was received May 15th:

"Vladivostok, May 15th. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia. Number two sixty three period Reference your two sixty one this matter has been taken up through the interallied railroad committee and with the government at Omsk period Robinson."

On May 14th a Proclamation of the Commanding General, dated April 21st, Vladivostok was received at Headquarters of the regiment. This was the first order, and the only order, which was ever received which in any way defined the duties of guarding the railroad. (Proclamation is attached hereto, marked A-1).

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BARRACKS.

5. During this period every effort was made to secure barracks at or near Verkhne-Udinsk. All efforts of the Commanding Officer proved unavailing, as had the efforts of Colonel Miller. Also the taking over of the guarding of the railroad was impossible as there was a complete lack of understanding between the Americans and the Russian authorities. In an endeavor to clear up this im-

possible situation the Commanding Officer, on May 28th, proceeded to Irkutsk for the purpose of conferring with the American Consul, Mr. Thomson, at that place, and the Russian General Artemieff who was in command at Irkutsk, and also the Czech General Syrový. In an interview with General Artemieff, the Proclamation of the Commanding General regarding the guarding of the railroad was handed to him and he was fully informed as to the actions of the Czecho-Slovak forces and the Japanese forces, and was requested to cause the Russian troops to give over the guarding of the railroad to the American command and to vacate the necessary barracks in their sector for the American guard. General Artemieff replied that while he did not doubt that such an Allied agreement had been entered into, as far as he was officially concerned or notified, the guarding of the railroad from Baikal City to Mysovaya lay with him and that he could not under his orders and would not remove his guard from that sector. Colonel Morrow was furnished the following written communication:

"From: Commander of the Troops, Irkutsk Military District,
May 28th, 1919. Irkutsk. To the Commanding Officer, 27th U. S.
Infantry, By order of the Supreme Chief Commander of the Russian
Troops, I am ordered to occupy and guard the Zai-Baikal railroad to sta-
tion Mysovaya, inclusive, and this I have fulfilled.
(Signed) Lieutenant General Artemieff."

On May 29th the following telegram was sent:

"Irkutsk, May 29th, 1919. Consul General Harris, Omsk.
Number one sixteen period Disregard my telegram regarding interview
with General Michaeloff and American Colonel Morrow period Colonel
Morrow arrived today and we saw General Artemieff who commands all
Russian troops in this section including those operating in the
section between Baikal City and Mysovaya which by allied proclamation
of April twenty first should be occupied exclusively by American
troops. stop General Artemieff should receive orders from the Supreme
Dictator to turn over all barracks from Baikal City to Mysovaya to the
American troops and to remove his guards from that section stop The
Japanese and Czechs fully understand the Allied agreement and are
acting in accordance with it stop Only General Artemieff hinders the
taking over of this sector by the American troops paragraph Please
telegraph me just when the Supreme Dictator issues the necessary in-
structions in order that I might inform Colonel Morrow and Thomson."

After having an interview with General Syrový, Colonel Morrow returned to Verkhne-
Udinsk on May 30th. On May 31st the following telegram was sent:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, May 31st, 1919. AMEX, Vladivostok. Number
two ninety three I have just returned from Irkutsk period General
Artemieff who commands there and the troops guarding the railroad from
Baikal City to Mysovaya states he has no knowledge of the Allied agree-
ment concerning the railroad and has been charged by the Kolchak govern-
ment with the guarding of this sector period He promised me to at once
get in communication with Omsk and get orders and decision from them
period He was apparently most friendly but in utter ignorance from his
own government period American Consul Mr. Thomson sent the following
telegram to Consul General Harris who is at Omsk Quote Disregard my
telegram regarding interview with General Michaeloff and American Colonel
Morrow stop Colonel Morrow arrived today and we saw General Artemieff
who commands all Russian troops in this section including those operat-

of the Commanding General regarding the guarding of the railroad was handed to him and he was fully informed as to the actions of the Czecho-Slovak forces and the Japanese forces, and was requested to cause the Russian troops to give over the guarding of the railroad to the American command and to vacate the necessary barracks in their sector for the American guard. General Artemieff replied that while he did not doubt that such an Allied agreement had been entered into, as far as he was officially concerned or notified, the guarding of the railroad from Baikal City to Mysovaya lay with him and that he could not under his orders and would not remove his guard from that sector. Colonel Morrow was furnished the following written communication:

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over of this sector by the American troops paragraph Please telegraph me just when the Supreme Dictator issues the necessary instructions in order that I might inform Colonel Morrow period unquote Thomson period. The Czecho-Slovaks are fully informed and in every way ready to assist us period Their force really guards the tunnel sector period Artemieff has four hundred men at Mysovaya period I am confident Artemieff will receive the necessary orders in a few days period In view of the above facts do you desire that I move troops at this time into the sector held by his forces comma or that I delay the movement until he has a reasonable time to hear from his superiors period I will proceed to take over from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya at once as all is clear sailing in this sector period General Syrov has assured me that the Czechs will safely guard the tunnel sector until the Americans can take it over period Morrow."

On or about June 2nd the following telegram was received from Vladivostok:

"Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number two ninety six following agreement made today with Russians quote Acting under the provisions of the railroad agreement and under the authority of the allied commanders and the interallied railway committee it is agreed between the Russian military authorities and the Americans that the Americans will guard the sector Verkhne-Udinsk inclusive to Mysovaya inclusive and the Russians will guard the sector Mysovaya exclusive to Baikal City inclusive period It being understood that the Russians will vacate the necessary barracks or building for the American troops in the sector that Americans are to guard under this agreement unquote You will act accordingly period Make necessary distribution of troops to protect railroad assigned you period acknowledge receipt keep us advised location of troops period Robinson."

It may be noted that this agreement changed the sector of the American command from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya and gave up the sector from Mysovaya to Baikal City. Also that while the American command had always understood that they were to guard the railroad, this understanding had never reached, nor did it ever reach the Russian authorities, nor did they at any time ever receive such orders from the Omsk government, and that the sector was finally taken over from them without their agreement, nor did they furnish then or at any other time any barracks or buildings to the Americans for the purpose of guarding the railroad, and any barracks or buildings that were secured were taken without their agreement. The understanding was perfect at Vladivostok but nowhere else. On June 2nd, 1919, Company "K" left Verkhne-Udinsk and took station at Mysovaya, placing guards over the railroad at that place. On the same date one platoon of Company "M" was sent to Posolskaya, one platoon to Selenga, one platoon to Mostovoi, and one platoon to the railroad station at Verkhne-Udinsk. One squad from the platoon at Mostovoi was stationed at Tataurovi. As no barracks were available in this sector save at Mysovaya, the platoons at Verkhne-Udinsk, Mostovoi, Selenga and Posolskaya went into camp. Company "K" at Mysovaya went into camp but, later in the month, secured barracks at that point, erecting their own mess halls, stables and rears. (Disposition of troops and their out-guards shown on map attached hereto, marked "B".) The orders for the detachments guarding the railroad were as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY,"
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 1, 1919.

period. The Czechs are really guarding the tunnel sector period to assist us period Their force really guards the tunnel sector period Artemieff has four hundred men at Mysovaya period I am confident Artemieff will receive the necessary orders in a few days period In view of the above facts do you desire that I move troops at this time into the sector held by his forces comma or that I delay the movement until he has a reasonable time to hear from his superiors period I will proceed to take over from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya at once as all is clear sailing in this sector period General Syrový has assured me that the Czechs will safely guard the tunnel sector until the Americans can take it over period Morrow."

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"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY,"
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 1, 1919.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 1.

1. The American sector extends from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya, both inclusive.

The purpose of the guard is as follows:

- (1). To protect the railroad and railway property.
- (2). To insure the safe and uninterrupted movement of trains.
- (3). To protect the civilian railway employees in the proper performance of their duties.
- (4). To prevent interference with passengers on trains or at railroad stations in American Sector. Armed individuals or bodies of troops will not be permitted to interfere with or arrest anyone at railway stations or in railroad yards in American sector, without previous consultation with the American Commander.
- (5). To insure the safe and uninterrupted movement of freight on trains in American sector.

II. The following facts must be thoroughly explained to each member of the railway guard:

- (1). That the American guard must not interfere in any way with the proper operation of the railroad.
- (2). That all orders for the movement of trains and operation of railroad must emanate from the proper railway official.
- (3). That all requests for cars or railroad service must be made to the civilian station master; the guard will never under any circumstances submit such requests to yardmen, enginemen, etc., nor will anyone else be permitted to do so.
- (4). That the civilian railway officials are our friends and must receive from us the utmost courtesy, consideration and support.
- (5). That interference with civilian railway officials or employees in the proper performance of their duties is absolutely prohibited.

By order of Colonel Morrow:

JOHN JAMES,
1st Lieut., 27th Infantry,
Acting adjutant."

These orders were supplemented on June 2nd, 1919, by Railway Guard Orders No. 2:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY SEVENTH INFANTRY,
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 2, 1919.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 2.

1. The following General Instructions are in addition to those published in Railway Guard Orders No. 1.:

(1). Under authority contained in the proclamation of April 21, 1919, by the Commanding General, A. E. F., Siberia, the sector of the railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk inclusive to Mysova, inclusive, has been placed under the protection of the 27th Infantry.

(2). All officers and men connected and charged with the guarding of the sector will fully carry out the provisions of said proclamation and the provisions of this order. Our mission is to see that the railroad contained in this sector

- (3). To protect the civilian railway employees in the proper performance of their duties.
- (4). To prevent interference with passengers on trains or at railroad stations in American Sector. Armed individuals or bodies of troops will not be permitted to interfere with or arrest anyone at railway stations or in railroad yards in American sector, without previous consultation with the American Commander.
- (5). To insure the safe and uninterrupted movement of freight on trains in American sector.

II. The following facts must be thoroughly explained to each member of the railway guard:

- (1). That the American guard must not interfere in any with the proper operation of the railroad.
- (2). That all orders for the movement of trains and operation of railroad must emanate from the proper railway official.
- (3). That all requests for cars or railroad service must be made to the civilian station master; the guard will never under any circumstances submit such requests to yardmen, enginemen, etc., nor will anyone else be permitted to do so.
- (4). That the civilian railway officials are our friends and must receive from us the utmost courtesy, consideration and support.
- (5). That interference with civilian railway officials or employes in the proper performance of their duties is absolutely prohibited.

By order of Colonel Morrow:

JOHN JAMES,
1st Lieut., 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant."

These orders were supplemented on June 2nd, 1919, by Railway Guard Orders No. 2:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY SEVENTH INFANTRY,
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 2, 1919.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 2.

1. The following General Instructions are in addition to those published in Railway Guard Orders No. 1.:

- (1). Under authority contained in the proclamation of April 21, 1919, by the Commanding General, A. E. F., Siberia, the sector of the railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk inclusive to Mysova, inclusive, has been placed under the protection of the 27th Infantry.
- (2). All officers and men connected and charged with the guarding of the sector will fully carry out the provisions of said proclamation and the provisions of this order. Our mission is to see that the railroad contained in this sector is fully, freely and fairly operated for the benefit of the Russian people and the Allied forces. That the tracks, houses, stations, cars, engines and all property of the railroad is safe from seizure or destruction by any one. The railroad must be operated by the legal railroad representatives and the railroad representatives thus operating the railroad shall be free from molestation or interference in the discharge of their duties. No other persons or parties will be permitted in any way to give orders or force compliance with orders given to railroad operators or

or employees. Organization Commanders will keep themselves fully informed of all gatherings, meetings, etc., on the part of any party or troops whose designs threaten the operation of the railroad.

(3). In case of attack, threatened destruction of the railroad or its property or interference with its proper operation as above outlined, the troops are authorized to take the severest measures, including death. All officers and men will fully understand that they are not running the railroad and assist the railroad officers in the proper operation of the railroad.

By order of Colonel MORROW:

JOHN JAMES,
1st. Lieut., 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant."

On June 5th, 1919, these orders were further supplemented by Railway Guard Orders No. 3:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY SEVENTH INFANTRY,
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 5, 1919.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 3.

I. Paragraph II, Railway Guard Orders No. 1, is changed to read as follows:

II. The following facts must be thoroughly explained to each member of the railway guard:

- (1) That the American guard must not interfere in any way with the proper operation of the railroad.
- (2) That all orders for the movement of trains and operation of railroad must emanate from the proper civilian railroad official, except that in the case of MILITARY troop and supply trains the military commandant designated by the proper railway authorities is charged with these duties.
- (3) That all requests for cars or railroad service must be made to the civilian station master; the guard will never under any circumstances submit such requests direct to yardmen, enginemen, etc., nor will any one else be permitted to do so, except that applications for train service for military troop and supply trains should be made to the military commandant designated by the proper railway authorities.
- (4) That the civilian railway officials are our friends and must receive from us the utmost courtesy, consideration and support.
- (5) That interference with civilian railway officials or employes in the proper performance of their duties is absolutely prohibited.

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(3). In case of attack, threatened destruction of the railroad or its property or interference with its proper operation as above outlined, the troops are authorized to take the severest measures, including death. All officers and men will fully understand that they are not running the railroad and assist the railroad officers in the proper operation of the railroad.

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By order of Colonel MORROW:

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By June 5th, 1919, the camp at Verkhne-Udinsk was practically completed. The camp site was an excellent one and was situated in a pine forest and near thirtypseven large ware-houses which afforded ample facilities for storage purposes. They were connected with the main line of the railroad by a switch, tracks passing in front of each ware-house. The soil was particularly favorable for a camp and the surrounding territory afforded excellent drill and maneuver grounds. The camp con-

tained every modern facility and was complete in every detail. All tents were framed, as were the stables, kitchens, and mess halls. (Detailed plans of the kitchens, stables, incinerators, etc., are attached hereto, marked "C"). The camp had its own electric light plant which was brought from Habarovsk having previously been secured from the Russian ware-houses at Red River Prison Camp. The camp was completely lighted by this plant, which also furnished power for a splendid open air theater and moving picture show. A large stockade enclosure containing over one thousand pine trees were erected and the tents pitched inside for use as a guard house. A complete field hospital containing operating room and X-ray room with all tents and floors framed was rapidly constructed.

6. Throughout the month of May continual reports were received regarding the interference of the forces under the command of Ataman Semenoff with the operation of the railroad, also of the enormous number of executions which were taking place at various points between Manchuria City and Verkhne-Udinsk, notably at Adrianovka, Olovyanaya, Borzya and Makkavyevevo, as well as whippings of railroad employees at other points in the sector. On May 28th Private Karas, Company "K" 27th Infantry, a member of the Military Police in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, in the execution of his office and in self-defence, killed Corporal Krakoff of Semenoff's Cossacks, by shooting him with an automatic pistol. This Cossack, in Company with three other drunken Cossacks, was on a rampage assaulting American soldiers in a rooming house. Three men of the Military Police in trying to stop this disturbance were assaulted by the Cossacks who attempted to draw their revolvers and disarm the Military Police. Krakoff was killed and the other Cossacks disarmed and arrested. They were then released to the Russian authorities. A full investigation of the killing fully exonerated Private Karas. The effect of this killing was most salutary and neither the Russian or the Cossack authorities questioned the fact that the killing was fully justified and that Private Karas acted only in self-defence. Early in May and before the Americans had taken over the sector at Verkhne-Udinsk and Mysovaya, the interference of Semenoff and his officers and his military station commandants became apparent in the American sector. On May 16th, they forcibly seized a car held by the American command and threatened to whip the Russian Caretaker if he reported the facts. On May 28th, a train of seven cars in charge of Captain Gilleland, Russian Railway Service Corps, was in the Verkhne-Udinsk yards. The armored train demanded that one care of the R. R. S. C. train be turned over to the armored train. This R. R. S. C. train was a work train engaged in repairing and erecting telephone lines. The demand was refused after which the officer in charge of the R. R. S. C. train was informed that if the car was not turned over within an hour the armored train would fire on him. On May 29th the armored train opened its ports, mamed its guns and trained them on these cars, which had been placed under charge of an American guard, but did not fire. In April Colonel Tomlovsky, Commander of the Engineers Company of the 9th Siberian Division, came to Lieutenant Colonel William C. Miller and requested assistance in getting his troops to the front, stating that he had twice been ordered to proceed to the West to join Admiral Kolchak but that Semenoff would not permit him to do so. He was informed by Colonel Miller that he, Colonel Miller, could not at that time assist him. On or about May 15th the Adjutant to C Colonel Tomlovsky called on Colonel Morrow and requested him to assist in getting his company to the front, as Semenoff's Commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk would not furnish him with transportation and if he should secure transportation that the armored train "Merciless", then at Verkhne-Udinsk, would prevent his moving troops to join Admiral Kolchak. He was informed at that time that the Americans had not yet taken over the railroad but that he would be given assistance when the guarding of the railroad was taken over by the American forces. On May 8th the crew of the armored train "Merciless" had threatened to whip certain railroad employees. On June 1st this armored train moved out of the yards and attacked the command

camp had its own electric light plant which was brought from Habarovsk having previously been secured from the Russian ware-houses at Red River Prison Camp. The camp was completely lighted by this plant, which also furnished power for a splendid open air theater and moving picture show. A large stockade enclosure containing over one thousand pine trees were erected and the tents pitched inside for use as a guard house. A complete field hospital containing operating room and X-ray room with all tents and floors framed was rapidly constructed.

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"American Consul, Irkutsk. On June first, six officers and one hundred and five soldiers of my company took the train Number 21, between the stations Divisionnaya and Kostovoi, and reached the

station Selenga, having their own conductors. At the station Selenga the station master Krisco, belonging to Semenoff's people, detained the train, having received from Verkhne-Udinsk the order to detain the train until the arrival of the armored train. Five Officers and twelve soldiers took the steam engine and left for the station Posolokaya, where the steam engine was cannonaded by the station master and the militiamen. The officers and soldiers from the train answered and then all the seventeen men escaped with arms into the mountains in the Irkutsk direction. Six soldiers escaped from the train Number 21 and arrived in Irkutsk by the trains Number 3 and Number 21. The soldier Molodiko was witness when the Semenoff's people arrested at the station Selenga seventy-four soldiers and Praporshik Tokareff. The arrested soldiers were told that they will be whipped, and Praporshik Tokareff will be transported to the "Moscow District" (shot). These arrested men were seen in the closed cars at the station Beresovka on June 2nd, under the Japanese convoy. My company ought to go to the Perm front according to the order of Kolchak dated April 30th, No. 40228. This repeated four times, but the Semenoff people as usual did not fulfill the order. Therefore it was decided to leave the company for it as a shame to serve with such people. On May 31 the company was very much excited by the misunderstanding between your troops and the Semenoff people. Please give me your kind assistance in deliverance of my arrested soldiers and Praporshik Tikareff, who is to be shot, and to bring them to Irkutsk in order to send them to the front. Colonel Tomlovsky, Commander of the Engineer Company, 9th Siberian Division."

On investigation all of the above facts were found to be correct and thirty-three prisoners were then on the armored train.

7. In connection with these armored trains and so that a thorough understanding of the incidents that follow may be arrived at, it is necessary that the attitude of Ataman Semenoff, and the officers and men under his command, be thoroughly understood. The American command at Habarovsk had had most grave and serious misunderstandings with Ataman Kalmykov who recognized only Ataman Semenoff as his superior. The hostility of the Cossacks under Kalmykov at Habarovsk was transmitted in full strength to Ataman Semenoff and the Cossacks under his command. Upon the arrival of Colonel Morrow at Verkhne-Udinsk, the hostility of the Cossacks and the men from the armored trains was immediately apparent. Frequent clashes occurred between the individual members of the two commands in which the Cossacks were uniformly the aggressors and uniformly came out the worse for wear. A violent and slanderous propaganda had been conducted throughout the city against the Americans prior to their arrival. The people of the city were so greatly influenced by this propaganda that in every way they refused to associate or have connections or dealings with the Americans. On May 18th the Cossacks from the armored train arrested three American soldiers in Verkhne-Udinsk and took them aboard the armored train then lying in the railroad yards near the station, kept them under guard for several hours and then, mounting about forty men, drove the three American soldiers through the streets from the railroad station to the center of the city, a distance of about one mile, and confined them under guard in the City Commandant's Office which is in the City Club, (Sobrania). The Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Finney, 27th U. S. Infantry, requested the release of these soldiers. He was informed by the officer in command that they would not be released to the Americans but would be turned over to the Japanese. A full report of the affair was made to the Commanding Officer about 7 A. M. First Lieutenant Walter T. Byrus, 27th U. S. Infantry, sent a message to the Cossack Commander that in

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not be arrested by Russian officers or men unless it was absolutely necessary to prevent violence, and if men were so arrested they were to be immediately released to American officers upon a proper demand from Headquarters, and that the American Military Police, already established in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, would not arrest any member of the Civilian population but would only be charged with the duty of arresting men of the American command. As the conference was closing, General Korwin Petroski, the Civil Governor, came into General Mejack's Office, and, upon being informed of the agreement between the American Commander and General Mejack, said that he, as Civil Governor of the Province, would not agree to the understanding that had been entered into between General Mejack and the American Commander. That the Americans could not and would not be permitted to station American Military Police in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk and that he, as Civil Governor, would arrest American soldiers when and where he pleased, and would hold them in confinement as long as he pleased, that he would try them by court, under the Russian law, and punish them under the Russian law, and that the American Military Police must at once be removed. He was informed by Colonel Morrow that Americans would maintain a Military Police in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, and that they would not be removed by him or anyone else, that if General Petroski, or the militia which he commanded, arrested any American soldiers and did not immediately release them on demand, they would be taken away from him by force. It was further suggested to him that he at once bring this matter to a practical conclusion by arresting an American soldier and refusing to release him or attempt to try him and await the consequences. This, General Petrovski refused to do. General Petrovski is a creature of Semenoff's - a mountebank and a clown, who openly expressed his hostility to the Americans and called them the enemies of Russia and took no pains to conceal his ill-will and dislike for the Americans in general. He was an active agent in the propaganda against the Americans.

8. On May 5th, men from the armored train "merciless" whipped the Master Mechanic J. K. Aphanasiev. (See statement of Mr. Aphanasiev hereto appended marked "D"). The armored trains of Semenoff, by their continual whipping of the railroad employees, the terror which they inspired in the officials as well as the employees of the railroad, their constant interference with passenger and freight traffic, were daily and hourly growing worse. The interference had reached such a stage that it could no longer be tolerated if the American command was to enforce the proclamation of General Graves of April 21st. On June 8th, the Commanding Officer went to Beresovka and a conference occurred at that place of which the following is a true record:

"Notes on a conference requested by Colonel Morrow at the office of Brigadier General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army at Beresovka beginning at 4:30 P. M., June 8th, 1919, at which following were present:

General Mejack, Military Governor Zabaikal District.
Brigadier General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army, and a Staff Officer.
General Panchenco, Commanding Russian troops at Beresovka.
Colonel C. H. Morrow, Commanding American troops in Verkhne-Udinsk,
Mysovaya sector.
1st. Lieutenant John James, Adjutant to Colonel Morrow.
Russian Interpreter, Mr. Siverman.
Japanese Interpreter, Lieutenant Minami.

Colonel Morrow presented to the Russian and Japanese Generals a copy of letter from American Consul dated June 3, 1919, inclosing a translation of a letter from Colonel Tomlovsky, Commander of an Engineer Company of the 9th

would not arrest any member of the Civilian population but would only be charged with the duty of arresting men of the American command. As the conference was closing, General Korwin Petroski, the Civil Governor, came into General Mejack's Office, and, upon being informed of the agreement between the American Commander and General Mejack, said that he, as Civil Governor of the Province, would not agree to the understanding that had been entered into between General Mejack and the American Commander. That the Americans could not and would not be permitted to station American Military Police in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk and that he, as Civil Governor, would arrest American soldiers when and where he pleased, and would hold them in confinement as long as he pleased, that he would try them by court, under the Russian law, and punish them under the Russian law, and that the American Military Police must at once be removed. He was informed by Colonel Morrow that Americans would maintain a Military Police in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, and that they would not be removed by him or anyone else, that if General Petroski, or the militia which he commanded, arrested any American soldiers and did not immediately release them on demand, they would be taken away from him by force. It was further suggested to him that he at once bring this matter to a practical conclusion by arresting an American soldier and refusing to release him or attempt to try him and await the consequences. This, General Petrovski refused to do. General Petrovski is a creature of Semenoff's - a mountebank and a clown, who openly expressed his hostility to the Americans and called them the enemies of Russia and took no pains to conceal his ill-will and dislike for the Americans in general. He was an active agent in the propaganda against the Americans.

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1st. Lieutenant John James, Adjutant to Colonel Morrow.
Russian Interpreter, Mr. Siverman.
Japanese Interpreter, Lieutenant Minami.

Colonel Morrow presented to the Russian and Japanese Generals a copy of letter from American Consul dated June 3, 1919, inclosing a translation of a letter from Colonel Tomlovsky, Commander of an Engineer Company of the 9th Siberian Division, relative to the attack on his company at Selenga and arrest of his officers and men by Semenoff's forces on June 1st, 1919. (Translation of the letter from Colonel Tomlovsky quoted in paragraph 6 of this communication.)

General Yoshie - "I do not know the facts of the case, but I believe that the statements of Colonel Tomlovsky are true."

Colonel Morrow - "Thirty-three men from Engineer Company referred to are now held by armored train at the station (Verkhne-Udinsk)."

General Yoshie - 'I have no direct concern about this matter and will therefore give Colonel Morrow my personal opinion, not my official opinion.'

Colonel Morrow - 'On May 8th, 1919, the crew of the armored car threatened to whip certain railroad employees, May 16th, seized a car held by American Commander, and threatened to whip Russian caretaker if he reported the facts. May 28th, a train of seven cars under charge of an American R.R.S.C. Officer was in the Verkhne-Udinsk yards. The armored train demanded that one car of the R.R.S.C. train be turned over to the armored train. The demand was refused after which the Officer in charge of the R.R.S.C. train was informed that if car was not turned over within an hour the armored train would fire upon him. May 29th, 1919, armored train opened its ports, manned its guns and trained them on a car under charge of an American guard. June 1st, 1919, armored car moves out of yards and holds up train at Salenga, arresting certain military passengers. The above recited facts make it clear that the armored train does interfere with traffic and is a menace to the American sector and must therefore move out of the American sector and I request that General Yoshie and General Mejack assist me to have the armored car removed from American Sector within 24 hours. I am responsible for security of railroad, if armored car does not move within 24 hours from 5 P.M., June 6th, 1919, I will make battle on it.'

General Yoshie - 'I understand armored car used to treat people as Colonel Morrow states, whip employees, etc., but at the same time the armored car helps to stop the Bolsheviks and to arrest suspects.'

Colonel Morrow - 'I do not desire bloodshed but must carry out my orders. The armored car interferes with the American guard, interferes with passengers, shop up train No. 21, June 21st. It must go.'

General Panchenco - 'The Engineer Company apprehended and arrested by the armored car left Beresovka without authority and it was at my request that the armored car acted on June 1st. The armored car is under orders of Lieutenant Colonel Lvoff, Commanding Russian troops at Park Barracks, but this time they went out at my request.'

Colonel Morrow to General Panchenco - 'Did you know the American Command was in charge of the guarding of the railroad in this sector?'

General Panchenco - 'I did not.'

Colonel Morrow - 'But I officially informed you of that fact. The armored car has no right to fight in the American sector without the knowledge of the American Commander.'

General Mejack - 'I can move the armored car on my own orders. Will Colonel Morrow be responsible for the safety of country in vicinity of railroad if armored car is moved?'

Colonel Morrow - 'Yes, if you desire to send armored car into the American sector to apprehend criminals I will give necessary permission.'

General Yoshie - 'I understand that armored train did threaten

General Yoshie - "I have no direct concern about this matter and will therefore give Colonel Morrow my personal opinion, not my official opinion."

Colonel Morrow - "On May 8th, 1919, the crew of the armored car threatened to whip certain railroad employees, May 16th, seized a car held by American Commander, and threatened to whip Russian caretaker if he reported the facts. May 28th, a train of seven cars under charge of an American R.R.S.C. Officer was in the Verkhne-Udinsk yards. The armored train demanded that one car of the R.R.S.C. train be turned over to the armored train. The demand was refused after which the Officer in charge of the R.R.S.C. train was informed that if car was not turned over within an hour the armored train would fire upon him. May 29th, 1919, armored train opened its ports, manned its guns and trained them on a car under charge of an American guard. June 1st, 1919, armored car moves out of yards and holds up train at Salenga, arresting certain military passengers. The above recited facts make it clear that the armored train does interfere with traffic and is a menace to the American sector and must therefore move out of the American sector and I request that General Yoshie and General Mejack assist me to have the armored car removed from American Sector within 24 hours. I am responsible for security of railroad, if armored car does not move within 24 hours from 5 P.M., June 8th, 1919, I will make battle on it."

General Yoshie - "I understand armored car used to treat people as Colonel Morrow states, whip employees, etc., but at the same time the armored car helps to stop the Bolsheviks and to arrest suspects."

Colonel Morrow - "I do not desire bloodshed but must carry out my orders. The armored car interferes with the American guard, interferes with passengers, shop up train No. 21, June 21st. It must go."

General Panchenco - "The Engineer Company apprehended and arrested by the armored car left Beresovka without authority and it was at my request that the armored car acted on June 1st. The armored car is under orders of Lieutenant Colonel Lvoff, Commanding Russian troops at Park Barracks, but this time they went out at my request."

Colonel Morrow to General Panchenco - "Did you know the American Command was in charge of the guarding of the railroad in this sector?"

General Panchenco - "I did not."

Colonel Morrow - "But I officially informed you of that fact. The armored car has no right to fight in the American sector without the knowledge of the American Commander."

General Mejack - "I can move the armored car on my own orders. Will Colonel Morrow be responsible for the safety of country in vicinity of railroad if armored car is moved?"

Colonel Morrow - "Yes, if you desire to send armored car into the American sector to apprehend criminals I will give necessary permission."

General Yoshie - "I understand that armored train did threaten American guards at Verkhne-Udinsk, did threaten and arrest passengers but the Engineer Company stopped was running away, and I cannot agree to proposal to open fire on armored train."

Colonel Morrow - "To all. I ask you as the American Commander in charge of guarding the railroad and as the power responsible for its full operation to remove the armored car from this sector and prevent bloodshed

in the city and a conflict between armed forces. I tell you this car is and has been and continues to threaten the operations of the railroad, and the lives of its employees. I tell you this in order that you may be fully informed. I cannot carry out my orders if the car remains here.'

Colonel Morrow to General Yoshie - 'What action will the Japanese take when I open fire?'

General Yoshie's reply to Colonel Morrow - 'If you open fire of course the Japanese Army will stand neutral, but I personally think that it is not quite right to fire on such short notice. Of course if a battle occurs I am under orders of Lieutenant General Oba, my division commander. I hope that no such trouble occurs in the vicinity of my command. I request you to ask Ataman Semenoff to take the armored car away. I will ask Lieutenant General Oba to use his influence to have the armored car removed.'

General Mejack - 'I am not in charge of the armored train but Ataman Semenoff is in charge of it. I will transmit to him the request of Colonel Morrow for the removal of the car. I consider twenty four hours ample time for the armored car to be removed.'

General Yoshie - 'This is different from the policy of the Japanese which is to let the Russians settle small affairs the Japanese troops only being sent against large forces.'

Colonel Morrow - 'I am charged with the good operation of the railroad and am carrying out an Allied agreement to which both the Russians and Japanese are a part. The Allies put me here, not America. I am carrying out orders, when the armored car opposes me it opposes the Allies and the Omsk Government. It is the American Commander's duty to decide what constitutes a menace to or an interference with the railroad and to determine the action to be taken. It is your duty to support me in that action. I do not intend to permit the armored car to go up and down the American sector interfering with traffic and arresting and killing passengers without any legal right or authority.'

Colonel Morrow to Generals Mejack and Panchenco - 'I request you to communicate my demands and the reasons therefore to the armored car Commandern and ask him to take his car East, not West. In case the armored car does not move by 5:00 P.M. tomorrow, I request you to notify all people at or in the vicinity of the railroad station and yards, to move out of the line of fire and to issue orders to the troops at Park Barracks that they must not attempt to cross the river from now on and the troops at Beresovka that they must not enter the city of Verkhne-Udinsk from this time until the question of the armored car is settled. After 5:00 P.M., June 9th, the Russian troops now in the city must remain in their barracks pending disposition of armored train. This to prevent a general conflict in the city.'

General Mejack - 'In reply to the ultimatum of Colonel Morrow, I desire to say that I consider the demand for the removal of the armored car unlawful and as not meeting the situation and an interference in the administration of the Russian Government and its guarding of law and order, against all this I protest. I consider it necessary to have an armored train in the American sector for my needs. I shall report this entire affair to my superior authorities as the armored car is in charge of Ataman Semenoff in the district in which I govern.'

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Colonel Morrow - 'I believe this brings our conference to a close.'

JOHN JAMES
1st. Lieut., 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant,
RECORDER"

At 5:00 P. M. of the same day, June 8th, the following telegram was sent to Field Ataman Semenoff:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 8th, 1919.
Field Ataman Semenoff, Chita. On account of interference with the railroad, seizure of cars, violation of all orders, interference with and threatening attitude towards my guard and the railroad employees, undisciplined and unwarranted obstruction of passenger traffic, interference with working parties, etc., I request the immediate removal of the armored cars now here to Chita. Their presence endangers the railroad and under my orders I will forcibly destroy them if they are not removed by five P M. tomorrow June ninth. As commander of this sector under the Allied agreement and the agreement with the supreme dictator for the guarding of the railroad, I request their removal in order to prevent bloodshed. I will write you a fully explanation of this entire affair tomorrow. I feel that you will fully agree with me when you receive this report. This is for the best interest of all concerned and I request your cooperation and prompt agreement with my request. I have fully informed the Japanese commander and the Russian General here of my decision and intention. Morrow, Commander, U. S. Troops, Baikal Sector."

To carry into effect the ultimatum which had been given to General Mejack, General Panchenco, and the armored train, Company "I" with two machine guns was sent to a point about two versts west of the Verkhne-Udinsk railroad station to control the roads leading from Beresovka to the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. Three 37-MM guns were entrenched during the night at points 800 and 1200 yards to the east of the armored train, Company "L" with two one pound rapid fire Poms-Poms and the remainder of the Machine Gun Company under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William C. Miller, were sent to the high ground West of the Uda River to prevent the Cossacks then stationed at the Park Barracks from crossing the river and entering the city. Two platoons were sent into the city under the command of Captain White to control the city barracks. These dispositions prevented a concentration of the Russian forces and left the American command in the center of these forces intact. All detachments and outposts were connected by telephone with the Headquarters at the camp which occupied a central position as regards the detachments. On June 9th, at 8:30 A. M., the following telegram was received from General Yoshie:

"June 9th, 1919. Telegram from General Yoshie to Mr. Minami. Transmit the following to Colonel Morrow: 'I understood your request to be reasonable once, but as I think it over more it is hard to believe that this demand should be made directly, because anyhow it is a demand on Russian troops. Therefore I think it will be much better for the interest of the future if we both report to Vladivostok for a settlement by the commander in chief of the Allied troops, so that I wish you most thoughtfully further consider your action. Yoshie.'"

To which the Commanding Officer replied as follows:

"Headquarters Twenty-Seventh Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 9th, 1919. Major General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army, through Mr. Minami. I acknowledge receipt of your letter of this morning. I have given this grave matter the most profound consideration. I have sent Ataman Semenoff a telegram, a copy of which

Field Ataman Semenoff, Chita. On account of interference with the railroad, seizure of cars, violation of all orders, interference with and threatening attitude towards my guard and the railroad employees, undisciplined and unwarranted obstruction of passenger traffic, interference with working parties, etc., I request the immediate removal of the armored cars now here to Chita. Their presence endangers the railroad and under my orders I will forcibly destroy them if they are not removed by five P. M. tomorrow June ninth. As commander of this sector under the Allied agreement and the agreement with the supreme dictator for the guarding of the railroad, I request their removal in order to prevent bloodshed. I will write you a fully explanation of this entire affair tomorrow. I feel that you will fully agree with me when you receive this report. This is for the best interest of all concerned and I request your cooperation and prompt agreement with my request. I have fully informed the Japanese commander and the Russian General here of my decision and intention. Morrow, Commander, U. S. Troops, Baikal Sector."

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On June 9th at 10:00 A.M., Colonel Kasai and Major T. Fukisawa, Imperial Japanese Army, 33rd regiment of Infantry, called on Colonel Morrow at the American Headquarters. The following conversation took place:

"Ultimatum of the Japanese delivered to Colonel C. H. Morrow, Commanding 27th U. S. Infantry at American Headquarters, Verkhne-Udinsk, June 9th, 1919, by Colonel Kasai and Major T. Fukisawa, Imperial Japanese Army, 33rd regiment of Infantry.

Colonel Kasai - 'I have been sent to you by General Yoshie. There were so many people at the conference yesterday that he fears that he might not have made himself clear so he has sent me here to make a full statement of the Japanese position. Due to the fact that Russians were present at the conference of yesterday, General Yoshie could not say certain things he desired to say.' (Colonel Kasai then makes a reference to note from General Yoshie, dated June 9th, 1919, quoted in paragraph 8, page 24, of this communication) 'General Yoshie says even armored trains comes under dispatch of Russian troops. Even Russians could not order armored train to leave from Verkhne-Udinsk. No one can direct removal of armored train without authority from Allied Commander, so that is necessary that the armored train remain here until orders for its removal is received from General Otani. General Yoshie therefore asks Colonel Morrow to suspend the execution of his, Colonel Morrow's order directing armored train to remove at 5:00 P.M., June 9, 1919, until receipt of instructions from General Otani. I ask your decision in the matter.'

Colonel Morrow then handed telegram dated June 9th, 1919, and addressed to General Yoshie which contains decision requested. (Telegram quoted in paragraph 8, page 24, of this communication). Mr. Minami read telegram to Colonel Kasai and Major Fukisawa.

Colonel Morrow - 'Does General Yoshie promise to remain neutral still remain good, if I fire upon the armored car, and if not, what steps will General Yoshie take?'

Colonel Kasai - 'General Yoshie states that Japanese will keep their promise and remain neutral in case of an armed conflict between the American forces and the armored car in the American sector. But if you fire on armored car and all Russian troops oppose you and a large battle ensues, the Japanese will be unable to remain out of the conflict. All questions will be settled if armored car is removed, so that I again ask you to wait for the decision of General Otani.'

Colonel Morrow - 'In case a conflict does occur which side will the Japanese take?'

Colonel Kasai - 'Of course we do not expect a general battle, but if it does occur, I cannot give an answer at this time as to the side the Japanese would take. This matter is solely a question of the removal of the armored train. If Colonel Morrow will not suspend his order for the removal of the armored train the Japanese will take the armored train to Beresovka and prevent the Americans troops from firing upon it'.

Colonel Morrow - 'Then I understand you to say that the Japanese say they will resist by force the removal of the armored car by the American troops from the American sector and that the Japanese accept full responsibility for any thing that may occur as a result of their action and will remove the armored car to Beresovka and protect it against the American troops.'

Colonel Kasai - 'That is correct.'

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Colonel Kasai - 'That is correct.'

Colonel Morrow - 'When will you remove the armored car? Will you remove it by 4:00 P. M. today?'

Colonel Kasai - 'Yes'.

Colonel Morrow - 'I ask you to put Japanese troops aboard when armored car leaves the yard'.

Colonel Kasai - 'I agree.'

Colonel Morrow - 'I do not intend to bring on a conflict with the Japanese with orders from higher authority.'

Colonel Kasai - 'I wish you to understand very well that Japanese do not mean any trouble against the Americans but desire to prevent trouble.'

Colonel Morrow - 'I thought I was in charge of this sector but it appears that General Yoshie is. I believe that our conference is now ended and that this matter now rests in the hands of higher authority.'

Pursuant to the foregoing the armored train was moved to Beresovka at 1:30 P. M. The Japanese did not place a guard aboard as it went out. Lieutenant Colonel Miller was sent to General Yoshie's Headquarters to make inquiries why this was not done. The Japanese replied that the armored train had moved to Beresovka before they could place guards aboard it and that it was then under guard of the Japanese and would remain so and would not be permitted to move out of Beresovka without the express permission of Colonel Morrow. From 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 8th to 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 9th, the Russian forces at Beresovka, at the Park Barracks and the City Barracks, did not attempt in any way to move into the city and in every way carried out the order which had been given by the American Commander not to attempt any movement to concentrate against the city. On January 9th, 1919, 2:40 P.M. the following telegram was received from Ataman Semenov:

"Chita, June 9th, 1919. To representative of American Command, Morrow. I agree to remove immediately the armored car if you guarantee to me the full cessation of disorder and indecent acts. I rely upon documents I have, by members of your troops, towards the peaceful population in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk and have the proper respect for the Russian law, Russian uniform and for Russian customs as other Allies who are in Russian territory have period Looking for friendly and cooperative work with the Allies in establishing government, law and order in my country, to my great sorrow, I realize that some members of the American troops are not cooperating with our joint work but interfere with its success. What would be useful and good only for our enemies Bolsheviks. If you will not give me the requested guarantee in order to remove the armored car about five o'clock, then I, as a Russian officer and citizen cannot permit any mockery on the Russian nation and on the Russian national dignity and on your challenge made, will immediately send troops to Verkhne-Udinsk. If the commander of the armored car committed any unlawful acts or interference, then he will be tried by court. Await satisfactory decision from you as a representative of the Allied command in the Baikal sector as I believe the American troops were sent to Russia not to fight with the Russian troops but for joint work in establishing law and order. About the above I am reporting to the headquarters of the supreme dictator to report to the supreme dictator and the Allied command. 4426 Eastern Siberian. Colonel Semenov."

To which the Commanding Officer replied as follows:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 9th, 1919, 4:00 P. M. Field Ataman Semenov, Chita. Your telegram received. As regards to conduct of my troops, their discipline and behavior will compare most favorably with that of your own troops. My respect for Russian law and customs is as high as your own. I am fully informed as to my mission in Siberia and shall continue to carry it out. That mission is assistance to the Russian people. If you dispatch troops here with hostile intentions toward my command I shall meet them in a similar manner.

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On June 10th, 1919, Ataman Semenoff replied as follows:

"Chita, June 10th, 1919. To American Colonel Morrow. Your telegram received. Looking from the point of view of not permitting foreign interference in the internal affairs of Russia I shall ask permission only from higher Russian Command and your gentle, beneficent permission, sent to my headquarters, I ascribe only to an incorrect translation of your thoughts by your interpreter. Ataman Semenoff."

On June 18th the armored train, through General Yoshie, requested permission to be permitted to proceed to Chita, stopping in Verkhne-Udinsk one hour for repairs. This permission was granted and the armored train proceeded out of the American sector, thus ending the first incident of the Semenoff armored trains. It may be noted, however in this connection, that, during the retention of the armored train at Beresovka while under the charge of the Japanese and under their guard, the crew of the armored train arrested two Austrian prisoners, Isadore Singer and Joseph Gruin. These two men were taken aboard the armored train where 7500 roubles were taken from Isadore Singer and 1500 roubles from Joseph Gruin. They were then given 150 strokes apiece, iron rods (rifle cleaning rods) being used in their whipping. No physician was permitted to see these men for over twenty-four hours. From the terrific whipping that these men received, Isadore Singer is still an invalid and unable to perform labor of any character. (See report of Colonel Johann Napoleon, hereto appended marked "E".) On June 10th Mr. Stevens, Head of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, passed through Verkhne-Udinsk on his way to Harbin. After a conference in which the entire situation was laid before him, Mr. Stevens sent the following telegram:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 10th, 1919. Commanding General, A. E. V., Vladivostok. From all reports I have received, the operations of Semenoff's armored trains in the American sector constitute an interference with the railroad, its operation and its employees. There is no necessity for Semenoff's armored trains in this sector, nor is their presence desired. Stevens."

On June 18th the heavily armored train "Destroyer" left Mogzon for Verkhne-Udinsk, forcing its way along the railroad, and arrived on June 19th. Immediately after its arrival Colonel Kovolovsky, Commanding the Russian troops at Beresovka, and the senior Russian Commander at that time in either Verkhne-Udinsk or Beresovka, came to the American Headquarters and the following conference took place:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia,
June 19, 1919.

Conference at the American camp beginning at 10:30 A. M., June 19, 1919, with reference to the armored train which arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, on June 19, 1919, from Chita.

PRESENT:

Americans:

Colonel C. H. Morrow, 27th Infantry.
1st. Lieut. John James, 27th Infantry, Adjutant
(Present, but not taking part. Colonel J. D. Leitch, Acting
Inspector General, Inspector).
Mr. Silverman - Interpreter.

received. Looking from the point of view of not permitting foreign interference in the internal affairs of Russia I shall ask permission only from higher Russian Command and your gentle, beneficent permission, sent to my headquarters, I ascribe only to an incorrect translation of your thoughts by your interpreter. Ataman Semenoff."

On June 18th the armored train, through General Yoshie, requested permission to be permitted to proceed to Chita, stopping in Verkhne-Udinsk one hour for repairs. This permission was granted and the armored train proceeded out of the American sector, thus ending the first incident of the Semenoff armored trains. It may be noted, however in this connection, that, during the retention of the armored train at Beresovka while under the charge of the Japanese and under their guard, the crew of the armored train arrested two Austrian prisoners, Isadore Singer and Joseph Gruin. These two men were taken aboard the armored train where 7500 roubles were taken from Isadore Singer and 1500 roubles from Joseph Gruin. They were then given 150 strokes apiece, iron rods (rifle cleaning rods) being used in their whipping. No physician was permitted to see these men for over twenty-four hours. From the terrific whipping that these men received, Isadore Singer is still an invalid and unable to perform labor of any character. (See report of Colonel Johann Napoleon, hereto appended marked "E".) On June 10th Mr. Stevens, Head of the Inter-allied Technical Board, passed through Verkhne-Udinsk on his way to Harbin. After a conference in which the entire situation was laid before him, Mr. Stevens sent the following telegram:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, June 10th, 1919. Commanding General, A. E. V., Vladivostok. From all reports I have received, the operations of Semenoff's armored trains in the American sector constitute an interference with the railroad, its operation and its employees. There is no necessity for Semenoff's armored trains in this sector, nor is their presence desired. Stevens."

On June 18th the heavily armored train "Destroyer" left Mogzon for Verkhne-Udinsk, forcing its way along the railroad, and arrived on June 19th. Immediately after its arrival Colonel Kovolovsky, Commanding the Russian troops at Beresovka, and the senior Russian Commander at that time in either Verkhne-Udinsk or Beresovka, came to the American Headquarters and the following conference took place:

Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia,
June 19, 1919.

Conference at the American camp beginning at 10:30 A. M., June 19, 1919, with reference to the armored train which arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, on June 19, 1919, from Chita.

PRESENT:

Americans:

Colonel C. H. Morrow, 27th Infantry.
1st. Lieut. John James, 27th Infantry, Adjutant
(Present, but not taking part, Colonel J. D. Leitch, Acting
Inspector General, Inspector) etc.
Mr. Silverman - Interpreter.

Russians:

Colonel Kovolovsky, Commanding Russian Division at Beresovka
(Divisionnaya Post) and his Adjutant.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I wish to speak concerning the armored train which arrived here from Chita, June 19, 1919. This train is here for the purpose of having some repairs made and will remain here until further orders.

Colonel Morrow: Is it not a fact that at Chita there are better and more commodious shops than here at Verkhne-Udinsk?

Colonel Kovolovsky: I am familiar with the shops at Chita but not those here. I do know that the shops at Chita are greatly overcrowded with work. I would like to know whether or not the American Commander has any objection to the armored train remaining at Verkhne-Udinsk; if so, what objection.

Colonel Morrow: I do object to its being here because it proceeded here by force and against the wishes of the railroad authorities.

Colonel Kovolovsky: What railroad authorities ?

Colonel Morrow: Firstly; the station master at Mogzon. The Superintendent of Transportation of the Operating Division. Secondly: Mr. Stevens, Head of the Operating Department of the railroad objects to the presence of the armored train here, because it interferes with the operation of the railroad, terrorizes railroad employees, menaces station masters and railroad employees and by its barbarous actions creates a reign of terror among the employees of the railroad. Colonel Lantry, R.R. S.C., American Engineer, of the Operating Department with the headquarters at Irkutsk, objects to the presence of the armored train here on the same grounds as Mr. Stevens. Major Cantrell, R.R.S.C., Division Khilok to Irkutsk, with headquarters here also objects to the presence of the armored train here on the same grounds as Mr. Stevens. It refuses to obey the orders or the regulations of my guard at the railroad station and is, in fact, a train for the purpose of whipping railroad employees, civilians and Austrian War Prisoners, without trial and at the whim of its commander or its crew.

Colonel Kovolovsky: The purpose of the armored train is to fight against the Bolsheviks, which must be done only on receipt of orders from higher authority. If such actions as you report have taken place, its commander is responsible and subject to trial by court-martial and if it is found that the offenses reported by you were committed, he will be tried and if you have proofs I would like very much to receive them. The orders from the Kolchak Government prohibit interference with the proper operation of the railroad. The commander of the new armored train received orders to proceed to Verkhne-Udinsk for repairs and knew nothing of the trouble between the Americans and the armored train already at this place. The military authorities did not know that the new armored train was coming here, but now that it has arrived, we are trying to reach some kind of an agreement with the Allies with reference to its remaining here.

Colonel Morrow: How long have you been in command at Beresovka?

Colonel Kovolovsky: Since last December.

Colonel Morrow: Did you direct officers from the armored train to come to Verkhne-Udinsk, to arrest Austrian prisoners of War Singer and Gruin and to take them on board the armored train at Beresovka, and to give them there 150 lashes?

Colonel Kovolovsky: You have been incorrectly informed. These prisoners of war were deserters from the prison camp at Beresovka. I gave the order for their arrest. Before they deserted they were members of the Red Army as documents found on them prove. Large sums of money were also found on them. For the desertion from the camp they will be tried by court-martial. If it is found that they were in the Red Army they will also be tried for that. I have heard rumors that they were whipped

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Colonel Morrow: Then I understand Colonel Kovolovsky to say that these prisoners were not whipped aboard the armored train nor anywhere else?

Colonel Kovolovsky: That is correct.

Colonel Morrow: Is it not a fact that Singer and Gruin had been living in Verkhne-Udinsk for over a year operating as merchants with the permission of the Russian authorities?

Colonel Kovolovsky: No.

Colonel Morrow: Is not Gruin a married man and has he not a wife in Verkhne-Udinsk.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I know for the last year he has lived with a woman; whether he is married or not I do not know.

Colonel Morrow: What is your opinion of Colonel Napoleon, senior war prisoner at Beresovka with reference to his character and veracity?

Colonel Kovolovsky: I know that the war prisoners themselves are not satisfied with him. Colonel Napoleon desires to have authority over the war prisoners and abuses that authority when he gets it. Some dissatisfaction has arisen over certain money kept by him for other war prisoners. I once had a great deal of confidence in him but later was disappointed with his conduct.

Colonel Morrow: The objection to the armored train here comes from every official in the operating department of the railroad and as American Commander, I also object to its presence here because it interferes with the operation of the railroad, terrorizes railroad employees, and menaces the railroad and my guard.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I desire to assure you that no misunderstandings will occur again and that it will menace no one.

Colonel Morrow: But, I tell you that the railroad officials say it is a menace and that it does interfere and they do not desire it here and do want it removed.

Colonel Kovolovsky: Officially there could be no misunderstanding with the civilian population or the railroad employees. The purpose of the armored train here is to prevent Bolshevik uprisings and to resist their attacks.

Colonel Morrow: Do you not understand that the American Army assumes full responsibility for the guarding of the railroad from the Bolsheviks, and that I am charged with that duty, not the armored train, and that I guarantee that I will do it.

Colonel Kovolovsky: The situation is such that for the last month everything is quiet in this sector, but the Bolsheviks work quietly, keep on agitating, and some steps must be taken to stop them from this purpose, therefore the presence of the armored train is very desirable.

Colonel Morrow: I have 2300 soldiers to suppress Bolshevik uprisings wherever they may occur.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I understand that.

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Colonel Morrow: How many troops are there at Park Barracks, are there not at least 500 men?

Colonel Kovolovsky: Yes.

Colonel Morrow: How many have you at Beresovka?

Colonel Kovolovsky: About 3000.

Colonel Morrow: Are there not about 3500 Japanese troops at Beresovka with three armored cars?

Colonel Kovolovsky: They have no armored cars only some cars with a few guns mounted.

Colonel Morrow: With all these forces why should it be necessary to have here a Semenoff arm red train, when the railroad officials object and the American Commander charged with the guarding of the railroad objects?

Colonel Kovolovsky: But the armored train can go more quickly.

Colonel Morrow: But I say that I will have an armored car here and will go out and fight against the Bolsheviks within 20 versts of the railroad.

Colonel Kovolovsky: But the Bolsheviks work very carefully and the armored train can often stop affairs before they can develop. When the American Commander puts an armored car here the Russian armored train will leave.

Colonel Morrow: I will have an armored train; until I do guarantee that I will protect the railroad and move as quickly as the armored train.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I agree with you. But will you object to the armored train remaining here a few days, meantime I will make a report of this conference to Chita.

Colonel Morrow: I object to the armored train remaining here one minute. I don't want bloodshed but if the armored train does remain here I believe there will be bloodshed.

Colonel Kovolovsky: But why do you object to the armored train so much; is it not a part of the army.

Colonel Morrow: Yes; but the barbarous actions of the armored train are so numerous and so outrageous that I can not help but object. Yesterday the engineer of the locomotive which pulled the train of the American Inspector General and myself was threatened with a whipping by an officer of the armored car. Several days ago a Corporal from the armored train arrested an Austrian war prisoner at the Station, took him aboard the train and gave him 50 lashes without just cause or authority.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I also know of the last incident; charges will be preferred against that Corporal.

Colonel Morrow: I do not intend to permit an armored train to remain here to threaten the very drivers of my own train. You already know that a couple of weeks ago the armored train took by force a car from a telephone work train under the charge of an American Engineer. I have had appeal after appeal from General Artemieff that soldiers and troops under orders or enroute to the front were prevented by the armored train from proceeding and for me to have the train removed.

Colonel Kovolovsky: The only case you could possibly refer to is the case of the Engineer Company which left Beresovka June 1st, 1919, without authority. This was before the agreement between Kolchak and Semenoff. About 60 of these men remained at Beresovka. At that time, being a part of the 8th Division Commander which authority they did not have.

Colonel Kovolovsky: They have no armored cars why come here with a train mounted.

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Colonel Morrow: Had not the Engineer Company received three or four orders to proceed to the front ?

Colonel Kovolovsky: No.

Colonel Morrow: Have you authority to issue orders to the armored train ?

Colonel Kovolovsky: Yes and they will obey my orders.

Colonel Morrow: Then I request you to have the armored train removed from the American sector.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I would like permission to leave the armored train here for a few days in order that the necessary repairs to it may be made.

Colonel Morrow: Place a definite limit on the time it is to remain and I will give you my answer.

Colonel Kovolovsky: Six days; that is, until the 25th.

Colonel Morrow: On the agreement that it will leave on June 25th and will not return and that no other armored train be sent to replace it, and that while it is here I hold Colonel Kovolovsky responsible for its good conduct and its non-interference with the railroad and its employees or with passenger traffic, I agree that it shall remain.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I accept the conditions and the responsibility and assure you of the good conduct of the armored train and its commander. At the time the armored train arrived its commander was a little nervous as he had just heard of the trouble with the previous armored train and groups of American soldiers approached and walked around his train.

Colonel Morrow: The armored train will not be attacked by my troops before the 25th. I will issue orders to my soldiers not to walk around the train. But I suggest that the cars of the armored train not actually undergoing repairs be taken to your garrison at Beresovka where I have no troops.

Colonel Kovolovsky: I agree. Always when conferring with you I can reach an agreement; but I can not be responsible for unauthorized acts of irresponsible individuals.

JOHN JAMES,
1st Lieut. 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant.
RECORDER"

Pursuant to the above agreement the armored train remained at Verkhne-Udinsk until June 25th when it left for Chita, thus closing the second incident of the armored trains of Ataman Semenov. No other trains of Ataman Semenov ever attempted to come into the American sector until after the fall of Omsk and when Irkutsk was seriously threatened by the uprising of the Social-Democrats. This was late in November. On June 20th the following letter was received from Colonel George H. Emerson, R.R.S.C.

"RUSSIAN RAILWAY SERVICE CORPS

Verkhne-Udinsk, June 20, 1919.

Colonel C. H. Morrow,
Commander U. S. 27th Inf. Verkhne-Udinsk.

Dear Colonel:

Colonel Kovolovsky: I would like permission to leave the armored train here for a few days in order that the necessary repairs to it may be made.

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Colonel C. H. Morrow,
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Dear Colonel:

Regarding Colonel Semenov's interference in connection with the operation of the Trans-Baikal Railroad, I wish to advise that I have received almost daily reports from Colonel Lantry, District Inspector assigned to the Trans-Baikal Railroad, to the effect that Colonel Semenov and officers under his command, were interfering with the operation of the railroad to the extent of absolutely controlling the movement of trains and the operation of same.

I made a special trip to Vladivostok, May 30th, for the purpose of placing the matter before the Inter-Allied Board. I discussed the proposition very thoroughly with Mr. Smith, the American representative, and he advised me that the matter had been discussed by the Inter-Allied Board and instructions issued through the military board to the various Allied Commanders that they were assigned to protect the railroad, that they must use force, if necessary, to see that railroad transportation was not interfered with and further that Allied inspectors were to call on military commanders if troops were necessary to avoid interference of Semenoff's or other forces interfering with railroad transportation.

The operation of Semenoff's armored cars in the district, Manchuria, to Mysovaya, is a menace and they are interfering with the Russian railroad officials, and have issued instructions to the effect that they have not recognized Allied operation of the railroad. The operation of the armored cars has created a reign of terror among the employees and their presence in your sector is not necessary and is not desired.

Yours very truly,

George H. Emerson,
Colonel"

On July 15th, the following letter addressed to Major S. T. Cantrell, R.R.S.C. was transmitted to Colonel Morrow. This letter shows conclusively that the interference of Semenoff's armored trains had grown so great that the R.R.S.C. men had been recalled from the sector which was guarded by the Japanese but which was under complete dominance of Semenoff:

July 15, 1919.

Major Cantrell:

On account of Semenoff's Colonel Jookovsky taking away by force Major Gravis' business car, number 5, please arrange for our inspectors on divisions to the east of Verkhne-Udinsk to return to their headquarters and stay there and not try to do any work until I advise you that there will not be any interference of our railway work. From International Committee.

Lantry."

9. From June to September the guarding of the railroad was a very easy task. At no point was the railroad attacked or any attempts made by any one to in any way interfere with the railroad or the railroad guard. Frequent reconnaissances were made by the various platoons into the nearby villages covering the entire sector. A reconnaissance sketch and a full report on every village were made during July and August. On July 27th, an athletic team, a football squad, a band and a large number of officers were sent to Irkutsk to take part in an athletic contest with the Czecho-Slovak forces at that place. On July 31st the following telegram was received:

"Irkutsk, July 30th,. Colonel Morrow, American Army, Verkhne-Udinsk. Sergeant Velanage and Sergeant Natafalusy arrested by Russian military authorities on night of July 27th charged with disorderly conduct and beating

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"Irkutsk, July 30th. Colonel Morrow, American Army, Verkhne-Udinsk. Sergeant Velanage and Sergeant Natafalusy arrested by Russian military authorities on night of July 27th charged with disorderly conduct and beating Russian official. Russian investigation completed. General Sechoff commander of this military district informs American Consul and myself that our soldiers are entirely to blame and refuses to release them unless General Artemieff so orders. We previously saw Artemieff who was cordial, promised quick investigation but stated case under General Sechoff's jurisdiction. From beginning I promised full prosecution by you, if released to me under arrest. Consul made point that arrested foreign soldiers must be delivered into custody of

responsible officers of army to which soldiers belonged, but this General Sechoff refuses to admit. I have story of this affair from Czech Provost Marshal, our men and Russians - all stories conflict, and I believe our soldiers did not give me full details. I foresee only delay and, eventually, Russian prosecution. Consul Williams advising Consul General Harris at Omsk. Advise me additional action to be taken. Novak, Lieutenant 27th U. S. Infantry.

This telegram was immediately transmitted to the American Headquarters at Vladivostok with the following additions:

"I have telegraphed the American Consul and General Artemieff demanding release of these men and an apology for their detention after proper officials demanded their release. If the Russian authorities can arrest, hold and try American soldiers, they can arrest, hold and try the Commanding General and the entire American Army. If not instructed to the contrary, and if soldiers are not released in 24 hours, I shall arrest two high military officials here and hold them in confinement until the two soldiers are released to me for trial. We cannot permit this principle of arresting and holding soldiers for one moment, if we do we are destroyed. Immediate reply requested. Morrow".

The following telegram was immediately sent to Lieutenant Novak, Irkutsk, care of the American Consul:

"Continue the demand by the American Consul as forcefully as possible for the release of our men. Demand apology for their detention. I have wired AMEX outlining retaliation and asking authority to execute. I have telegraphed General Artemieff as follows quote. General Artemieff, Irkutsk. The holding of two American soldiers in the prison at Irkutsk after a demand for their release and trial by proper American authorities violates every principle of Allied cooperation. If the militia at Irkutsk can arrest, hold and try American soldiers, they can also arrest, hold and try the Commanding General of the American or Allied forces. This claim is ridiculous. These men must at once be released to the American Consul for trial by me. I trust to your Excellency to rebuke this official for his stupidity and cause him to apologize to the American Consul for holding these men after he had asked for their release to him. Unquote. Morrow."

At the same time the following telegram was sent to the American Consul at Irkutsk:

"Demand the immediate release of the two American soldiers now held by the Russian authorities. The Russians must not attempt to try American soldiers. Their guilt or innocence has nothing to do with the matter. They must be released immediately. If they can arrest and try one soldier they could arrest and try the entire American Army, which is absurd. If they are not released on your demand, telegraph me. They will be tried here and the Russian authorities may submit any proof that pleases them. If these men are not released immediately I shall retaliate in a manner that the Russian authorities will long remember. Morrow."

On August 1st, at 7 o'clock in the morning, these two American soldiers were turned over to the American Consul and were brought by Lieutenant Novak to Verkne-Udinsk. A full investigation of the matter clearly established that these two old and excellent noncommissioned officers were bringing home a drunken, inoffensive American soldier and a militiaman tried to arrest the American soldiers and this the two sergeants would not permit, whereupon a Russian officer attempted to interfere

DO NOT GIVE ME FULL DETAILS. I WILL ONLY USE AS NECESSARY FOR PROSECUTION. Consul Williams advising Consul General Harris at Omsk. Advise me additional action to be taken. Novak, Lieutenant 27th U. S. Infantry.

This telegram was immediately transmitted to the American Headquarters at Vladivostok with the following additions:

"I have telegraphed the American Consul and General Artemieff demanding release of these men and an apology for their detention after proper officials demanded their release. If the Russian authorities can arrest, hold and try American soldiers, they can arrest, hold and try the Commanding General and the entire American Army. If not instructed to the contrary, and if soldiers are not released in 24 hours, I shall arrest two high military officials here and hold them in confinement until the two soldiers are released to me for trial. We cannot permit this principle of arresting and holding soldiers for one moment, if we do we are destroyed. Immediate reply requested. Morrow".

The following telegram was immediately sent to Lieutenant Novak, Irkutsk, care of the American Consul:

"Continue the demand by the American Consul as forcefully as possible for the release of our men. Demand apology for their detention. I have wired AMEX outlining retaliation and asking authority to execute. I have telegraphed General Artemieff as follows quote. General Artemieff, Irkutsk. The holding of two American soldiers in the prison at Irkutsk after a demand for their release and trial by proper American authorities violates every principle of Allied cooperation. If the militia at Irkutsk can arrest, hold and try American soldiers, they can also arrest, hold and try the Commanding General of the American or Allied forces. This claim is ridiculous. These men must at once be released to the American Consul for trial by me. I trust to your Excellency to rebuke this official for his stupidity and cause him to apologize to the American Consul for holding these men after he had asked for their release to him. Unquote. Morrow."

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"Vladivostok, August 3rd, 1919. Colonel Morrow, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number 410. Your number 396 dated three-thirty P. M. July thirty-first received here six fifty-seven P.M. August first. Inasmuch as our govern-

ment has not recognized the government in Russia we have not recognized thus far the right of Russian courts to arrest and try our men. If you have carried out your plans it is presumed that before the receipt of this telegram you will have arrested the two high Russian officials for which action you must assume full responsibility. Such action is drastic and should have only been taken as a last resort hence the Commanding Officer cannot approve such actions without more detailed information as to the situation. When did this arrest occur? Your statements of the case and our reply has been wired General Graves at Omsk in addition we are taking the case up here with the Russian authorities.
Robinson."

BARRACKS Cont'd. (See Par. 5.)

10. The question of securing barracks, however, for the winter remained a very serious one. Every effort was made to secure barracks but all efforts appeared to be unavailing. On July 28th, 1919, the following telegram was received:

"Vladivostok, July 28, 1919. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number 401. Wire date on what barracks, if any, you have obtained for use in your sector also size and location of additional barracks you will require to accommodate your command this winter. Rush reply. King."

In answer to the above telegram the following telegram was sent:

"Verkhne-Udinsk. July 29th, 1919. AMEX, Vladivostok. Number 391. Regarding your number 401. Barracks obtained for one company at Mysovaya. These barracks will require expenditure of five thousand dollars to make habitable for winter. Also three small buildings to accommodate ten men must be constructed to care for outguards along the railroad from latter point. No other barracks secured. Barracks will be required here for one thousand eight hundred forty men and stables for three hundred forty five men animals. The Park Barracks will accommodate one thousand men and a large number of animals. Beresovka will accommodate the entire command if Japanese leave which is rumored. Barracks and stables there in bad repair and will require large expenditure of money and time to bring them up to American living standards. If barracks are secured there estimate will be submitted as soon as barracks are inspected. Besides this half barrack for sixty men must be constructed near railroad station here. A half barrack must be constructed at Mostovoi for sixty men and one small building for sixteen men at Tataurovo. A half barrack at Salenga for sixty men and one small building for ten men. A half barrack for sixty men at Pcsolskaya and five small buildings for ten men. The construction of all these half barracks and small buildings should be begun as soon as possible in order to be completed before winter. As regards Park Barracks and Beresovka see my report made to Inspector General regarding barracks. Morrow."

On August the following telegram was received:

"Vladivostok, August 1, 1919. Colonel Morrow, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk, Number 409. How many warehouse have you available at Verkhne-Udinsk and can any of them be altered to supply your requirements for barracks for this winter? Please wire me details and also advise what building materials are available in that territory. King."

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The following reply was made on August 3rd, 1919.

"Verkhne-Udinsk, August 3rd, 1919. AMEX, Vladivostok, Number 399. Reference your 409. We now occupy fourteen warehouses here, also there are twenty three more here making a total of thirty seven. It is believed we can secure these warehouses and that they can be made suitable for winter

quarters. However the interior must be completely relined, space between roof and interior sheeting filled with sawdust, and six stoves per building installed. Bath houses and latrines must also be constructed. The stables to accommodate three hundred forty five animals must be built outright else warehouses useless. Practically all materials available here for this construction save nails and hinges for doors. Russian garrison at Beresovka increased by one thousand men as Japanese who are now under orders move out. Warehouses and all barracks this country under control Semenoff still I believe I can secure warehouses. If we are to winter here the construction of barracks for troops along the railroad as well as here must be commenced at once. This will not admit of delay. If headquarters are prepared to assume expense of construction of these barracks, stables, and repairs of warehouses I will submit estimate of entire cost which however must be far from accurate. Morrow."

On August 8th the following reply was received:

"Vladivostok, August 8th, 1919. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number 422. Reference your four naught four. General Graves has been asked to take this matter up at Omsk and also take it up with you when he comes through. You make sure that is settled with General Graves when he comes through Verkhne-Udinsk. King."

This put an end to any apparent hope of securing barracks at or near Verkhne-Udinsk. However, the Military Governor, General Mejack was again strongly urged by the Commanding Officer to secure the Park Barracks for the use of the American troops as winter quarters and on August 14th, the following letter was received from General Mejack:

"Military Govern,
2nd Military District,
August 14, 1919. No. 4046.

Commanding American Troops in Baikal Sector Colonel Morrow:

In reply to my request to let you have the Park Barracks for winter quarters, I received the following telegram:

On account of the order No. 27 to the Corps, Park Barracks shall be given to the Manchuria Division, who after their return from the front will be filled up by new recruits and therefore they cannot be given to the American command. Automobile repair shop can also be established there, but the mose space shall be given to the Manchurian Division. Beresovka shall be given to the Americans.

Regimental Adjutant Subcovski.

Copy of the preceeding telegram was sent to Beresovka Garrison Commander and to the Chief of Zai-Baikal Engineer Department, Colonel Emelyanov, for orders, to whom you shall apply for information in regard to quarters for your troops.

Major General Mejack."

The authority to utilize the entire warehouse section, 37 buildings, was also received. General Mejack having secured this authority from Haberovsk. After a conference with the Russian Commander at Beresovka and the Chief of the Russian Engineers, together with an inspection of the barracks which it was proposed to give to the Americans at Beresovka, it was decided to

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"Verkhne-Udinsk, August 22nd, 1919. ALEX. Vladivostok. Number 444.
Can secure the war-houses here for use as barracks for entire command.
To prepare them for winter occupation will cost approximately seventy five thousand dollars. Can also secure barracks at Beresovka for entire command.
These barracks in bad repair approximate cost of putting them in proper shape

twenty five to thirty thousand dollars. Location here for hundreds of reasons much preferable to Beresovka. Can secure accommodations for all save two platoons on railroad. These buildings and small buildings for outguards must be constructed at once. If we occupy either the warehouses or the barracks at Beresovka the authority for the expenditure of the sums requested should be immediately authorized in order to render barracks habitable before winter sets in and to save increased cost as materials are increasing in cost. Every day is valuable. These expenditures cannot be avoided. Morrow."

On August 26th the following reply was received:

"Vladivostok, August 23rd, 1919. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Verkhne-Udinsk. Number 462. Reference your four four forty four have referred matter to General Graves at Omsk will advise you earliest practicable date. Meanwhile get possession of barracks at Beresovka. King."

On the night of August 26th at a dinner given in honor of General Yoshie, Imperial Japanese Army, the interpreter of the Commanding Officer, Mr. Silverman, was informed by General Mejack, that he had received that afternoon a telegram from Ataman Semenoff, stating that the barracks at Beresovka would not be given to the American command and that, he, General Mejack, would not deliver this telegram to the Commanding Officer until the following day at 10 O'clock, nor would he communicate it to any official until that time. On the morning of the 27th, at 7 A.M., Company "I" of the 27th Infantry under the command of Captain Fry, was ordered to proceed to Beresovka and take over the barracks at that place, establishing sentries and, after the occupation of the barracks was complete and a guard established, to report his actions to the Russian Commander, Major General Myssura. This was accomplished without incident. On August 27th, the following communication was received from Major General Mejack.

"Military Governor,
2nd Military District,
August 27th, 1919.

Headquarters of the American Troops:

On account of occupation of the Park Barracks and Beresovka Garrison by the Russian troops, those barracks cannot be taken by the American troops. I issued today order to District Committee to assign immediately buildings in the city for American troops. The following sent you for information.

Remark. The above telegram received from the Regimental Adjutant of Military Commander of the Trans-Baikal District by Number 019924/a. Communication from Regimental Adjutant 8th Rifle Division of August 25th, 1919, by No. 4237.

Major General Mejack."

On August 28th the Commanding Officer called on General Myssura at Beresovka, as General Myssura had protested against his occupying the barracks at Beresovka, although previously to this time and on receipt of the original order giving the barracks to the Americans, General Myssura had fully consented to their use by the American troops and had designated the buildings to be occupied by them at Beresovka. This fact was called to the attention of General Myssura, who was informed that the Americans had already occupied the barracks at that place, and had made all their plans and preparations to winter their troops there; that it was too late for those plans to be changed, and that at the American command would continue to occupy barracks, at Beresovka. This decision General Myssura communicated to Ataman Semenoff, at Chita. If any complaint was ever made of this it never came in any official form to the American Headquarters. The barracks assigned at Beresovka for the use of the American troops, had formerly been a prison camp for Austrian prisoners of war, and had been occupied by these prisoners for five years. They were one story log buildings, and in a wretched state of repair. Half of the window-sash being gone and more than two-thirds of the window panes. The stoves were in bad repair. Ten

The sanitary conditions in and around the barracks were such as would deny description. There were no kitchens or mess halls, no stables; all of the latrines were in such condition as prevented their use. All the buildings, while large enough to easily accommodate the entire command, required an enormous amount of work as well as a large expenditure of money. The command had to be moved nine versts from its summer camp, together with four months supplies to Beresovka. At the same time the outguards along the railroad had to be cared for, and their winter quarters prepared. The construction, double walling, flooring and the putting in of windows and stoves for 68 cars, required for the troops along the lines, constituted an enormous task. A station and waiting-room for the guard at Verkhne-Udinsk also had to be constructed. The nights were already beginning to grow cold, fires having to be kept in all of the tents during the night. The task set before the regiment was indeed an enormous one, and permitted no waste of time. By September 12th, the entire command, less the 4th Field Hospital, prisoners and one platoon for guard had taken up station at Beresovka. About 200 Austro-German was prisoners and 150 Russian laborers of all kinds, were set to work on the barracks and grounds. The entire command worked without stopping for Sundays or holidays from the beginning of September until the middle of November to complete the work which was required to make these barracks habitable and equal to a high standard of American sanitation. When this work was about half completed one thousand of the old men of the regiment were sent to the United States and replaced by one thousand recruits. This entirely broke up the working organization of the regiment and required that a new organization be built up with these untrained recruits, which in every way delayed and hampered the work of construction. When the work was completed, the garrison was the completest one I have ever seen in Siberia. Its every feature was excellent. It included: three splendid stables, eleven warehouses, two excellent hospitals, an excellent regimental infirmary, a fine bathhouse, an enormous gymnasium 300 X 48 feet, an ice skating rink 152 X 58 feet. The Y. M. C. A. building was in every way excellent and for colouring and taste could not be surpassed. Excellent kitchens and messhalls were constructed for every organization; officers quarters were repaired and put in excellent condition; a beautiful club building was designed and furnished. The entire garrison was whitewashed inside and outside; the windows and woodwork painted; latrines were placed in excellent condition. The electric light plant was brought from the old camp and installed in the new garrison, the main lines put in and the interior wiring done in 58 buildings. This completely lighted the entire garrison. Telephone lines were constructed through the entire garrison and to the railroad station and Provost Guard in Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk. This white garrison surrounded by the unsightliness and unsanitary conditions of the Russian garrison, presented such a contrast as to fully repay the men of the command for all the labor they had expended.

11. On October 1st, General Dun Levitsky, of Ataman Semenoff's forces, arrived from the vicinity of Chita, with a command of approximately 2000 men. This force consisted largely of Buriat and Mongolian troops, mounted on small Mongolian ponies and armed with lance, rifle and sabre. In addition to this force there was a regiment of artillery consisting of four batteries, two guns each. They immediately took up quarters in the Park Barracks, five versts east of Verkhne-Udinsk. Immediately upon General Levitsky's arrival in the city, he came with the Russian Military and Civil Governors to call on the American Commander at Beresovka. On October 2nd Ataman Semenoff arrived in Verkhne-Udinsk, and was entertained at a dinner by General Levitsky, to which all the officials of the city, and the Japanese and American Commanders were invited and did attend. During the dinner Ataman Semenoff requested the American Commander to review the force of General Levitsky the next morning. The review took place on a field about one mile north of the old 27th Infantry camp. It was apparent to all that this force of Mongolians and Buriats would not present any serious difficulties in an armed encounter with the

as a large expenditure of money. The command had to be moved nine versts from its summer camp, together with four months supplies to Beresovka. At the same time the outguards along the railroad had to be cared for, and their winter quarters prepared. The construction, double walling, flooring and the putting in of windows and stoves for 68 cars, required for the troops along the lines, constituted an enormous task. A station and waiting-room for the guard at Verkhne-Udinsk also had to be constructed. The nights were already beginning to grow cold, fires having to be kept in all of the tents during the night. The task set before the regiment was indeed an enormous one, and permitted no waste of time. By September 12th, the entire command, less the 4th Field Hospital, prisoners and one platoon for guard had taken up station at Beresovka. About 200 Austro-German was prisoners and 150 Russian laborers of all kinds, were set to work on the barracks and grounds. The entire command worked without stopping for Sundays or holidays from the beginning of September until the middle of November to complete the work which was required to make these barracks habitable and equal to a high standard of American sanitation. When this work was about half completed one thousand of the old men of the regiment were sent to the United States and replaced by one thousand recruits. This entirely broke up the working organization of the regiment and required that a new organization be built up with these untrained recruits, which in every way delayed and hampered the work of construction. When the work was completed, the garrison was the completest one I have ever seen in Siberia. Its every feature was excellent. It included: three splendid stables, eleven warehouses, two excellent hospitals, and excellent regimental infirmary, a fine bathhouse, an enormous gymnasium 300 X 48 feet, an ice skating rink 152 X 58 feet. The Y. M. C. A. building was in every way excellent and for colouring and taste could not be surpassed. Excellent kitchens and messhalls were constructed for every organization; officers quarters were repaired and put in excellent condition; a beautiful club building was designed and furnished. The entire garrison was whitewashed inside and outside; the windows and woodwork painted; latrines were placed in excellent condition. The electric light plant was brought from the old camp and installed in the new garrison, the main lines put in and the interior wiring done in 58 buildings. This completely lighted the entire garrison. Telephone lines were constructed through the entire garrison and to the railroad station and Provost Guard in Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk. This white garrison surrounded by the unsightliness and unsanitary conditions of the Russian garrison, presented such a contrast as to fully repay the men of the command for all the labor they had expended.

11. On October 1st, General Dun Levitsky, of Ataman Semenoff's forces, arrived from the vicinity of Chita, with a command of approximately 2000 men. This force consisted largely of Buriat and Mongolian troops, mounted on small Mongolian ponies and armed with lance, rifle and sabre. In addition to this force there was a regiment of artillery consisting of four batteries, two guns each. They immediately took up quarters in the Park Barracks, five versts east of Verkhne-Udinsk. Immediately upon General Levitsky's arrival in the city, he came with the Russian Military and Civil Governors to call on the American Commander at Beresovka. On October 2nd Ataman Semenoff arrived in Verkhne-Udinsk, and was entertained at a dinner by General Levitsky, to which all the officials of the city, and the Japanese and American Commanders were invited and did attend. During the dinner Ataman Semenoff requested the American Commander to review the force of General Levitsky the next morning. The review took place on a field about one mile north of the old 27th Infantry camp. It was apparent to all that this force of Mongolians and Buriats would not present any serious difficulties in an armed encounter with the American or any other armed force. Few of the officers were able to speak with the men and there were but little signs of organization. During the day the American Commander and Ataman Semenoff held a conference, at which the Military Govern, General Mejack, was present. The Ataman said that he deeply regretted the conduct of his armored trains in the American sector and that he had been very badly served by his Commanders and had been deceived and lied to about the conditions at Verkhne-Udinsk and also, that he desired the past to be forgotten. Colonel Morrow informed him

that the Americans were very deeply incensed at the slanderous and untruthful articles which were being published in the Chita papers regarding the Americans; that these articles had for their sole purpose the discrediting of Americans in the eyes of the Russian population and were published as propaganda against the Americans; that they were published at a place where Semennoff was known to be all powerful and the Dictator of Chita; that the Americans, therefore, did hold him responsible for these articles. Ataman Semennoff agreed that many of the articles were not true in fact and promised that articles of a similar character would not again be published in the papers of Chita. The Ataman left for Chita the night of October 3rd. Prior to the arrival of the Mongolian-Buriat troops or Dickie Division (Wild Division) the entire country from Mysovaya to Verkhne-Udinsk and south to the Mongolian Border, had been absolutely peaceful. No apparent reason could be assigned for the stationing of the "Dickie Division" at the Park Barracks in Verkhne-Udinsk. In the West the forces of the Supreme Dictator, Admiral Kolchak, were in a very serious condition, while to the east of Chita the forces of Ataman Semennoff himself were in a most serious and precarious condition. Shortly after the arrival of the Mongolian and Buriat troops, their requisitioning parties began to go into the Interior to the south along the trail of Khatka and to the villages southeast and southwest of Verkhne-Udinsk. These detachments requisitioned food, cattle, horses, etc., and to the peasants of the villages were but raiding bands who took without pay their property and the very food which made life possible. Following these raids reports emanating from Cossack sources began to be received regarding forces of so-called Bolsheviks in the vicinity of Verkhne-Udinsk and throughout the surrounding country. These reports were not credited as it was well known that no such forces existed and that the people labeled as Bolsheviks were but peasants who objected to the forcible seizure of their goods and property. On October 12th Sergeant Stoleff, Cossack, belonging to the command of General Levitsky, was killed by Private Stevens of the 27th Infantry, a member of the Military Police, in a restaurant in Verkhne-Udinsk. Sergeant Stoleff was drunk and threatening all American soldiers with death and destruction. Private Stevens came into the room and Sergeant Stoleff started to draw his sabre and carry into execution his many threats. Stevens immediately shot him, the wound proving fatal after a few hours. General Levitsky, after an investigation, immediately exonerated Private Stevens and stated that Sergeant Stoleff had brought on the killing and that the American soldier acted only in self-defense.

12. Early in October there began, from Vladivostok, a shipment of arms through Verkhne-Udinsk destined for the use of Admiral Kolchak at Omsk. One of these echelons having 45,000 rifles aboard was under the command of Lieutenant Ryan, 31st Infantry, and was guarded by 45 men from the same regiment. On October 23rd, it reached Chita, the Headquarters of Ataman Semennoff. On October 24th the following telegram was received:

"Chita, Siberia, October 24, 1919. Colonel, Morrow, U.S. Army, Beresovka, Siberia. Supply train with rifles for Kolchak at Chita Lieutenant Ryan in charge of train has orders not to let any supplies off the train Semennoff authorities demand that Lieutenant Ryan comply with telegram from Omsk Consul Fowler conferring with Semennoff trouble is expected result of conference will wire immediately train guard forty men five Red Cross doctors result of conference will be known at six PM Genander."

The Commanding Officer telegraphed as follows:

"Beresovka, Siberia, October 24, 1919. American Consul Fowler, Chita. Lieutenant Ryan. Ryans orders must be carried out notify Semennoff that the

the eyes of the Russian population and were published as propaganda against the Americans; that they were published at a place where Semenov was known to be all powerful and the Dictator of Chita; that the Americans, therefore, did hold him responsible for these articles. Ataman Semenov agreed that many of the articles were not true in fact and promised that articles of a similar character would not again be published in the papers of Chita. The Ataman left for Chita the night of October 3rd. Prior to the arrival of the Mongolian-Buriat troops or Dickie Division (Wild Division) the entire country from Mysovaya to Verkhne-Udinsk and south to the Mongolian Border, had been absolutely peaceful. No apparent reason could be assigned for the stationing of the "Dickie Division" at the Park Barracks in Verkhne-Udinsk. In the West the forces of the Supreme Dictator, Admiral Kolchak, were in a very serious condition, while to the east of Chita the forces of Ataman Semenov himself were in a most serious and precarious condition. Shortly after the arrival of the Mongolian and Buriat troops, their requisitioning parties began to go into the Interior to the south along the trail of Khatka and to the villages southeast and southwest of Verkhne-Udinsk. These detachments requisitioned food, cattle, horses, etc., and to the peasants of the villages were but raiding bands who took without pay their property and the very food which made life possible. Following these raids reports emanating from Cossack sources began to be received regarding forces of so-called Bolsheviks in the vicinity of Verkhne-Udinsk and throughout the surrounding country. These reports were not credited as it was well known that no such forces existed and that the people labeled as Bolsheviks were but peasants who objected to the forcible seizure of their goods and property. On October 12th Sergeant Stoleff, Cossack, belonging to the command of General Levitsky, was killed by Private Stevens of the 27th Infantry, a member of the Military Police, in a restaurant in Verkhne-Udinsk. Sergeant Stoleff was drunk and threatening all American soldiers with death and destruction. Private Stevens came into the room and Sergeant Stoleff started to draw his sabre and carry into execution his many threats. Stevens immediately shot him, the wound proving fatal after a few hours. General Levitsky, after an investigation, immediately exonerated Private Stevens and stated that Sergeant Stoleff had brought on the killing and that the American soldier acted only in self-defense.

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The Commanding Officer telegraphed as follows:

"Beresovka, Siberia, October 24, 1919. American Consul Fowler, Chita. Lieutenant Ryan. Ryan's orders must be carried out notify Semenov that the telegram from Omsk will be transmitted to General Graves at Vladivostok and if he orders Lieutenant Ryan to turn over the rifles they will be turned over but authority must be obtained from General Graves this situation must await his decision have Omsk telegram immediately telegraphed to General Graves and request orders and decision be issued to Lieutenant Ryan. Morrow".

The following was received from Chita on October 25th:

"Chita, Siberia, October 25, 1919. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka. Telegram from General Graves states quote Do not give arms to Semenovff end quote. Semenovff has given until 11:00 A.M. this date when he will take rifles by force if possible. Ryan."

To which the Commanding Officer replied as follows:

"Beresovka, Siberia, October 25, 1919. Lieutenant Ryan, Chita. Obey your orders from General Graves and do not turn over arms stay by your train. I am telegraphing Semenovff. Morrow".

The following telegram was dispatched to Ataman Semenovff:

"Beresovka, Siberia. October 25, 1919. Ataman Semenovff, Chita. Urgently request that you take no forcible action against small American eschelon now at Chita. The question of the delivery of arms should be adjusted by the Supreme Dictator. Lieut. Ryan only obeys his orders from the American Commander, General Graves. This question should not lead to battle as the dictator can at a later date dispose of the arms in question as is pleasing to him. Your cooperation is requested in order that this small question may not lead to the gravest and most serious result to Russia. Request you make use of telegraph and communicate with me fully on this subject. Morrow."

At the same time the following telegram was sent to the outlying detachments of the American command:

"Beresovka, Siberia, October 25, 1919. Commanding Officer, American Troops, Mysovaya. Hold company in readiness for immediate move to Verkhne-Udinsk Arrange for transportation with Czech Commander If you receive orders to concentrate here bring all troops from Posolskaya, Salenga and Mysovaya using force if necessary to secure transportation. Morrow."

Within an hour after sending the original telegram to Semenovff, the following reply was received:

"Chita, Siberia, October 25th, 1919. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka, Siberia. Dear Colonel we understand each other I see. Don't worry I shake your hand. Ataman Semenovff.

This Telegram was immediately transmitted to Lieutenant Ryan at Chita and the eschelon containing the rifles was allowed to proceed on its way without molestation. However, this affair assumed very serious proportions as one of Semenovff's armored trains backed down within a few yards of the American eschelon and opened its ports and prepared for action. A strong force of Infantry was sent by Semenovff to the railroad station in Chita which was very near the point where the American eschelon was lying. Lieutenant Ryan uncoupled his ammunition cars from the train, unloading a large number of rifle cases and prepared a breastworks from these rifle cases on each side of the track, behind which he placed his guard and fully prepared for action. These rifles unquestionably would have been taken away by Semenovff from a less resolute and determined officer than Lieutenant Ryan. It was only by his good judgment and determination to fight that prevented this high-handed action on the part of Ataman Semenovff.

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13. It may be noted in this connection that the enormous numbers of executions taking place in the territory controlled by Ataman Semenovff during August, September and October, were daily increasing. The number of railroad men being whipped and executed in this territory had reduced the efficiency of the railroad by over sixty percent and well-informed observers were beginning to fear a complete break-down of the railroad in the territory under his control. On November 9th, Omsk fell and with it the Kolchak Government. Many of the Departments and Ministers evacuated

Omsk and came to Irkutsk. Shortly after their arrival in Irkutsk many reports were received which lead everyone to believe that Irkutsk city was strongly against the remnants of the Kolchak Government and opposed to Semenov who was now left in charge of practically the only organized force in the country.

14. On November 26th, the armored train "Grosnaya" came to Mysovaya. Regarding its actions the Commanding officer at that point telegraphed as follows:

" Mysovaya, Siberia, November 26, 1919. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Beresovka. Number 159. Armored train of Ataman Semenov at this station. Drunken officers and soldiers from this train continually insulting American soldiers. On the twenty-fifth a machine gun was taken from the armored train and mounted for action but was removed when a protest was made. Officers and soldiers from this train have made threats to attack the Czech command here who are quartered in cars on the railway. Recommend immediate removal of armored train from town of Mysovaya as it is a menace to the proper operations of the railway. Waite. Captain Commanding."

The above report was telegraphed to Ataman Semenov November 26th, with the following addition:

"Request you issue orders to armored car commander so that no trouble may occur there. I am responsible for Mysovaya and the railway there and guarantee its safety. I cannot understand the necessity for the armored cars presence at Mysovaya where it is extremely likely to cause trouble on account of its hostile actions. Morrow."

At the same time the following telegram was sent:

"Beresovka, Siberia, November 26th, 1919. Commanding Officer, U. S. Troops, Mysovaya. You know my position regarding the railroad and armored car. If armored car attacks Czechs or fires on railroad cars in the yards destroy the armored car. I am sending Novak and thirty-seven millimeters to you this afternoon. Inform armored train commander that Semenov and myself are friends and that if he precipitates a battle there he will be destroyed. Morrow."

This telegram was communicated to the armored train commander who at once caused his crew to conduct themselves properly and in all ways complied and conformed to the wishes and demands of the American Commander. In reply to the telegram sent to Ataman Semenov, the Chief of Staff of Ataman Semenov replied as follows:

"Chita, Siberia, To Colonel Morrow. The sending of an armored car to Mysovaya is not connected with General Gaida's incident but with the great number of desertions from the Siberian Army, who are prohibited to pass through Zai-Baikal. I request to inform your troops about it. Chief of Staff, Colonel Subcovski. I 3276/a.

The armored train conducted itself in all the few days that it remained in Mysovaya after the warning from the Americans, in a very orderly manner and then departed for Slydyanka, which is outside the American sector. At Slydyanka it at once began the execution of many people, railroad employes and others and the whipping of various people in and around Slydyanka. On December 24th, the Social-Democrats took over the city Irkutsk, deposing the remnants of the Kolchak Government. Fighting continued in the streets of Irkutsk.

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The armored train conducted itself in all the few days that it remained in Mysovaya after the warning from the Americans, in a very orderly manner and then departed for Slydyanka, which is outside the American sector. At Slydyanka it at once began the execution of many people, railroad employes and others and the whipping of various people in and around Slydyanka. On December 24th, the Social-Democrats took over the city Irkutsk, deposing the remnants of the Kolchak Government. Fighting continued in the streets of Irkutsk and its vicinity for several days. Ataman Semennoff sent from Chita the Russian General Skipitroff with four armored trains to retake the city from the Social-Democrats. By far the largest part of the Bariat troops under the command of General Levitsky were dispatched to Irkutsk under the command of General Jardovsky. The Japanese from Beresovka also sent one battalion of about 1000 men to Irkutsk. On the 28th, 29th, and 30th, General Levitsky dispatched three expeditions of from 80 to 100 men into the interior; one to the south towards

the village Cluchi; one to the southeast towards Mohorosky-Sibere, and another expedition to the relief of his second expedition. All three of these expeditions were met by the peasants, defeated and driven back towards Verkhne-Udinsk. At the same time these expeditions occurred several attacks on the railroad in the Japanese sector were made by the peasants, particularly at the towns of Petrovsky-Zavod and Hilok and against the Siding 37. In the uprising which took place at Irkutsk a large number of the American Red Cross personnel, both male and female, were caught in the railroad yards and were unable to leave Irkutsk until the 4th or 5th of January and then only by the assistance of the Czechs. About the middle of December the following telegram was received from General Janin, Commanding the Czecho-Slovak and the Allied forces:

"Irkutsk. To Colonel Morrow. The High Inter-Allied Council of Versailles has decided the evacuation of the Czechs and other troops like Poles, Roumanians and so on, out of Siberia. United States Generously gave its help in offering the overseas transport for thirty-six thousand Czechs. On their way to the east the Czech and other troops according to the technical difficulties of transportation on the line are obliged to stop temporarily on the railroad line on the west part of Verkhne-Udinsk and very likely in a country under your supervision. In advising you about this particular situation, I beg you to inform me eventually of the different notices and remarks you could defer to me according to these particular circumstances. Personally I would be very much obliged to you if your largest assistance could be given to these troops on their way across the part of the country under your command and also in the particular case of technical difficulties above mentioned if they should be obliged to beg you for help. General Janin, Commander of the Allied Troops Siberia.

Immediately upon receipt of this telegram the Commanding Officer, with Major Don S. Colby, Russian Railway Service Corps, in conference with the Czecho-Slovak military command at Verkhne-Udinsk, agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks, on their arrival in the American sector, should move in their proper order and without hindrance; that the Czecho-Slovak echelons report to the Czecho-Slovak Commandant; the American Commanders at Mysovaya and Verkhne-Udinsk, acting on information given to them by the Czechs, would see that this movement was not interrupted. The following telegram was sent to General Janin:

"Beresovka, Siberia, General Janin, Commander of Allied Troops, Irkutsk. I am assisting the movement of the Czech echelons through my sector and shall continue to do so. Three echelons moved in two days. Thorough understanding between Czech Commandant here and myself. Movement must be slow due to condition of Railroad. Morrow."

On December 23rd, the following telegram was issued by the Chief of Semenoff's Military Transportation:

"Chita, December 21st, 1919. To All Station Commanders and Chiefs of Traffic System. The Chief of the Military Commission orders not to send any Czech echelons east. All echelons enroute should be held up and a message regarding each case sent to me. Captain Meleroff."

On the same date the following order was issued by the Station Commandant at Sludyanka:

Japanese sector were made by the peasants, particularly at the towns of Kozlovka, Zavod and Hilok and against the Biding 37. In the uprising which took place at Irkutsk a large number of the American Red Cross personnel, both male and female, were caught in the railroad yards and were unable to leave Irkutsk until the 4th or 5th of January and then only by the assistance of the Czechs. About the middle of December the following telegram was received from General Janin, Commanding the Czecho-Slovak and the Allied forces:

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On the same date the following order was issued by the Station Commandant at Sludyanka:

"To All People from Verkhne-Udinsk to Vydrino: All Controller Mechanics of the Telegraph Service: All Station Masters; All Superintendents of Traffic; All Chiefs of Militia; All Station Commandants and Telegraph Foremen. According to an order issued by the Chief of Transportation of Troops, do not permit any person from the passing echelons to use the telegraph, phonophore or dispatcher's circuit, for any kind of talking,

unless they have written permit signed by officials of the Chita Military District. In case there is any doubt apply to me. The person guilty of violating this order will be tried by court. Lieutenant Skerobogatieff, Station Commandant Sludyanka."

The Czecho-Slovak eschelons at this time were resting at almost every station between Irkutsk and Manchuria Station, a distance of a thousand miles. This was practically a declaration of war by the Semenov forces on the Czechs, was a direct violation of the Allied agreement concerning the railroad. No attention was paid to this order as far as the American sector was concerned, and the Czech eschelons continued to move. But, both east and west of the American sector, Semenov's order was carried out, even as early as December 17th the interference of Semenov with the Czech evacuation was apparent, which is evidenced by the following telegram from Chita:

"Chita, December 17th. To General Janin, Irkutsk, Urgent. Telegram No. 1105. For Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuria and to Stretinsk. All Military Controllers, Chief Telegraph Operators, Head Men of Communications and Station Masters. The Commander of Troops orders that after the receipt of this telegram no code messages, also plain messages of the Czecho-Slovak command shall be accepted and no conversation by telegraph or dispatchers' circuit be permitted. Meleroff."

These orders, of course, prevented the Czecho-Slovak eschelons, widely separated, from communicating with each other, as well as the Czecho-Slovak High Commander, General Janin, from communicating with his eschelons or with the other Allied representatives.

15. The taking over of Irkutsk by the Social-Democrats, from the Ministry of Kolchak, caused the situation in Irkutsk to grow very intense between the Czecho-Slovak forces and the forces of Semenov which were sent to Irkutsk to retake the city. This interruption of the Czecho-Slovak evacuation by Semenov, the breaking of faith by General Skipitroff, Semenov's Commander, with the Czecho-Slovak forces, brought about the natural consequence of armed conflict between the forces of Semenov and the Czecho-Slovaks. This conflict broke out early in January, 1920, and will be discussed later in this report.

16. From December 25th up to January 3rd, repeated requests were made by General Levitsky and the Chief of Staff of Ataman Semenov, Colonel Subcovsky, that the American command dispatch troops against what they called the Bolshevik forces, and particularly against Moharsky, Siberia, and Petrovsky-Zavod. Both of these places lay in the sector for which the Japanese were responsible. Moharsky lies 75 miles off the railroad. As this was none of the Americans' business and pertained to the Japanese, if it pertained to any one, the American Commander refused to send troops to these points. On January 3rd, General Levitsky reported that a large number of so-called Bolsheviks were concentrating in the village of Mococheeno, which lies about 12 versts southeast from Verkhne-Udinsk, and in adjoining villages, all of which were located in the American sector, and that these bands were concentrating for the purpose of attacking the railroad in the American sector and the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. While these reports of the purpose of these bands were not believed, it was considered necessary, after a conference between Colonel Morrow and the Russian Generals Myssura and Levitsky, to send an American force to Mococheeno and adjoining villages to investigate conditions there. General Levitsky was himself planning an expedition from Verkhne-Udinsk as far to the south as Kiatka which lies about 200 miles to the south of Verkhne-Udinsk. The column of Levitsky's was to consist of 450 mounted Mongolians and 4 pieces of artillery.

The Czecho-Slovak eschelons at this time were resting at almost every station between Irkutsk and Manchuria Station, a distance of a thousand miles. This was practically a declaration of war by the Semenov forces on the Czechs, was a direct violation of the Allied agreement concerning the railroad. No attention was paid to this order as far as the American sector was concerned, and the Czech eschelons continued to move. But, both east and west of the American sector, Semenov's order was carried out, even as early as December 17th the interference of Semenov with the Czech evacuation was apparent, which is evidenced by the following telegram from Chita:

"Chita, December 17th. To General Janin, Irkutsk, Urgent. Telegram No. 1105. For Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuria and to Stretinsk. All Military Controllers, Chief Telegraph Operators, Head Men of Communications and Station Masters. The Commander of Troops orders that after the receipt of this telegram no code messages, also plain messages of the Czecho-Slovak command shall be accepted and no conversation by telegraph or dispatchers' circuit be permitted. Maleroff."

These orders, of course, prevented the Czecho-Slovak eschelons, widely separated, from communicating with each other, as well as the Czecho-Slovak High Commander, General Janin, from communicating with his eschelons or with the other Allied representatives.

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the railroad or the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, but was solely the act of a peasant people determined upon defending their lives and property. The American expedition was sent to Moocheeno for the purpose of preventing its destruction by the forces of General Levitsky, more than with an idea of finding Bolshevik enemies there. The character of General Levitsky and the campaign he intended to wage against the people of the Selenga valley, were well known to the Commanding Officer, and the character of the people he intended to wage a merciless warfare on with his Mongolians was also well known. The force dispatched to Moocheeno and placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gillem, Jr., consisted of Companies I & L, and Machine Gun Company, Medical Detachment, Supply Train and 28 mounted orderlies, and marched from Beresovka for Moocheeno at 7:15 A.M., January 4th, 1920. The column of General Levitsky was supposed to join the rear of the American column three versts west of the ferry across the Selenga River at 9:45 A.M., but just prior to the departure of the command from Beresovka, the following message was received from General Levitsky:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, January 4th, 1920. Colonel Morrow:
I am very sorry I cannot go with my troops to Moocheeno. The Reds are coming from Kuitunskaya to the city of Verkhne-Udinsk, and they are now ten or twelve versts away from the city. They now make a strong attack against Vakmeestrova, then if they take the village, your left flank is open. Tomorrow I will send a large patrol to Posolia to the left of Verkhne-Udinsk and another south to Verch-Padg. Reinforcements will be sent to Captain Taknoss at Vakmeestrova. The guard will be placed on the road at the appointed place. Major General Levitsky."

Despite this message, the American Command proceeded to Moocheeno where they were met and treated with all kindness by the peasant army. The concentration of two hundred rifles had taken place at Moocheeno but their object was purely a defensive one, against the murdering bands of Mongolians and in no way threatened the railroad or the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. The people were in no way Bolshevik and were without political ideas or plans. (For detailed report of the expedition to Moocheeno, see report of Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gillem, Jr., attached hereto, marked "F"). On January 3rd and 4th, delegations came from Moocheeno and the nearby villages, reporting the terrible atrocities committed in previous raids and in the raid then being made by General Levitsky's Mongolians. These reports were checked in every conceivable way and were found to be correct and the 90 rifles brought into Verkhne-Udinsk by the American Command were turned back to the representatives of the village of Moocheeno, as it was only right and just that simple white peasantry should not be killed, slaughtered and robbed by Mongolian monsters. Deputations, varying in number from three to five, continued to come to the American headquarters from all the villages to the south, southeast and southwest of Verkhne-Udinsk. Their stories were the same, of murder, robbery, rape, mutilation and crimes unspeakable, committed by the Mongolians under General Levitsky. Entire villages were destroyed, men, women and children killed, their bodies mutilated and then thrown into the fire while yet living. Cutting off of hands, feet and lips were common practices. Horses, cattle and all live stock were taken; hay, grain and food of the people seized or burned; the furniture in the homes was broken or burned up; entire villages were laid waste, and all these crimes were committed against peaceful peasant population who had wrung their scanty stores from the earth by their toil. In the middle of a bitter winter, their all was taken away from them, their all was taken away from them, their villages destroyed and they were left homeless to perish in Siberian snows. The flight of the women and children from these stricken villages in this bitter weather is beyond description. Women and children, running from one village, had passed through a second village and had fallen back on a third. In escaping from

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cannot be doubted. The Commanding Officer represented to General Janin at Verkhne-Udinsk the true state of affairs existing in the villages to the south. This condition of affairs was represented by General Janin and Colonel Morrow to the Japanese General Ogato, commanding the Japanese troops at Beresovka. An American patrol was sent to the village of Bobkina and, upon receipt of the report from this patrol, a party consisting of Americans, French and Japanese officers was dispatched there to make observations in that village. The following is their report:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Jan. 18, 1920.

On the 10th of January, the Wild Division, Commanded by General Levitsky, passed through the village of Bobkina, perpetrating there about fifteen murders upon people without arms. The 18th of January, the former American Vice-Consul at Chita, Mr. Fowler and Lieutenant Davis of the American Army, Lieutenant Fuji and Captain Koda of the Japanese Army, Major Doctor Marland and Major de Latour DeJean of the French Army, went to this very village and were there able to make the following observations:

A dozen corpses, with the hands cut off, were lying heaped up in a pile half destroyed, all the bodies more or less cut up by sabre wounds. The greater part bore many wounds made while living by sabre blows, particularly on the face and back. All the corpses were burned. Many bore evident traces of having been burned while still living. From this last observation it must be admitted that the greater part, severely wounded only, must have died of asphyxiation as an inspection of the wounds shows that not one was immediately mortal. After the departure of the criminals, the people of the village attracted by the smoke, were able to recover the corpses before complete burning up, which act has permitted the very precise preceding observations to be made. About 15 meters from this place, in a large space still stained by blood on the snow, we found the bloody remains of burned hair and a large piece of a scalp, cut by a sabre blow.

Fowler, U.S. Vice Consul,
E. Davis, U.S. Army,
Fuji, Japanese Army,
Koda, Japanese Army,
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17. The command of General Levitsky continued its march to a village called Goozleg and here the Mongolians mutinied against Levitsky and his Cossacks. In the fight that followed Levitsky was killed and his body burned by the Mongolians and from most reliable reports, received from General Levitsky's staff officers, of the 125 Cossacks who accompanied Levitsky, less than 25 escaped with their lives, and only five Cossack officers returned to tell the story. Two of the field pieces were taken by the Mongolians who continued their march to the south with the evident intention of crossing into Mongolia. From the two other pieces they removed the breech-blocks. About the 26th of January reports reached the American Headquarters that this force of Mongolians had been met by the peasants to the north of the Mongolian border, and severely defeated and dispersed them. There still remained of Levitsky's "Wild Division" at the Park Barracks in Verkhne-Udinsk about three hundred men with four guns. On January 23rd sixty of these deserted, taking with them their horses, and on the 24th, about fifty deserted taking with them the four remaining field pieces. The remaining force was ordered to evacuate Verkhne-Udinsk and move to the east into the country controlled by Ataman Semenov. The American

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18. On January 9th, the heavily armored train "Destroyer" entered Verkhne-Udinsk and at once proceeded to arrest and rob the Assistant Station Master in the railroad station at Verkhne-Udinsk and announced their intention of executing him. These facts were reported to Colonel Morrow at Beresovka who came from Beresovka by automobile to Verkhne-Udinsk and with Lieutenant Byrns, 27th Infantry and Major Colby and Lieutenant Keating, R.R.S.C. and Mr. Silverman, civilian interpreter, went aboard the "Destroyer". The following report is of the conversation held thereon:

"Interview between Colonel Morrow, U.S.A. and Russian General on board Semenoff Bronevik at Station Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, January 9th, 1920.

Present:

Colonel Morrow, U.S.A., Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry .
Lieutenant Byrns, U.S.A., 27th Infantry,
Major Colby, R.R.S.C. Div. Inspector, Trans-Baikal Railway.
Lieutenant Keating, R.R.S.C. (Reporter).
Mr. Silverman, Civilian Interpreter.
General Bogomoletz, Russian Officer, Ataman Semenoff's Forces.
Captain Moscalev, Russian Officer, Commander of Bronevik.

When Colonel Morrow boarded the bronevik, Silverman, the interpreter, introduced him as the Commanding Officer of the American Forces. One tall Russian officer presented himself as a General, the other as a Captain.

Colonel Morrow: I have received a report that the Station-master has been arrested by you and is held on your train. Is that correct ?

General Bogomoletz: Yes.

Colonel Morrow: Do you understand that the American forces are guarding this sector, that they have charge of it, and are held responsible for it ?

General Bogomoletz: Yes, we know of it, we are not supposed to give you information of what we are doing.

Colonel Morrow: Do you know that I am guarding and policing this city at the request of the Russian authorities, at the request of a General Ataman Semenoff?

General Bogomoletz: Yes, we know that.

Colonel Morrow: Do you know that Semenoff and myself are the best of friends.

General Bogomoletz: I do not know.

Colonel Morrow: Well, it is true, and I would like to know why the station master has been arrested.

General Bogomoletz: I am not supposed to give an account to you of our actions. I will not converse with you any more in regard to such, I request the conversation to stop.

Colonel Morrow: Let me tell you this: I do not want to cause any trouble for you, however, I have twenty-five hundred (2500) men here, to carry out my orders, and I ask you to continue the conversation so that we may arrive at a peaceful solution.

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General Bogomoletz: I am not supposed to give an account to you, only to my senior authorities.

Colonel Morrow: My orders charge me with the protection of the railroad and its employes, it is an Allied agreement. Ataman Semenoff understands it entirely.

General Bogomoletz: I know very well the Allied agreement but this case is an absolutely private case, I do not consider it necessary to make a statement of the reason for arresting this man.

Colonel Morrow: I must know why this man was arrested, he is under my protection. I am bound to know this, if it is not right I cannot permit it.

General Bogomoletz: If I have not any reasons for doing these things I don't do anything.

Colonel Morrow: I must know this reason. I have the confidence and trust of General Levitsky and General Mejack, the Russian Generals here. I am charged with the guarding of the railroad, it is my orders that the railroad should not be interfered with, nor its employees.

General Bogomoletz: You will be notified of the reasons for the arrest.

Colonel Morrow: Alright, if you do this, and release this man, I will be responsible, I will see to it that the man does nothing wrong in this town.

General Bogomoletz: We also have means to look out for him.

Colonel Morrow: That is true, but I am looking out for the Bolsheviks and I will look out for him. I want you to understand that I am here because I have a duty to perform, I am charged with the protection of this sector, as you know. I mean to perform this duty. As long as you have suspicions of this man, I will watch him. I don't want to inquire into any personal reasons you may have. I want official reasons.

(The General gave the commander of the Bronavik an order which was not interpreted. The Commander left the room and returned in a few minutes. At the same time though, the General denied that he was the commander of the bronevik, yet he kept on the conversation and replied to all of Colonel Morrow's questions).

General Bogomoletz: I was told that he is a Bolshevik, and I wanted to kill him tonight, But if you insist, I shall release him. One Bolshevik can do us no harm. He is released. It is best.

Colonel Morrow: That is true, it is best for you and best for me. I will take care of this man and see that he does not do any damage, and I will report the matter of our pleasant conversation to General Levitsky.

General Bogomoletz: Alright.

Colonel Morrow: It would be very serious. You must know that I would not come here to talk this way if it was not serious. I can seven versts to talk with you, and I assure you that your actions will be approved by the Russian Generals in this city.

General Bogomoletz: Please, I hope after what is stated of this man, after his release, he will be looked after by the American Commander.

Colonel Morrow: I give you my word that I will watch his actions with my secret police, and I will see that, in no way, as assistant station master, does he in any way discriminate against the trains of Ataman Semenov, the Japanese or anybody else. I will see to it that he will do what is right.

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General Bogomoletz: It is agreeable.

Colonel Morrow: I will report the entire matter to the Ataman, I will say that the General has shown very good judgement and very high courtesy and I wish him luck and success.

General Bogomoletz: We received the information of this man from our information department, and if Colonel Morrow wishes he may obtain the information about this man from them, it is immaterial, if the station master is guilty we will get him sooner or later.

Colonel Morrow: That is alright, I will watch him.

At this point the interview was closed. It was ascertained from the Russian Railway Officials that the Assistant Station Master had been released during the interview.

The station master having been released, the armored train, "Destroyer" proceeded westward from Verkhne-Udinsk, the same night. At 8:00 A.M. January 10th, the following telegram was received from Captain Ramsey, 27th Infantry, who was then at Selenga:

"Selenga, January 10th, 1920. Colonel Morrow, American Command, Beresovka. Received from Posolskaya the following telegram quote We are attacked, one killed, two wounded. Arrest the armored train coming out. I will give orders to the rest. Captain Ramsey."

At 10:00 A.M. the following telegram was received:

"Mysovaya, Siberia, January 10, 1920. Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, Beresovka, Siberia. Armored train fired on our detachment at Posolskaya killing one and wounding three. Train now held between Posolskaya and Tuimlew. I am taking ninety men from here with Czechs to destroy train. Hold all armored trains at Verkhne-Udinsk. Czech Commander here requests that you get in touch with Czech Commander now near Verkhne-Udinsk. All is clear west of Mysovaya. Wounded men from Posolskaya being brought to Mysovaya. Waite."

As it was believed that the armored train that had attacked Posolskaya was one of Semenoff's trains moving from the west to the east and that it was not the "Destroyer" which had moved from Verkhne-Udinsk to the west, the Commanding Officer at Beresovka considered that he had two armored trains to deal with, these armored trains lying somewhere between Beresovka and Posolskaya. The following telegram was sent to Captain Waite at Mysovaya:

"Beresovka, Siberia. January 10th, 1920. Commanding Officer, U. S. Troops, Mysovaya. One bronevik left here last night west bound. Don't let it pass. I am leaving here as soon as possible with platoon machine guns and thirty-seven millimeter. We shall take both bronevik. Morrow."

A request was made on the Semenoff Military Commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk for an engine to take these troops west towards Posolskaya. This request was refused. The Semenoff military station commandant was immediately placed under arrest and engine seized in the roundhouse under charge of Major D. S. Colby, R.R.S.C., and brought to Beresovka. Another engine was seized in the yards at Beresovka and guards placed on it, troops being put aboard and the engines wooded and watered. The command left Beresovka for Posolskaya at 2:10 P.M. One engine preceded the train by about 1200 yards as an advance guard engine. Tataurovo was reached at 3:10 P.M. without incident. Here it was learned that an armored train was approaching the station from the west. The troops were immediately detrained and took up position in the western edge of the

sooner or later.

Colonel Morrow: That is alright, I will watch him.

At this point the interview was closed. It was ascertained from the Russian Railway Officials that the Assistant Station Master had been released during the interview.

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given. The armored train was under the command of Captain George D. Ramsey, 27th Infantry, with 16 men. The prisoners on the armored train were taken from the car and their number verified. They were placed in a closed car, the officers were placed under close guard in the car used as headquarters car by General Bogomoletz. Both the armored train and the detachment then returned to Beresovka and the prisoners were taken to one of the barracks and placed under guard. They were furnished with cots, blankets and a separate mess was established for them. The main incidents of the capture of the armored train "Destroyer" are as follows: The armored train having entered Verkhne-Udinsk, robbed the assistant station master of all his money, property, household belongings, etc., and their intentions to execute him having been blocked by the Commanding Officer of the American troops, proceeded to Posolskaya, General Bogomoletz still in a state of rage over the incident at Verkhne-Udinsk. Posolskaya was then guarded by the 3rd Platoon, Company "M" 27th Infantry, consisting at Posolskaya of but 42 men and 2 officers. They were quartered in box cars which lay in the sidings near the station. The armored train arrived at Posolskaya between 12 and 1 o'clock at night. The commander of the train held a long interview with the Semenov military commandant of that place, Lieutenant Krisco. Krisco had been an open enemy of the Americans for several months and had in every way endeavored to bring on trouble between the Americans and the Russian people. He had submitted many lying and slanderous reports to the headquarters of the Semenov commander. On the 9th he had openly told various people, including railroad employees, that there would be trouble at Posolskaya that night. The people of Posolskaya had left the village, having previously informed the American Commander, Lieutenant Kendall, of the statements made by Lieutenant Krisco. Half an hour before the arrival of the armored train Krisco was asked by the American Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Kendall, if there was a Semenov armored train coming to Posolskaya, and he replied that there was not. There was no argument, no quarrel, nor any conversation between the American command and the armored train. The armored train after remaining about a half hour at the station, started pulling back towards Verkhne-Udinsk and at the same time opened fire without the slightest warning on the sleeping Americans in their box cars. These shots riddled the tops of the cars. The American detachment, under the command of Lieutenant Kendall, immediately turned out of their cars and took up the fight with the armored train. Sergeant Carl Robbins climbed aboard the engine and threw a hand grenade into the cab. He was immediately killed by being shot through the head by an officer who was on guard over the engine crew. The platoon began to work around both sides of the armored train, subjecting it to a heavy fire from rifles and hand grenades, Lieutenant Kendall himself using an automatic rifle. Private John R. Montgomery, an ammunition carrier, was killed by Lieutenant Kendall's side. Private Homer D. Lommie in attempting to board the armored train, was knocked from the train, and the train passed over part of his foot. The armored train moved toward the east three or four hundred yards, where, due to the damage caused to its engine was forced to stop. The detachment continued its attack against the armored train, again working around the train. The crew having succeeded in starting the engine again, the armored train continued to the east to the station Timlyui where, fearing the American detachment at Selenga, it stopped and sent out messengers to telephone to Colonel Morrow at Beresovka and to Lieutenant Kendall at Posolskaya, that the train desired to surrender. The message reached Lieutenant Kendall at Posolskaya who replied that the crew of the armored train should march back to Posolskaya, unarmed, and their surrender would be received. This they agreed to do. In the meantime, the message had reached Captain Ramsey at Selenga and, taking an engine and 16 men, he went to Timlyui and there received the surrender of the armored train and its entire crew. Too much praise cannot be given Second Lieutenant Paul W. Kendall, 27th U. S. Infantry, and the men of his detachment, who were attacked in the middle of the night by a powerful armored train which mounted 4 machine guns, 1 one-pounder, 1 three-inch field piece, one 2.4 piece and 55 rifles, with abundant ammunition for all. The crew of the armored train

were placed under close guard in the car used as headquarters car by General Bogomoletz. Both the armored train and the detachment then returned to Beresovka and the prisoners were taken to one of the barracks and placed under guard. They were furnished with cots, blankets and a separate mess was established for them. The main incidents of the capture of the armored train "Destroyer" are as follows: The armored train having entered Verkhne-Udinsk, robbed the assistant station master of all his money, property, household belongings, etc., and their intentions to execute him having been blocked by the Commanding Officer of the American troops, proceeded to Posolskaya, General Bogomoletz still in a state of rage over the incident at Verkhne-Udinsk. Posolskaya was then guarded by the 3rd Platoon, Company "M" 27th Infantry, consisting at Posolskaya of but 42 men and 2 officers. They were quartered in box cars which lay in the sidings near the station. The armored train arrived at Posolskaya between 12 and 1 o'clock at night. The commander of the train held a long interview with the Semenov military commandant of that place, Lieutenant Krisco. Krisco had been an open enemy of the Americans for several months and had in every way endeavored to bring on trouble between the Americans and the Russian people. He had submitted many lying and slanderous reports to the headquarters of the Semenov commander. On the 9th he had openly told various people, including railroad employees, that there would be trouble at Posolskaya that night. The people of Posolskaya had left the village, having previously informed the American Commander, Lieutenant Kendall, of the statements made by Lieutenant Krisco. Half an hour before the arrival of the armored train Krisco was asked by the American Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Kendall, if there was a Semenov armored train coming to Posolskaya, and he replied that there was not. There was no argument, no quarrel, nor any conversation between the American command and the armored train. The armored train after remaining about a half hour at the station, started pulling back towards Verkhne-Udinsk and at the same time opened fire without the slightest warning on the sleeping Americans in their box cars. These shots riddled the tops of the cars. The American detachment, under the command of Lieutenant Kendall, immediately turned out of their cars and took up the fight with the armored train. Sergeant Carl Robbins climbed aboard the engine and threw a hand grenade into the cab. He was immediately killed by being shot through the head by an officer who was on guard over the engine crew. The platoon began to work around both sides of the armored train, subjecting it to a heavy fire from rifles and hand grenades, Lieutenant Kendall himself using an automatic rifle. Private John R. Montgomery, an ammunition carrier, was killed by Lieutenant Kendall's side. Private Homer D. Tommie in attempting to board the armored train, was knocked from the train, and the train passed over part of his foot. The armored train moved toward the east three or four hundred yards, where, due to the damage caused to its engine was forced to stop. The detachment continued its attack against the armored train, again working around the train. The crew having succeeded in starting the engine again, the armored train continued to the east to the station Timlyui where, fearing the American detachment at Selenga, it stopped and sent out messengers to telephone to Colonel Morrow at Beresovka and to Lieutenant Kendall at Posolskaya, that the train desired to surrender. The message reached Lieutenant Kendall at Posolskaya who replied that the crew of the armored train should march back to Posolskaya, unarmed, and their surrender would be received. This they agreed to do. In the meantime, the message had reached Captain Ramsey at Selenga and, taking an engine and 16 men, he went to Timlyui and there received the surrender of the armored train and its entire crew. Too much praise cannot be given Second Lieutenant Paul W. Kendall, 27th U. S. Infantry, and the men of his detachment, who were attacked in the middle of the night by a powerful armored train which mounted 4 machine guns, 1 one-pounder, 1 three-inch field piece, one 2.4 piece and 55 rifles, with abundant ammunition for all. The crew of the armored train consisted of 53 men and 7 officers. The train was armored with about 1/4 inch steel plate, backed by 18 inches of reinforced concrete. Against this the detachment had their rifles, 2 automatic rifles and a few hand grenades. They were attacked in the night and fought over ground covered with snow, without cover or concealment, and continued their pursuit of the armored train as far as it was humanly possible to do so. The following officers and men of this command have been recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross:

2nd Lieutenant Paul W. Kendall,
2nd Lieutenant John C. Stinell,
Sergeant Carl Robbins, deceased,
Private John L. Montgomery, deceased,
Private Homer D. Tommie, wounded.
Sergeant Hermann Malchow,
Sergeant Peter P. Matthews.

Their courage and high endeavor eminently entitled them to this distinguished order from the government they so splendidly served.

19. On January 10th, 1920, the following telegram was sent to Ataman Semenov:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, January 10th, 1920. Ataman Semenov, Chita.
One of your armored trains fired into my troops at Posolskaya yesterday. Request you avoid international conflict by refraining from sending other armored trains into the American sector. Morrow:."

On January 11th the following telegram was sent:

"Beresovka, Siberia, January 11th, 1920. Ataman Semenov, Chita.
Armored train "Destroyer" attacked small force of forty two Americans at Posolskaya, morning of January tenth, at one A.M. Armored train was captured and is held here. Americans two killed and one wounded. Armored train five killed and one wounded. This occurrence I am sure will cause you deep regret and I do not or could not hold you responsible for the ill-advised actions of a drunken officer. Suggest that you designate an officer to settle this affair with me. Morrow."

At the same time this telegram was sent, General Myssura of the Russian Garrison, was requested by Colonel Morrow to send a similar telegram to Ataman Semenov and to tell him that if he sent other armored trains into the American sector, they would be met by the American forces and destroyed. A telegram of this nature was sent by General Myssura on the direct wire to Ataman Semenov on the 11th. A conversation was held by General Myssura over the direct wire with Lieutenant General Semenov, uncle of Ataman Semenov. No reply was received to any of the above mentioned telegrams until January 14th. On January 11th, due to the reports that a Semenov armored train was proceeding from Petrovsky-Zavod, west to Verkhne-Udinsk, and that an armored train from the west was preparing to enter the American sector at Mysovaya, and as there were 1200 Semenov troops situated in Beresovka, and Verkhne-Udinsk, it was considered necessary to take over the dispatching system from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya in order to keep the headquarters and the outlying detachments in communication with each other. The dispatching system was taken over at 11 P.M., January 11th, and a guard placed over the dispatchers' office, telegraph office, and the railroad at Verkhne-Udinsk, also all dispatchers' offices, telegraph office, between Verkhne-Udinsk and Mysovaya. Heavy patrols were sent through the Russian garrison at Beresovka, in order to insure that no hostile movement took place in that garrison and that no movement took place from the Park Barracks towards the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. About 1 A.M. January 12th, the Czecho-Slovak Colonel Nemetz, then at Selenga, requested the American Commander, Colonel Morrow, to come to the dispatcher's home at Beresovka, in order that he might communicate to him the situation which had arisen in the west. Colonel Morrow and his Regimental Adjutant, Lieutenant James, proceeded to the railroad station at Beresovka and held approximately the following conversation with Colonel Nemetz, who states that he had been given full power to deal direct with the American Commander in this matter. Colonel Nemetz informed the American Commander that due to the interference of

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for the purpose of disarming the Semenovff forces at that place. He requested the assistance of the American Commander in this undertaking, pointing out that the Americans had been attacked by the forces of Semenovff. The Americans themselves were under orders to evacuate the country and must evacuate at the same time that the Czecho-Slovak evacuation took place. He requested Colonel Morrow further to guarantee to the Czechs a free entry into Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk, so that they would not be fired on before sufficient eschelons had been massed there to enable them to successfully disarm the garrison at that point. Colonel Morrow replied that he would give Colonel Nemetz a definite answer to his proposition within a couple of hours. Orders were then issued by Colonel Morrow to give the Czecho-Slovaks free use of the dispatchers' circuit so that they might communicate with their eschelons. Colonel Nemetz was informed of this order. In the meantime messages were received confirming the report that an armored train then at Petrovsky-Zavod to the east of the American sector was preparing to come to Verkhne-Udinsk, after repeated warnings given to Ataman Semenovff not to send armored trains into the American sector. The sending of this armored train could mean but one thing; that it was coming to make battle on the American forces. Furthermore, Semenovff had not answered any of the telegrams sent him. He had 1200 men with artillery and machine guns under his command at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka, besides large forces at Chita, and in the country under his control. What forces he might be massing against the American command could only be surmised. Colonel Morrow and Lieutenant James then proceeded to the quarters of Major General Myssura, commanding the Semenovff garrison at Beresovka and asked him what telegrams, if any, he had received from Ataman Semenovff. General Myssura exhibited to them the copies of the telegrams he had sent to Ataman Semenovff on the 10th and 11th, then informed them that he had not received any reply and furthermore, that it would have been very easy for Semenovff or his Chief of Staff to have replied if they had desired to do so, as the direct wire was at the service of Semenovff at any time and that he had received that day a telegram from Semenovff relating to a trifling matter concerning cots for a school. Colonel Morrow and the Adjutant, Lieutenant James, then returned to the Headquarters of the regiment. All of the organization commanders were assembled and the full situation laid before them and their decision was requested as to what action the Command should take in view of the entire situation; the attack of the armored train, the well-known hostility of Semenovff and his troops towards the Americans, the order and the necessity for the Americans to immediately evacuate; the forcible disarming of Semenovff's men under the direct orders of General Janin, the further facts of the telegrams sent by the Commanding Officer and the telegrams sent by General Myssura to Ataman Semenovff and his failure to reply to the same, also the movement of Semenovff's armored trains towards Verkhne-Udinsk, and further the original mission of the American forces in Siberia to assist the Czecho-Slovaks. The following definite proposition was submitted for their consideration:

"In view of our orders to proceed to Vladivostok, in view of all that is known of Semenovff and his troops, the present situation in its entirety, do we deem it necessary in order to insure our safe return home to accept the offer of the Czecho-Slovaks or to decline it." On this the assembled officers unanimously agreed to accept the Czecho-Slovak offer and to enter into an agreement with them as to our future movements. This agreement was communicated over the dispatcher's telephone to Colonel Nemetz then at Selenga about 4:30 A.M. Colonel Nemetz was fully informed as to the strength of the Semenovff garrison at Beresovka, Verkhne-Udinsk, and the Park Barracks, was guaranteed a safe entry for all his eschelons into Beresovka and that the Russian artillery would be held under guard of the Americans so that it could not be used against him. Furthermore, the plan was adopted that two Czech eschelons and the armored train "Orlick" would reach Beresovka about 8 or 9 A.M. and await the arrival of two other eschelons, that the leading eschelons

time at the Czecho-Slovak evacuation took place. He requested Colonel Morrow further to guarantee to the Czechs a free entry into Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk, so that they would not be fired on before sufficient eschelons had been massed there to enable them to successfully disarm the garrison at that point. Colonel Morrow replied that he would give Colonel Nemetz a definite answer to his proposition within a couple of hours. Orders were then issued by Colonel Morrow to give the Czecho-Slovaks free use of the dispatchers' circuit so that they might communicate with their eschelons. Colonel Nemetz was informed of this order. In the meantime messages were received confirming the report that an armored train then at Petrovsky-Zavod to the east of the American sector was preparing to come to Verkhne-Udinsk, after repeated warnings given to Ataman Semenov not to send armored trains into the American sector. The sending of this armored train could mean but one thing; that it was coming to make battle on the American forces. Furthermore, Semenov had not answered any of the telegrams sent him. He had 1200 men with artillery and machine guns under his command at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka, besides large forces at Chita, and in the country under his control. What forces he might be massing against the American command could only be surmised. Colonel Morrow and Lieutenant James then proceeded to the quarters of Major General Myssura, commanding the Semenov garrison at Beresovka and asked him what telegrams, if any, he had received from Ataman Semenov. General Myssura exhibited to them the copies of the telegrams he had sent to Ataman Semenov on the 10th and 11th, then informed them that he had not received any reply and furthermore, that it would have been very easy for Semenov or his Chief of Staff to have replied if they had desired to do so, as the direct wire was at the service of Semenov at any time and that he had received that day a telegram from Semenov relating to a trifling matter concerning cots for a school. Colonel Morrow and the Adjutant, Lieutenant James, then returned to the Headquarters of the regiment. All of the organization commanders were assembled and the full situation laid before them and their decision was requested as to what action the Command should take in view of the entire situation; the attack of the armored train, the well-known hostility of Semenov and his troops towards the Americans, the order and the necessity for the Americans to immediately evacuate; the forcible disarming of Semenov's men under the direct orders of General Janin, the further facts of the telegrams sent by the Commanding Officer and the telegrams sent by General Myssura to Ataman Semenov and his failure to reply to the same, also the movement of Semenov's armored trains towards Verkhne-Udinsk, and further the original mission of the American forces in Siberia to assist the Czecho-Slovaks. The following definite proposition was submitted for their consideration:

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for the purpose of disarming the Semenovff forces at that place. He requested the assistance of the American Commander in this undertaking, pointing out that the Americans had been attacked by the forces of Semenovff. The Americans themselves were under orders to evacuate the country and must evacuate at the same time that the Czecho-Slovak evacuation took place. He requested Colonel Morrow further to guarantee to the Czechs a free entry into Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk, so that they would not be fired on before sufficient eschelons had been massed there to enable them to successfully disarm the garrison at that point. Colonel Morrow replied that he would give Colonel Nemetz a definite answer to his proposition within a couple of hours. Orders were then issued by Colonel Morrow to give the Czecho-Slovaks free use of the dispatchers' circuit so that they might communicate with their eschelons. Colonel Nemetz was informed of this order. In the meantime messages were received confirming the report that an armored train then at Petrovsky-Zavod to the east of the American sector was preparing to come to Verkhne-Udinsk, after repeated warnings given to Ataman Semenovff not to send armored trains into the American sector. The sending of this armored train could mean but one thing; that it was coming to make battle on the American forces. Furthermore, Semenovff had not answered any of the telegrams sent him. He had 1200 men with artillery and machine guns under his command at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka, besides large forces at Chita, and in the country under his control. What forces he might be massing against the American command could only be surmised. Colonel Morrow and Lieutenant James then proceeded to the quarters of Major General Myssura, commanding the Semenovff garrison at Beresovka and asked him what telegrams, if any, he had received from Ataman Semenovff. General Myssura exhibited to them the copies of the telegrams he had sent to Ataman Semenovff on the 10th and 11th, then informed them that he had not received any reply and furthermore, that it would have been very easy for Semenovff or his Chief of Staff to have replied if they had desired to do so, as the direct wire was at the service of Semenovff at any time and that he had received that day a telegram from Semenovff relating to a trifling matter concerning cots for a school. Colonel Morrow and the Adjutant, Lieutenant James, then returned to the Headquarters of the regiment. All of the organization commanders were assembled and the full situation laid before them and their decision was requested as to what action the Command should take in view of the entire situation; the attack of the armored train, the well-known hostility of Semenovff and his troops towards the Americans, the order and the necessity for the Americans to immediately evacuate; the forcible disarming of Semenovff's men under the direct orders of General Janin, the further facts of the telegrams sent by the Commanding Officer and the telegrams sent by General Myssura to Ataman Semenovff and his failure to reply to the same, also the movement of Semenovff's armored trains towards Verkhne-Udinsk, and further the original mission of the American forces in Siberia to assist the Czecho-Slovaks. The following definite proposition was submitted for their consideration:

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the Americans had been attacked by the forces of Semenoff. The Americans themselves were under orders to evacuate the country and must evacuate at the same time that the Czecho-Slovak evacuation took place. He requested Colonel Morrow further to guarantee to the Czechs a free entry into Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk, so that they would not be fired on before sufficient eschelons had been massed there to enable them to successfully disarm the garrison at that point. Colonel Morrow replied that he would give Colonel Nemetz a definite answer to his proposition within a couple of hours. Orders were then issued by Colonel Morrow to give the Czecho-Slovaks free use of the dispatchers' circuit so that they might communicate with their eschelons. Colonel Nemetz was informed of this order. In the meantime messages were received confirming the report that an armored train then at Petrovsky-Zavod to the east of the American sector was preparing to come to Verkhne-Udinsk, after repeated warnings given to Ataman Semenoff not to send armored trains into the American sector. The sending of this armored train could mean but one thing; that it was coming to make battle on the American forces. Furthermore, Semenoff had not answered any of the telegrams sent him. He had 1200 men with artillery and machine guns under his command at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka, besides large forces at Chita, and in the country under his control. What forces he might be massing against the American command could only be surmised. Colonel Morrow and Lieutenant James then proceeded to the quarters of Major General Myssura, commanding the Semenoff garrison at Beresovka and asked him what telegrams, if any, he had received from Ataman Semenoff. General Myssura exhibited to them the copies of the telegrams he had sent to Ataman Semenoff on the 10th and 11th, then informed them that he had not received any reply and furthermore, that it would have been very easy for Semenoff or his Chief of Staff to have replied if they had desired to do so, as the direct wire was at the service of Semenoff at any time and that he had received that day a telegram from Semenoff relating to a trifling matter concerning cots for a school. Colonel Morrow and the Adjutant, Lieutenant James, then returned to the Headquarters of the regiment. All of the organization commanders were assembled and the full situation laid before them and their decision was requested as to what action the Command should take in view of the entire situation; the attack of the armored train, the well-known hostility of Semenoff and his troops towards the Americans, the order and the necessity for the Americans to immediately evacuate; the forcible disarming of Semenoff's men under the direct orders of General Janin, the further facts of the telegrams sent by the Commanding Officer and the telegrams sent by General Myssura to Ataman Semenoff and his failure to reply to the same, also the movement of Semenoff's armored trains towards Verkhne-Udinsk, and further the original mission of the American forces in Siberia to assist the Czecho-Slovaks. The following definite proposition was submitted for their consideration:

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Colonel Morrow's quarters General Myssura, Commanding the Russian garrison, being entirely unaware of what was going to happen, was paying a social visit. Colonel Morrow interviewed Major Riddell in a side room. Major Riddell desired at once to place General Myssura under arrest but this Colonel Morrow refused to permit, stating that General Myssura and his Adjutants were guests in his house and that he could not and would not permit them to be arrested there and that he would guarantee that they would not communicate in any way the plans or intentions of the Americans and Czecho-Slovaks to the Russian troops. At the same time Major Riddell was ordered by Colonel Morrow to remain in Beresovka with his echelons and the armored car until two other echelons had arrived, then to leave Beresovka and proceed to Verkhne-Udinsk, that he would there be met by Lieutenant Finney, 27th Infantry, then in command of the Military Police force consisting of 120 men and that Lieutenant Finney had been given the order from Beresovka by Colonel Morrow to begin the disarming at Verkhne-Udinsk at the same hour the disarming took place at Beresovka. Major Riddell said that he thoroughly understood and would comply with the orders. These orders were given through an interpreter. Lieutenant Finney had previously been given orders to this same effect and informed that upon the arrival of Major Riddell they would confer and begin the disarming in Verkhne-Udinsk when orders to do so were received from Colonel Morrow at Beresovka. Major Riddell returned to his echelon at ten minutes after 10 o'clock and without waiting for orders or the arrival of the other echelons proceeded to Verkhne-Udinsk, taking with him the armored train "Orlick", then he was met by Lieutenant Finney, and there at once in spite of his instructions began the disarming of the small garrison at that place. This left the station of Beresovka without a single Czech echelon in its yards and gave to the Russiansample time and afforded them every facility for communicating the fact of the Czech intentions to the very much larger and much stronger garrison at Beresovka. The 3rd and 4th echelons did not arrive at Beresovka until 3:30 P.M. In the meantime, Colonel Morrow communicated the plans and intentions of the Czecho-Slovaks to General Myssura and urged him to lay down his arms without fighting, thereby saving his garrison from certain destruction. General Myssura replied that he desired to go to the Japanese Headquarters and consult with General Ogata. Colonel Morrow stated that he would accom any him there and did accompany General Myssura to General Ogata's headquarters. In the meantime the entire American command at Beresovka was formed under arms in its garrison, which lay between the Japanese garrison and the Russian garrison, prepared to take immediate action if such action proved necessary. The Russian garrison was not permitted to go near its artillery which lay on the open ground near the railroad station. The following were present at the conference which occurred at General Ogata's headquarters; General Myssura, Siberian Army, Commanding the Russian garrison at Beresovka; Adjutant General Myssura; General Ogata, Imperial Japanese Army; Chief of Staff to General Ogata; Colonel C. H. Morrow, Commanding U. S. Troops; First Lieutenant John James, Adjutant to Colonel Morrow. The conference was opened by Colonel Morrow with the statement of the plans and purposes of the Czecho-Slovaks, the statement of their overwhelming force and their intentions in regard to Semenoff forces at Beresovka and Verkhne-Udinsk, and the reasons assigned by the Czecho-Slovaks for the disarming the Semenoff forces. General Myssura was then urged to turn over his arms to either the Japanese or American Commander in order to prevent the destruction of his garrison and the unavoidable killing of women and children which would occur in the conflict which would follow his refusal to do so. General Ogata stated that he did not believe the circumstances warranted the disarming of the Semenoff garrisons; that there was not sufficient grounds for this disarmament; but he advised General Myssura not to bring on a conflict if it could be avoided and that in the event of a conflict the Japanese forces agreed to remain neutral; that Japan would guarantee to the Americans and the Czecho-Slovaks free and uninterrupted transportation from Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuria Station and would not permit the Semenoff forces to in any way interfere with the rapid and

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received a message that the telegraph stations as well as the headquarters of General Levitsky had been taken over by the Czecho-Slovaks. General Myssura was informed of this fact by Colonel Morrow and told that if he attempted to go to the telegraph station he would surely be arrested by the Czecho-Slovaks and that he could not even leave the garrison at Beresovka without being arrested by the Czecho-Slovaks. Colonel Morrow also having received a message that the armored train was coming from Petrovsky-Zavod, informed General Myssura of this fact. General Myssura replied that if an armored train was coming, it was coming to kill Bolsheviks and had no hostile intentions toward the Americans. General Ogata urged Colonel Morrow to request the Czecho-Slovaks not to disarm the Russian garrison, stating that Colonel Morrow could force the Czecho-Slovaks to obey his orders. Colonel Morrow replied that it was now too late, that the Czecho-Slovaks were under the orders of General Janin and not under his orders and that he would not make any such proposals to the Czech forces. General Ogata was then asked the direct question: In the event of fighting between the Czecho-Slovaks and Americans together against Semenoff's troops, what action will the Japanese take?". To which General Ogata replied: "I will remain neutral, but I do not desire it; I would like for this matter to be settled peacefully. General Myssura was asked what he would do in case of an armed conflict. All he replied was: "I can only say that this takes place in Colonel Morrow's sector." General Myssura's attitude throughout was that of one deliberately waiting for his troops to be disarmed while he was not present, in order to furnish a lame excuse that he himself did not surrender his troops to any one. At no time did he request permission to go to his troops or in any way attempt or show the slightest desire to go to them and organize them for resistance, although he was continually being informed by Colonel Morrow as to what was taking place in the garrison at Verkhne-Udinsk. At 5 o'clock the Czecho-Slovaks came off their cars, took over the artillery from the Russian guard and completely disarmed the Russian garrison without a single shot being fired. Colonel Morrow offered General Myssura protection for himself and his family in his house. This General Myssura declined and remained with General Ogata. By 5 P.M. the disarming of all troops at Verkhne-Udinsk and the Park Barracks had been also accomplished. Two hand grenades were thrown into the Park Barracks by the Czecho-Slovaks which was sufficient to cause the Mongolians stationed there to immediately surrender their arms. No casualties on either side were reported and there were none. About 8 P.M. Colonel Morrow and the Adjutant, Lieutenant James, called on Colonel Nemetz, who had arrived at Beresovka. General Nemetz informed them that he had received a telegram from General Janin that the Czecho-Slovak disarming of the Semenoff troops would cease at Verkhne-Udinsk and that he would await the arrival of General Janin with his echelons at that place. On January 14th, Colonel Nemetz's Adjutant called on Colonel Morrow and informed him that he had received a telegram from General Janin directing that all the arms, armored trains, etc., taken by the Czecho-Slovaks from Irkutsk to Verkhne-Udinsk, inclusive, be turned back to the Russian authorities and stating that the following agreement had been entered into between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Japanese: (1). That the Japanese forces would oppose by force of arms any further disarming of the Semenoff forces east of Verkhne-Udinsk, and that the Japanese Army was concentrating for the purpose. (2) That the Japanese guaranteed, on the honor of Japan, a safe and rapid evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak and American forces between Verkhne-Udinsk and Manchria Station. (3) And further guaranteed that such evacuation would not be delayed nor meet with any opposition from the forces of Ataman Semenoff; and if it was necessary, in order to secure such uninterrupted passage, that the forces of Japan would take up arms against the forces of Ataman Semenoff. Further, that General Janin was expected to arrive on the following day and would confirm these orders and agreements. On the following day Colonel

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of January 15th and Colonel Morrow and the Regimental Adjutant, Lieutenant James, called on General Janin in his car where he fully confirmed the above mentioned telegram and agreements. General Janin expressed himself as highly gratified at the actions of the American forces at Beresovka in rendering assistance to, and cooperating with, the Czecho-Slovaks. He further gave to Colonel Morrow a copy of the following telegram addressed to him from Chita:

"Chita, December 19th, 1919. Telegram 115. For General Janin. From Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuria and Stretensk to all Military Controllers, Chief Operators, Head Men of crews and Station Masters. In addition to my telegram number 1105, of December 17th, 1919, the conversation of Czecho-Slovak Command by order of Commander of troops extends also to the American Command. Meleroff."

20. On January 17th, General Janin and Colonel Morrow, accompanied by their immediate staff officers and interpreters, called on General Ogata and fully informed him of the barbarities, murders and burnings committed by the command of General Levitsky; also of the horrible atrocities, murders, rapes, etc., committed by General Bogomoletz, who commanded the armored train "Destroyer", which had been captured by the American forces at Posolskaya. The evidence, taken from the crew of the "Destroyer", was read to General Ogata; the evidence of the burned and ruined villages south of Verkhne-Udinsk was also read to General Ogata; the whipping and killing of railroad employees by the Semenov armored trains were fully set forth and General Ogata was requested to ask General Suzuki, the Divisional Commander of the Japanese forces, then stationed at Chita, to come to Verkhne-Udinsk so that a conference might be held between General Suzuki and General Janin, General Ogata and Colonel Morrow. This in order that the barbarities of Semenov's armored trains might be stopped and that the column of General Levitsky, then operating in the south, be recalled, thus saving the lives of many hundreds of Russian men, women and children. General Ogata agreed and telegraphed to General Suzuki who replied that he would come from Chita to Verkhne-Udinsk at the earliest possible date. General Suzuki arrived at Beresovka on January 24th and at 2 P.M. had a conference with General Janin. At 5 P.M. Colonel Morrow was invited to meet General Suzuki at the Japanese Headquarters for a conference and later for a dinner at which General Janin would be present. Record of this conference follows:

"Report of a conference held at the Japanese Headquarters at Beresovka, Siberia, beginning at 5:30 P.M., January 24, 1920.

PRESENT

General Suzuki, I.J.A., Japanese Division Commander at Chita, Siberia, with his staff officers,
General Ogata, I.J.A., Japanese Brigade Commander, Beresovka, Siberia, with staff officers.
Colonel C. E. Morrow, 27th Infantry, Commander, U.S. Troops, Zai-Baikal sector (Verkhne-Udinsk incl. to Mysovaya incl.)
1st. Lieutenant John James, 27th Infantry,
Mr. Silverman, Russian interpreter for Colonel Morrow.
Japanese, English Interpreter for General Suzuki.

Colonel Morrow: I would like to speak to General Suzuki about the situation in this town and the neighboring village. The actions of General Levitsky, Commander of the Semenov Burita-Mongolian Brigade here, have been very bad. He has killed many people who were not Bolsheviks. He and his troops have murdered them. He

the actions of the American forces at Beresovka in cooperation with, the Czecho-Slovaks. He further gave to Colonel Morrow a copy of the following telegram addressed to him from Chita:

"Chita, December 19th, 1919. Telegram 115. For General Janin. From Verkhne-Udinsk to Manchuria and Stretensk to all Military Controllers, Chief Operators, Head Men of crews and Station Masters. In addition to my telegram number 1105, of December 17th, 1919, the conversation of Czecho-Slovak Command by order of Commander of troops extends also to the American Command. Meleroff."

20. On January 17th, General Janin and Colonel Morrow, accompanied by their immediate staff officers and interpreters, called on General Ogata and fully informed him of the barbarities, murders and burnings committed by the command of General Levitsky; also of the horrible atrocities, murders, rapes, etc., committed by General Bogomoletz, who commanded the armored train "Destroyer", which had been captured by the American forces at Posolskaya. The evidence, taken from the crew of the "Destroyer", was read to General Ogata; the evidence of the burned and ruined villages south of Verkhne-Udinsk was also read to General Ogata; the whipping and killing of railroad employees by the Semenoff armored trains were fully set forth and General Ogata was requested to ask General Suzuki, the Divisional Commander of the Japanese forces, then stationed at Chita, to come to Verkhne-Udinsk so that a conference might be held between General Suzuki and General Janin, General Ogata and Colonel Morrow. This in order that the barbarities of Semenoff's armored trains might be stopped and that the column of General Levitsky, then operating in the south, be recalled, thus saving the lives of many hundreds of Russian men, women and children. General Ogata agreed and telegraphed to General Suzuki who replied that he would come from Chita to Verkhne-Udinsk at the earliest possible date. General Suzuki arrived at Beresovka on January 24th and at 2 P.M. had a conference with General Janin. At 5 P.M. Colonel Morrow was invited to meet General Suzuki at the Japanese Headquarters for a conference and later for a dinner at which General Janin would be present. Record of this conference follows:

"Report of a conference held at the Japanese Headquarters at Beresovka, Siberia, beginning at 5:30 P.M., January 24, 1920.

PRESENT

General Suzuki, I.J.A., Japanese Division Commander at Chita, Siberia, with his staff officers,
General Ogata, I.J.A., Japanese Brigade Commander, Beresovka, Siberia, with staff officers.
Colonel C. H. Morrow, 27th Infantry, Commander, U.S. Troops, Zai-Baikal sector (Verkhne-Udinsk incl. to Mysovaya incl.)
1st. Lieutenant John James, 27th Infantry,
Mr. Silverman, Russian interpreter for Colonel Morrow.
Japanese, English Interpreter for General Suzuki.

Colonel Morrow: I would like to speak to General Suzuki about the situation in this town and the neighboring village. The actions of General Levitsky, Commander of the Semenoff Burita-Mongolian Brigade here, have been very bad. He has killed many people who were not Bolsheviks. He and his troops have murdered them. He has tortured them, tortured women and children, cut off their hands, burned them to death. Now General Levitsky is dead, killed by his own troops. The people who live in the villages to the south of here are good people and have sent to me their delegates asking me to save their lives. They have told me that they will not interfere with the railroad and that they will not fight troops of Japan unless the Japanese send troops against them. General, I believe that this is true, these delegates were old men. I have the proofs of these murders and robberies that have

been committed. The troops on the Semenov armored train, which the Americans captured, killed at least 55 people between Chita and Verkhne-Udinsk on their last trip, robbed them of their clothing and money, raped women and killed two women. They arrested the assistant station master, Verkhne-Udinsk, and pillaged his house, and General Bogomoletz, after having robbed him, was going to kill him. I went aboard the armored train and made him release this man. After the armored train was captured I found the property taken from the assistant station master in the armored train and in the hands of the men of the armored train. The whole world will be shocked when they hear of the horrible crimes committed by this armored train. I have proofs showing that the officers and men of the armored train are murders and robbers. I know that already over 50 of the railroad men have left Verkhne-Udinsk and many others are preparing to leave as soon as I leave with my soldiers. They are afraid that the Japanese will permit the troops of Semenov to whip them, rob them and murder them, I have never permitted, since I first came here, Semenov's officers to arrest or whip the railroad men or to kill them. To do this I have frequently been on the point of fighting the troops of Semenov, but the railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya has not once been broken or interrupted and has never been attacked by the people of the country. I request the General, as he has protected the Semenov officers and men and prevented the Czechoslovaks from disarming them, that he (General S.) now prevent Semenov's troops from arresting, whipping and killing the railroad men. If Semenov's officers are permitted to do this, railroad traffic at Verkhne-Udinsk will stop as all the railroad men will run away. If the Mongolian troops are sent out to kill the people in the villages near the railroad, these people will destroy the railroad. Japan having protected Semenov and his officers, the world will blame Japan. I have spoken this truth to the General for the good of Japan for the good of Russia and out of my friendship for Japan.

General Suzuki: I thank you very much for your kind information. When the American troops were guarding the railroad at Verkhne-Udinsk, railroad traffic was excellent and I intend to guard the railroad and its employees in the same manner as you have done it. In case of misconduct by Semenov troops I will not excuse it. There are certain defects in the government of Ataman Semenov and he is going to try to remedy these defects in the future. You mentioned that Japan protects the troops of Semenov, we do not protect them when they do wrong. We cooperate with them when their purpose coincides with our own. If the disarming of the troops of Semenov by the Czechoslovak troops had been permitted, I fear that their transport would have been seriously interfered with, so I mediated between them. I hear that the American troops are going to evacuate very soon and we will do everything we can to help them as we have helped the Czechoslovaks. As the education of Semenov troops is not good I fear many regrettable incidents have occurred. The Bolsheviks also robbed and murdered, but I believe that in the interests of humanity it must be stopped.

Colonel Morrow: I wish to tell you some things about the people in the country here, there was always peace here until General Levitsky arrived. He made the trouble by going into these villages with his troops. All these people want is to be left alone and to take care of their homes and families, they are not Bolsheviks. Perhaps the two officers of General Ogata who visited Bobkina have told the General what they have seen. I sent an officer to another village who found even worse conditions. The officers of Semenov cannot be trusted, they cannot govern, they can only kill and rob; they have no sense. The officers and men on the bronevik "Destroyer" have been turned over to General Myssura. The armored train will go back to the Russians as soon as I leave.

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General Suzuki: I think that when the armored train goes east it will not again return to the west.

Colonel Morrow: General Bogomoletz admits that his troops fired first on my troops at Posolskaya.

General Suzuki: I fear there must have been some misunderstanding.

Colonel Morrow: I shall tell you what General Bogomoletz says (General Janin and his Chief of Staff arrive at 6:16 P.M.) Colonel Morrow then continued: General Bogomoletz says that a machine gunner on the bronevik accidentally fired his machine gun towards the cars of the American detachment which were alongside the bronevik.

Recorder: Due to the arrival of General Janin and his Chief of Staff the conference have ended.

JOHN JAMES,
1st. Lieut., Adjutant, 27th Infantry.
Recorder.

21.

On January 23rd. , General Janin was pleased to decorate the following Americans with the Croix de Guerre

Colonel Charles H. Morrow, 27th U. S. Infantry,
Captain William Waite, 27th U. S. Infantry,
Captain Vernon L. Hash, 27th U. S. Infantry,
1st. Lieutenant John James, Adjutant, 27th Infantry,
1st. Lieutenant William C. Coogan, Personnel Adjutant,
27th U.S. Infantry,
2nd Lieutenant Paul W. Kendall, 27th U.S. Infantry,
Sergeant Carl Robbins, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry (deceased)
Private John L. Montgomery, Co. "M" 27th Infantry (deceased).

and with the French War Medal, Gold:

1st. Lieutenant Harry Killpack, 27th U.S. Infantry.

d and with the French War Medal, Silver:

1st. Lieutenant M.R. Finney, 27th U.S. Infantry.
1st. Lieutenant Walter Byrns, 27th U.S. Infantry.

and with the French War Medal, Bronze:

Regimental Sergeant-Major James F. Cooper, 27th U.S. Infantry
Regimental Supply Sergeant Leon Gaylord, 27th U.S. Infantry
Sergeant Herman Malchow, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry
Sergeant Peter C. Matthews, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry
Private Homer D. Bormie, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry.

and Major Don S. Colby, Russian Railway Service Corps, on duty with the 27th U.S. Infantry, with a French War Medal, Gold.

22. On January 15th, due to all of the preceding events in the American sector and westward, and to the uncertainty existing in the minds of the railroad employees east of Verkhne-Udinsk, the railroad traffic came practically to a standstill, while the yards at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka were filled with Czecho-Slovak echelons. In order to clear up the railroad situation and to continue the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks to the east, as well as to expedite the American

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Regimental Supply Sergeant Leon Gaylord, 27th U.S. Infantry
Sergeant Herman Malchow, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry
Sergeant Peter C. Matthews, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry
Private Homer D. Tommie, Co. "M" 27th U.S. Infantry.

and Major Don S. Colby, Russian Railway Service Corps, on duty with the 27th U.S. Infantry, with a French War Medal, Gold.

22. On January 13th, due to all of the preceding events in the American sector and westward, and to the uncertainty existing in the minds of the railroad employees east of Verkhne-Udinsk, the railroad traffic came practically to a standstill, while the yards at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka were filled with Czecho-Slovak echelons. In order to clear up the railroad situation and to continue the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks to the east, as well as to expedite the American evacuation, it became necessary to relieve the Semenov military commandant at Verkhne Udinsk, or, rather put in an American Commandant, as the Semenov commandant had fled the city. Pursuant to this the following order was issued:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY SEVENTY INFANTRY
Beresovka, Siberia, January 13, 1920.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 4

1. As the officer charged with the duties of the military commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk cannot be found and due to the absence of the commandant railroad traffic has practically ceased and, as under my orders I must use every means in my command to secure the prompt movement of railroad traffic and insure its continuance hereafter, I find it a military necessity to appoint a military commandant of the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. I, therefore, designate Major Don S. Colby, R.R.S.C., as the station commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk, and call on all railroad officials and employees to obey his orders.

By order of COLONEL MORROW:

JOHN JAMES,
1st. Lieut. 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant. "

Major Colby immediately assumed the duties of military commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk station, taking over the office of the Semenoff military commandant and continued in this capacity until the last American echelon had departed from Verkhne-Udinsk. With a Corps of able assistants he immediately brought order out of disorder then existing and never in its history were as many trains moved in and out of the railroad yards at Verkhne-Udinsk daily, as Major Colby proceeded to move. In fact, so many trains were moved that the inefficient Russian railroad officials at the eastern division points could not begin to handle the traffic. At this time the Czech evacuation west of Irkutsk was becoming a very dangerous and difficult matter. The Czecho-Slovaks had been forced to abandon 4 echelons east of Klukvennaya. The Polish troops and Russian troops guarding their rear had entirely broken or gone over to the fast-following enemy forces. The rapid evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces to a point east of the tunnel sector became a paramount and most pressing necessity. With this in view, a plan was evolved by Major D. S. Colby, R.R.S.C., for rapidly accomplishing this mission. The plan was submitted to Colonel Charles H. Morrow by Major Colby and approved and was taken by Colonel Morrow and Major Colby, together with Captain Paddyhays of the Czecho-Slovak forces, to General Janin at 6 P.M., on January 29th. The plan is as follows:

"Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia.

Suggestions to General Janin and to General Ogata for improving railroad conditions at Verkhne-Udinsk and to the west as well as to the ease for their consideration and determination:

I We approve all the suggestions of Engineer Hindra.

II In the sector east of Verkhne-Udinsk, (Verkhne-Udinsk not included) it would be necessary to place a Japanese military commandant in place of the Russian military commandant, that Japanese commandant collaborate with a Czech military commandant.

III At Verkhne-Udinsk an American military commandant (American Railroad Engineer) assisted by a Czech commandant without a Russian commandant. From Verkhne-Udinsk to Irkutsk it should be under Command of Czechs and a Czech military commandant at Irkutsk.

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III At Verkhne-Udinsk an American military commandant (American Railroad Engineer) assisted by a Czech commandant without a Russian commandant. From Verkhne-Udinsk to Irkutsk it should be under Command of Czechs and a Czech military commandant at Irkutsk.

IV That Verkhne-Udinsk and the Intendencia yard, and all stations and intermediate points to Kultack included to be filled with Czech echelons and to include Petrovsky-Zavod, if possible, that the engines from these echelons be returned westward for the purpose of moving all Czech echelons from the west to points east of the Tunnel Sector. That as soon as the congested conditions which now exist east of Verkhne-Udinsk is cleared up, that as many echelons as these terminals can handle be run eastward daily.

NOTE: The congested conditions to the east of Verkhne-Udinsk at this time practically prohibits the sending of more echelons to the east, as it would only increase the congested conditions now existing to the east. There are a number of engines at Verkhne-Udinsk, Mysovaya, and Sludyanka which, with a minimum amount of repair, could be put in service and utilized to bring Czech echelons from the west to points east of the Tunnel Sector."

"Minutes of a Conference Regarding Czech Evacuation Held at Chita on February 3, 1920.

PRESENT: For United States: Lieutenant Colonel F. B. Parker,
Major A. C. Peterson, Lieutenant P. B. Wilkes, Jr.

For Japan: General Hoshino, General Suzuki, Majors Hiroka, Nakatani, Nakashima; Captains T. Arimo, Ushirogu, Salda, Shiraishi, Yoshimoto; Lieutenant K. Herii; Interpreters S. Magotori and S. Tsuyeda.

The meeting was called to order at 2:25 P. M., General Hoshino presiding. The General stated that the points mentioned in Colonel Parker's letter of February 2nd would be taken up in numerical order and discussed. He also stated that at the conference held on January 28th, 29th and 30th many of the points had already been discussed and approved.

General Hosnino stated that he approved of the concentrating of all Czech echelons east of the Tunnel Sector but on condition that he have the control of the number of trains which will be parked in that territory, so as not to deter the operation of Japanese trains, etc.

Colonel Parker stated that this was a temporary measure to permit the Czech echelons to get through the tunnels before the advance of the Bolsheviks into Irkutsk, mentioning the recent trouble at that place in which several Czechs had been killed, necessitating their taking over the city as well as railroad station from Reds.

After some further discussion it was decided that 10 echelons may be parked between Petrovsky-Savod and Verkhne-Udinsk, including the former station, but not the latter; 10 echelons in the Intendencia Yard just east of Verkhne-Udinsk and 5 echelons at Divisiona and Verkhne-Udinsk, West of Divisiona as many echelons can be parked as the tracks will hold; however the main line must be kept clear. General Hoshino made a further condition that in case of disease breaking out in the closely concentrated echelons in any of the above named sectors that the Czechs will be required to remain in the trains so as not to endanger the people.

In regard to Japanese military commandants in the sector east of Verkhne-Udinsk, in place of Russian commandants, General Hoshino stated that he had already placed Japanese commandants at Petrovsky-Zavod, Hilok and Mogzon, but they could not take all authority from the Russian commandants.

Colonel Parker stated that there must be a Czech commandant at these stations whose business it is to look after the movement of Czech echelons and if any question comes up he should get a final decision from the Japanese commandant and not the Russian. In other words we wanted the Japanese commandant to have the power to say what should be done. General Hoshino stated that this was practically the case now. Colonel Parker stated that he did not want to have any misunderstanding on this point; that in the handling of the railroad business the Czech would confer and talk with the Russian but if any dispute came up between the two, the Japanese should be the one to decide. General Hoshino stated that this would be done.

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In regard to the third point, Colonel Parker stated that as the American military commandant had resigned this would not now be urged. With reference to a Czech commandant at stations from Verkhne-Udinsk to Irkutsk, General Hoshino stated that at one of the recent conferences in Chita it was decided to put Czech commandants in charge from Mysovaya to Irkutsk but not at Mysovaya.

Colonel Parker stated that at Mysovaya the Czechs have many trains and the Czechs have a very well organized transportation force there and it is considered

advisable to allow the Czechs command there, in consultation with the Japanese commandant, to have charge for the present while the Czech echelons are bunched in that sector.

General Hoshino stated that in conference in Chita the other day it was decided that the Japanese must have control from Mysovaya east including this point as Japanese echelons are moving up to that point and their authority cannot be relinquished at that point. He also stated that at present there is a Japanese, a Czech and a Russian commandant at Mysovaya and if the situation remains as it is at present, he can see no reason to make a change.

Colonel Parker then suggested that the Czech movement through Mysovaya should have preference except when it interfered with Japanese, then the latter would have preference and that the Japanese commandant there be instructed to allow the Czechs to have preferred movement after the Japanese and that if this was agreed to, Colonel Parker would be willing to consent to the Japanese being in supreme command there.

Colonel Hoshino agreed to this suggestion.

General Hoshino also approved the note regarding the repairing of a number of engines now at Verkhne-Udinsk, Mysovaya and Sludyanka and putting them in service to bring Czech echelons from the west to points east of the Tunnel Sector.

In regard to placing Czech telegraph operators at Petrovsky-Zavod, Hilok and Mogzon, General Hoshino stated it had been decided that the Czechs may do this after a thorough understanding with the Russinas. The arrangements must be made with the Russians, however, if they raised any objections to such an arrangement, the Japanese would use their influence to see that the matter was handled satisfactory to the Czechs.

Colonel Parker stated that he had received advice that there are now at Manchuria 12 decaped engines and that an order had been issued by the Russian authorities to waive the technical inspection and to forward these engines promptly. These engines will be sent west to Irkutsk for the use of Czech echelons and everything will be done to get them through quickly. General Hoshino expressed his pleasure at this information, stating that he was glad to have received a telegram from President Stevens about increasing the number of engines and requested Colonel Parker to extend his best wishes to Mr. Stevens. He also expressed his pleasure that Colonel Parker, Majors Nerz and Peterson would remain at Chita and assist in the transportation problems and that he and Colonel Parker would confer and decide on all transportation problems in the future.

Colonel Parker replied that he appreciated the courtesy which had been extended to him and his staff and that he would send a telegram to President Stevens and Colonel Johnson at Harbin, also to General Janin and Major Colby at Verkhne-Udinsk, advising them that all points had been satisfactorily arranged, and would give General Hoshino a copy of his message.

General Hoshino announced that he had received a telegram from Colonel Suzuki, whom he had sent to Verkhne-Udinsk as his representative, in which he said that General Janin made objection to the conference which General Hoshino had had at Chita recently with Polish officers without General Janin's knowledge. General Hoshino requested Colonel Parker to explain in his message to General Janin that this meeting was held without any intention of ignoring General Janin; on the contrary it is his desire not to discriminate against anyone in the movement of troops but to handle the general situation to the best advantage of all concerned.

Colonel Parker stated that he would include this information in his message to General Janin.

as Japanese echelons are moving up to that point and their authority cannot be relinquished at that point. He also stated that at present there is a Japanese, a Czech and a Russian commandant at Mysovaya and if the situation remains as it is at present, he can see no reason to make a change.

Colonel Parker then suggested that the Czech movement through Mysovaya should have preference except when it interfered with Japanese, then the latter would have preference and that the Japanese commandant there be instructed to allow the Czechs to have preferred movement after the Japanese and that if this was agreed to, Colonel Parker would be willing to consent to the Japanese being in supreme command there.

Colonel Hoshino agreed to this suggestion.

General Hoshino also approved the note regarding the repairing of a number of engines now at Verkhne-Udinsk, Mysovaya and Sludyanka and putting them in service to bring Czech echelons from the west to points east of the Tunnel Sector.

In regard to placing Czech telegraph operators at Petrovsky-Zavod, Hilok and Mogzon, General Hoshino stated it had been decided that the Czechs may do this after a thorough understanding with the Russians. The arrangements must be made with the Russians, however, if they raised any objections to such an arrangement, the Japanese would use their influence to see that the matter was handled satisfactory to the Czechs.

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General Hoshino announced that he had received a telegram from Colonel Sakuda, whom he had sent to Verkhne-Udinsk as his representative, in which he said that General Janin made objection to the conference which General Hoshino had had at Chita recently with Polish officers without General Janin's knowledge. General Hoshino requested Colonel Parker to explain in his message to General Janin that this meeting was held without any intention of ignoring General Janin; on the contrary it is his desire not to discriminate against anyone in the movement of troops but to handle the general situation to the best advantage of all concerned.

Colonel Parker stated that he would include this information in his message to General Janin.

In concluding the conference Colonel Parker asked General Hoshino if he would notify the various Japanese commandants of the permission given the Czechs to have Czech commandants and telegraph operators at the stations east of Verkhne-Udinsk. General Hoshino replied that he would do this.

Colonel Parker expressed his pleasure at the very satisfactory meeting which had been had and the conference adjourned at 3:30 P. M.

P. B. WILMES, JR.,
2nd Lieut. R.R.S.C.
Secretary.

Approved:

F. B. PARKER,
Lieut. Col., R.R.S.C.

This plan having been fully explained to General Janin, it received his unqualified approval. On January 29th, Colonel F. B. Parker, R.R.S.C., having arrived from Irkutsk, this plan was taken by Colonel Morrow and Colonel Parker to General Janin and again received his approval. Colonel Morrow and Colonel Parker were requested by General Janin to take it and urge its adoption upon General Suzuki at Chita while he, General Janin, would urge its consideration upon General Ogata at Beresovka. This plan was taken by Colonel Parker to General Suzuki at Chita and there received, in a large measure, full adoption by the Japanese General Hoshino, who was charged by the Japanese with the evacuation of the Czech-Slovak forces. Colonel Morrow was prevented from going to Chita with Colonel Parker on account of the evacuation of his own forces from Verkhne-Udinsk and the necessity of remaining with his troops while passing through the country commanded by Ataman Semenoff. In this connection it may be added that before this plan could be put into operation, in the early days of February, the Czechs were forced to stop and recall echelons from the east to fight at Zema, as well as take the town of Zema from the enemy.

23. On December 26th conditions had reached such an alarming state that the Mayor of Verkhne-Udinsk called on Colonel Morrow and asked him to protect the city, stating that the population was greatly alarmed on account of the murdering and plundering of the Mongolian bands and that also the population feared arrests and rioting by the Mongolians as well as which might be affected by the fall of Irkutsk. Also that the peasants in the nearby villages might in retaliation against the Mongolians attack the city itself. The following proclamation was given to the Mayor and a copy furnished General Ogata:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY
Beresovka, Siberia, December 26th, 1920.

City Mayor,
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia.

The American Command Colonel Morrow makes the following announcement to the people of Verkhne-Udinsk, which I request the city administration to publish for the information of the population. That no local party or armed force shall disturb the city. That no internal uprising threatening the peace and safety of the population shall take place. Verkhne-Udinsk is now quiet and should remain so. The railroad must continue its uninterrupted operations. This announcement is made in order that our position may be known.

C. H. MORROW,
Colonel 27th U. S. Infantry,
Commanding American Troops,
Zai-Baikal Sector.

P. B. WILKES, JR.,
2nd Lieut. R.R.S.C.
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C. H. MORROW,
Colonel 27th U. S. Infantry,
Commanding American Troops,
Zai-Baikal Sector.

The Mayor was informed that he could publish this proclamation when he desired and considered it necessary. On December 29th the following letter was received:

"Commanding the Special Zai-Baikal
Rifle Brigade,
No. 218,
December 29, 1919,
Beresovka.

Commanding the American Troops at Baikal Sector.

I have received a copy of the proclamation, transmitted to the City Mayor and addressed to the population, and I wish to express my sincere thanks to you, Colonel Morrow, for your desire and readiness to keep order and peace in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk.

Janor General Myssura."

On January 13th, an unsigned proclamation was posted in the city calling on the population to take up arms and overthrow the city government. The city mayor at once requested permission to publish the American proclamation which had been given him. This was done and before night the entire city was covered with the American proclamation. The effect was of the very greatest and not a single disorder took place in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk until after the departure of the last American echelon. On account of numerous arrests being made in the city by unauthorized and irresponsible officers of General Levitsky's force, as well as threats of whippings and executions among railroad employees, it became necessary on January 15th to issue the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS U. S. TROOPS, ZAI-BAIKAL SECTOR,
Beresovka, Siberia, January 15, 1920.

From: Commanding Officer,

To : Provost Marshal, Verkhne-Udinsk, 1st. Lieutenant M. R. Finney.

Subject: Arrests.

Permit no one except American Military Police to make any arrests in Verkhne-Udinsk on any ground. Take away and release any one arrested by any other force. Officers will be permitted to perform their proper and authorized administrative and disciplinary duties within their respective forces. Notify the City Commandant and the Chief of Militia that I have issued this order and will enforce it by force of arms. This is necessary on account of arrests and whippings by irresponsible persons, and on account of the present disorganized conditions among the forces in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk.

C. H. MORROW,
Colonel, 27th Infantry.

On January 19th the Japanese guard in the station of Verkhne-Udinsk arrested the assistant station master because he did not uncouple some cars as they had requested him. The American guard was immediately thrown around the station of Verkhne-Udinsk and the Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Finney, went to the railroad station, where he informed the officer in charge of the Japanese guard in that station that this man was not to be arrested by the Japanese or any other force. The station master was immediately released and the Americans informed that he had really not been arrested, but had only been directed to report to their guard. This closed the incident and no further arrests of civilians were attempted by the Japanese forces. On January 25th Gregoric Dechinsky was arrested by two Russian officers of the staff of the "Wild Division" on the charge of helping the Americans to distribute arms to the Bolsheviks at Vaknaestrov. This charge was absolutely groundless. A force of 50 men was sent to the city where they forcibly took this prisoner away from the Russians who were guarding him. Deschinsky, a Russian of about 50 years of age, who had served in the

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by artillery fire. No further arrests were made until after the Americans had left Verkhne-Udinsk when three delegates from the stricken villages were executed by the Wild Division. At this time also the American Command submitted to General Janin a long list containing the names of railroad employees, civilians and members of the Economic Cooperatives and the large Cooperative Societies, who were to be executed by the Semenov officers immediately after the departure of the Americans. This list was given to General Janin who was to give it to the Japanese and warn them that these executions were to take place and were unjustified and unwarranted and would take place unless the Japanese prevented. This was the only hope that the American Commander had of saving the lives of these innocent people whose only crime was that they worked for a living and were doing good and useful things for the railroad, the city and the people, and all the above were things greatly abhorred and feared by the Semenov officials (These lists, with a copy of the letter to General Janin, are attached hereto, marked "H") The American proclamation found at least apparent favor as is evidenced by the following telegram:

"Chita, January 14th, 1920. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka, Siberia. I sincerely thank you for your proclamation, preventing any disorder in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. I assume that your officers and men are Zai-Baikal. No incorrect actions towards those in the Zai-Baikal territory will be permitted. The American Consul at Chita is worrying about it and inquired about it from the Commander of the Japanese Mission. All those rumors are provocations and you may rest assured as our mission is to avoid any conflicts. I assure you again that after you leave the country the relations between you and us will remain most friendly. I gave orders about an uninterrupted use of American and Czech telegrams. Chief of Staff, Major General Subcovski.

The Armored Train "Destroyer" and Prisoners
Captured by the Americans at Posolskaya, January 10th, 1920.

24. Beginning on January 11th a full and complete investigation was made into the actions and conduct of the armored train "Destroyer" on its last trip from Chita to Verkhne-Udinsk. All of the testimony taken was freely given by the officers and men of the "Destroyer" and is contained and fully set forth in document hereto attached on "Testimony relating to the armored train "Destroyer" and other armored trains." It includes a full statement by Semenov's Divisional Commander of Armored Trains, Major General Bogomolov and the direct commander of the armored train, Captain Moscaliev. To the telegrams Colonel Morrow sent on the 10th and 11th of January 1920 Semenov replied on the 13th, but the telegram was not received until the 14th of January. The following is the telegram from Chita:

"Chita, January 13th, 1920. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka. In reply to your telegram in regards to bronevik "Destroyer" I was very glad to receive your communication fully answering the friendly relations between us. For the investigation of the incident which caused the capture of the bronevik, I appoint General Myssura. I also guarantee you that the real men, guilty of the said incidents will be punished to the limit of the law of war time. I request to release immediately the command and men of bronevik "Destroyer", return the arms to men and armored car and give the bronevik a possibility to get to Chita. I am assured that our friendly relations will quicken the settlement of your above said No. 30. End. Chief Commander of Troops, Lieutenant General Semenov."

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Immediately upon receipt of this telegram a copy of which had been furnished General Myssura, General Myssura called on Colonel Morrow to arrange the settlement of the affair. General Myssura was asked what powers he had, if any, to try and punish the officers and men of the armored train "Destroyer" and he replied that he did not have any powers, that he could not convene a court, could not try the officers or men and could not approve of the sentence of a court if he had the power to convene one. Colonel Morrow informed General Myssura that it was useless to attempt to

negotiate with one who had no powers to negotiate with and that no steps would be taken in the negotiations until he, General Myssura, had been given power to try and punish the guilty. On the same day the following telegram was dispatched:

"Beresovka, January 14th, 1920. Lieutenant General Ataman Semenov, Chita. Replying to your telegram of January thirteenth I have conferred with General Myssura who has no power to try and punish. I cannot negotiate with him unless he has full power to quickly try and quickly punish these guilty officers. As regards the men and the bronevik, we can reach a satisfactory solution easily. C. H. Morrow, Colonel, Commanding American Troops in the Zai-Baikal.

On January 14th the following telegram was received:

"Chita, January 14th. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka. I urgently request you to return our bronevik from Beresovka to Chita. There will be a detailed investigation about its actions and all guilty will be severely punished. Chief of Staff, Major General Subcovski.

On January 17th Ataman Semenov telegraphed to General Myssura as follows:

"Chita, January 17th, General Myssura, Beresovka. Very confidential. Russian officers can be tried only by a Russian Court. Ataman Semenov. "

On January 19th the following telegram was sent to Ataman Semenov:

"Beresovka, Siberia, January 19th, 1920. Lieutenant General Ataman Semenov, Chita. Replying to your number thirty three to General Myssura which has been transmitted to me, it is my one desire that these offenders be tried by a Russian court and request again that such a court be quickly convened and given full powers for trial and to carry out the sentence of the court. The horrible barbarity, murders, robberies and rapes of this car, outside of its unprovoked firing on the American detachment, defy the power of words. This testimony I have and you know I will move in a few days. If you desire to clear yourself of these crimes, disavow them and stand well before the world as a punisher of crime. I request you to quickly convene this court otherwise I must think you approve of all these horrible murders, robberies and rapes and the world will think the same. Request that you reply immediately as I know that you control the wires and can do so. Morrow.

On January 19th the following message was received:

"Chita, January 19th, 1920. Colonel Morrow, Beresovka. Chief of the Foreign Department, Headquarters Chief Commander of Troops and also a liaison officer with foreign military representatives, Colonel Krupski, pays his respects to Colonel Morrow. Requests with the permission of Colonel McCroskey American Military Agent not to refuse to talk to him through the telegraph. Krupski.

Colonel Morrow went to the telegraph office about 9:30 P. M. and held a conversation over the direct telegraph wire with Colonel Krupski, then at Chita. This conversation lasted until 12:45 P.M. Colonel Krupski requested that the officers and men of the bronevik "Destroyer" be returned to Chita. in order that they might be sent

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a desire to punish one guilty of every crime in the catalogue. Colonel Krupski was further informed that General Bogomoletz, had been given powers by Ataman Semenoff to convene a court on each of the nine armored trains of Semenoff and to try and execute without evidence those he considered guilty of any crime, and if the Ataman could delegate such powers to General Bogomoletz, he could easily delegate such powers to General Myssura or any other Russian commander at Verkhne-Udinsk. Colonel Krupski promised to use his best endeavors with the Ataman to secure the convening of such a court and promised to notify Colonel Morrow the next day by telegraph whether or not such a court would be convened. (Full report of this conversation is hereto appended marked "I"). No reply was received from Colonel Krupski on the 20th. On January 23rd Colonel Krupski arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk and the following conversation took place between him and Colonel Morrow:

"Conference between Colonel C. H. Morrow, U.S.A., 27th Infantry and Russian Officer Colonel Krupski, Representing Ataman Semenoff's Forces, Chita. Verkhne-Udinsk, January 23rd, 1920.

PRESENT.

Colonel C. H. Morrow, 27th Infantry
Lieut. John James, Adjutant, 27th Infantry,
Colonel Krupski, Russian Army, (under Ataman Semenoff)
Mr. Posbeloff, (Civilian - Attached to Staff at Chita)
Lieut. W. A. Keating, R.R.S.C. (stenographer)
Max Ehmer, R.R.S.C. (Interpreter.)

Colonel Krupski having stated informally that he came by direction of Ataman Semenoff to talk with Colonel Morrow with a view of putting an end to unpleasant rumors and to cooperate and help clear up the understanding which took place between the Americans and Semenoff's forces, having particular reference to the capture by the Americans of the bronevik "Destroyer", asked that he be given the details of the incident, saying that Chita did not know all that had happened.

Colonel Morrow: The bronevik "Destroyer" came to Verkhne-Udinsk on the afternoon of January 9th and shortly after it arrived they arrested the assistant station master, robbing him of his household belongings, cloth goods and property, including his watch and money, and took him aboard the armored car, then they went through the house breaking and slashing things to pieces. At 5:30 in the afternoon I came aboard the armored car myself, with Major Colby and two other officers. I asked General Bogomoletz if he had arrested the station master, he said that he had and that he intended to kill him. I asked him why he had arrested him and he refused to answer the question, telling me that he would do as he pleased and would not continue the conversation, he would stop talking to me. I told him I was the American Commander of this district from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya, guarding and protecting the railroad and the railroad employees and that he could not arrest, rob and execute the station master, that if he intended to do it, I had two thousand soldiers and he could not do it - that whether he desired to continue the conversation or not, he would talk to me, - that there was a good understanding between the Russian Generals Mejack, Myssura, Levitsky and myself and that he (Bogomoletz) should not come in here and arrest and kill people without consulting with me or the Russian Generals about it. Bogomoletz then agreed to release the station master, he did release him, but he made him sign a paper that all of his property had been returned to him when that was not true. Three days after the capture of the bronevik I searched the prisoners and found on them the watch belonging to the station master.

Ataman could delegate such powers to General Bogomoletz, he could easily delegate such powers to General Myssura or any other Russian commander at Verkhne-Udinsk. Colonel Krupski promised to use his best endeavors with the Ataman to secure the convening of such a court and promised to notify Colonel Morrow the next day by telegraph whether or not such a court would be convened. (Full report of this conversation is hereto appended marked "I"). No reply was received from Colonel Krupski on the 20th. On January 23rd Colonel Krupski arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk and the following conversation took place between him and Colonel Morrow:

"Conference between Colonel C. H. Morrow, U.S.A., 27th Infantry and Russian Officer Colonel Krupski, Representing Ataman Semenoff's Forces, Chita. Verkhne-Udinsk, January 23rd, 1920.

PRESENT.

Colonel C. H. Morrow, 27th Infantry
Lieut. John James, Adjutant, 27th Infantry,
Colonel Krupski, Russian Army, (under Ataman Semenoff)
Mr. Posbeloff, (Civilian - Attached to Staff at Chita)
Lieut. W. A. Keating, R.R.S.C. (stenographer)
Max Ehner, R.R.S.C. (Interpreter.)

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Colonel Krupski: Who had the watch?

Colonel Morrow: One of the men, I do not know just whom.

Colonel Krupski: I would like to know definitely, soldiers or officers?

Colonel Morrow: I do not know. I caused all the prisoners to be searched and took all the property. I took the watch and returned it to the station master. I have a list of the property and things they stole from him.

Colonel Krupski: Did you give this list to General Myssura?

Colonel Morrow: I offered to give General Myssura all of the testimony if he would send clerks to get it. I have the writing in Russian.

Colonel Krupski: And what happened after Bogomoletz arrested the station master.

Colonel Morrow: I am coming to that. The bronevik left Verkhne-Udinsk at 9:00 o'clock, going west and went to station Posolskaya about seventy-five versts from here where there was an American detachment of about thirty-eight men guarding the railroad, sleeping in teplooskies. They arrived there about 12:00 or 1:00 o'clock and without any argument or talk, or dispute, between either the officers or men of the bronevik and the Americans, the bronevik opened fire on the Americans.

Colonel Krupski: Did the bronevik open fire when it first came into the station or did it stand awhile?

Colonel Morrow: It stood awhile, took on water for the engine and held a conversation with the station master at Posolskaya.

Colonel Krupski: How many shots did they fire.

Colonel Morrow: The fire was opened by machine guns, then the bronevik moved back towards Verkhne-Udinsk a few hundred yards. As soon as the bronevik fired the Americans jumped out of their Teplooskies and returned the fire, they had only hand grenades and rifles. The engine was seriously damaged from the fire, it could not get away quickly, it had to stop. The Americans followed after the bronevik, the bronevik firing with its machine guns and the Americans firing with their rifles. Then the engine was gixed up a little and the bronevik came on east to station Timlooi, siding 22, there it sent in messages that it would surrender. An American detachment was coming in from Selenga and the bronevik surrendered to them. The bronevik was then brought into Beresovka. I can now read you the testimony of General Bogomoletz, if you wish.

Colonel Krupski: How many times did they fire on the Americans, how many shots?

Colonel Morrow: It is impossible to state, they fired with all of their machine guns, so many shots, we could not tell. Our soldiers, except the guard, were in their teplooskies asleep.

Colonel Krupski: When were some of the soldiers killed, at the first fight at Posolskaya or at Timlooi?

Colonel Morrow: They were killed in the first fight. One man was killed as he threw a hand grenade into the engine, another was killed as they followed after the bronevik firing at it. The fighting lasted about one-half hour. All of the crew of the bronevik and all of the officers are now alive and have been turned over to General Myssura. They have been well fed, given cots to sleep on and kept warm. Not one of them killed or one of them touched in any way. I have the testimony of about fifteen men, in English and in Russian, telling what the bronevik did from Chita to Verkhne-Udinsk with the testimony of General Bogomoletz, Captain Moscaliev, the Commandant of the train. This testimony was given of their own free will.

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Colonel Krupski: It is quite possible, but I want to find out first how it happened, there must be an investigation before this can be done.

Colonel Morrow: Bogomoletz executed two women, and his trials did not last twenty minutes, he tried them without witnesses and killed them. There is nothing that can clear the honor of the Ataman save a quick trial of Bogomoletz and his officers. His crimes, the crimes of Bogomoletz and his officers against the Russian people are horrible, I have the proof of them in Russian.

Colonel Krupski: Perhaps if Bogomoletz had such short trials and executions he had reasons for doing so. He had a list of those Bolsheviks here in this district and if he executed some of these people he had authority to do this from Chita. Of course if he robbed them that is not right, he had no authority to do that. Near the station Oloviannaya, for instance, they found a secret soviet of Bolsheviks who were working there, he had a list of these men and they were to execute all of them.

Colonel Morrow: Was Bogomoletz going to try them, or just execute them without trial?

Colonel Krupski: Without trial, because now, at the present time, it is war time, it is military law.

Colonel Morrow: Would that apply to Bogomoletz, could you try him and execute him the same way, execute him without trial?

Colonel Krupski: Yes. The former commander of the bronevik and his captain had been doing the same things this Bogomoletz does. He robbed people and executed them when he did not have authority to do it. So after we found these two men guilty they were executed in one-half hour by order of General Semanoff. We thought that, after this, General Bogomoletz would not do such things, that he was a good man and would be alright. When Bogomoletz captured a band of Bolsheviks they found a letter in the pocket of one of the executed men which showed that the Bolsheviks executed their enemies, all of them. This was at Oloviannaya on the night before New Year. Doubtless this all looks very barbarous to you, it is true that we have not yet found the proper method of trying and executing our enemies. When the Czech stopped fighting the Bolsheviks and this trouble started, the Bolsheviks executed more on their side than Semanoff had killed here. These Bolsheviks were executed because they were trying to block and damage the railway, after they were executed it was found that the railroad ran much better. Did Bogomoletz state why he had arrested the man here or did he refuse?

Colonel Morrow: He said he had information that he was a Bolshevik.

Colonel Krupski: Was General Bogomoletz on the bronevik when the fight took place?

Colonel Morrow: Certainly.

Colonel Krupski: How did he explain why they started fighting?

Colonel Morrow: I want you to read all that Bogomoletz said.

Colonel Krupski: That is not necessary if you say General Myssura has it, is it in English or Russian?

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Colonel Krupski: That is not necessary if you say General Myssura has it, is it in English or Russian?

Colonel Morrow: In Russian. Bogomoletz admits that his machine guns fired on the Americans first, without any warning and without any trouble between the Americans and the bronevik, he says he believes it was an accident.

Colonel Krupski: May be Bogomoletz did not know anything about this fight starting.

Colonel Morrow: He claims he was asleep in his car.

Colonel Krupski: That is very possible, perhaps after the shooting started it was reported to him that the Americans started the firing.

Colonel Morrow: He said he thought at first that the Americans started it but he found out later that the bronevik had started it. Here is another point; the station master at Posolskaya, the military commandant, has been an open enemy of the Americans and has in every way attempted to make trouble between the Americans and the Russians. Our detachment there had information from the people at Posolskaya that there was going to be trouble there that night and that an armored train was coming, they asked Nichalnik Stancia, if the armored train was coming, and he told them "No", there was no armored train coming." Then when the armored train did come to Posolskaya, Krisko went aboard it, talked to the General and talked to the Commander of the bronevik, then he got his belongings, his property and clothes and got on the bronevik - then the fight happened - after Krisko was aboard the train. In his statement, Captain Moscaliev, the commander of the bronevik, says at the end of his testimony: "In conclusion I wish to state it is my belief that the station master at Posolskaya is responsible for this entire trouble. He did not tell the Americans that the armored train was coming, he stated to the railroad employees tonight something must happen." The people in the village left the village that night and went over to a nearby place, knowing that something was going to happen, that a fight was going to happen.

Colonel Krupski: Did the bronevik know that the Americans were at Posolskaya, when they were on their way there they did not know about it.

Colonel Morrow: It seems to me that a commander of bronevik should know his district.

Colonel Krupski: Not necessarily, sometimes they do not, they get orders to go to districts they do not know. General Bogomoletz is in command of all the broneviks, of all of the armored cars, but perhaps he did not know this district up here toward Irkutsk. When Irkutsk was cut off this district came under the command of Chita.

Colonel Morrow: The evidence shows that the people know there was going to be a fight that night.

Colonel Krupski: Maybe the people did not know anything about a fight, maybe they were afraid of the coming of the bronevik.

Colonel Morrow: They told our men that they were going to be attacked that night by the bronevik. Krisko, the Semenov commandant, told the railroad employees that there was going to be trouble there that night. Captain Moscaliev says in his statement that the station master told them that.

Colonel Krupski: It is not clear to me how the Nichalnik knew that the bronevik would come down to cause some trouble there.

Colonel Morrow: It is very clear to us that he went there to do it, that is why Krisko knew. The General came here and arrested and robbed the station master at Verkhne-Udinsk, he knew that he should not do that in this town, I have had lots of trouble with Semenov's broneviks. Krisko knew that he was coming because the General notified him, if it had not been for that, how could he have told the people that it was coming.

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Colonel Krupski: Krisko knew that the bronevik was coming alright, but how could he know that the bronevik would start a fight with the Americans? It is very unreasonable to believe that they would tell him that before they came.

Colonel Morrow: Krisko is an officer, a military commandant, he sent a telegram, he asked - he demanded them to send troops there.

Colonel Krupski: You have that telegram?

Colonel Morrow: I have, and a statement from the man that he himself would take arms. Now, General Bogomoletz says that he tried and killed forty-four people, including two women, between Chita and Verkhne-Udinsk. Captain Moscaliev says there were fifty-three killed, all on this last trip from Chita to Verkhne-Udinsk, and we have the full testimony of this and of robbery.

Colonel Krupski: They will be executed, I am sure, because it was not right to rob people, maybe they were right in executing some of them, but not robbery, we will not stand for that.

Colonel Morrow: We have the testimony of robbery, palin murder and rape.

Colonel Krupski: Whose testimony is that ?

Colonel Morrow: Bogomoletz says nothing about the robbery, just the killing of the two women, but the soldiers testify as to the rape, many of them.

Colonel Krupski: Who raped the women, soldiers or officers?

Colonel Morrow: Soldiers. At the station Cloviannaya one woman was arrested by order of Worker Yacovenco, she was raped by four or five men, one man's name was Malichyn. This took place on the first of January 1920.

Colonel Krupski: Whose testimony is that ?

Colonel Morrow: That is the testimony of Alexander Gautemuroff, a soldier. Afterwards she was killed in her underwear.

Colonel Krupski: Why did they kill her?

Colonel Morrow: I do not know.

Colonel Krupski: Did General Bogomoletz say anything about that woman being killed, why it was done without trial or --

Colonel Morrow: That is outside the question, I am talking about a rape now. Could she be sentenced by General Bobomoletz to be raped by four or five men just because she was a Bolshevik?

Colonel Krupski: No. But did Bogomoletz know anything about the woman being raped or executed?

Colonel Morrow: He told me that she was executed because she had communication with the Bolsheviks.

Colonel Krupski: He should know himself if she had communication with the Bolsheviks. He should have the information from the Staff at Chica, a list of names. He had no right to do this.

Colonel Morrow: Bogomoletz told us that all he had to do was to get a report from the military commandant at the station, then he could kill them, and he did do it.

Colonel Krupski: That is true, but there should be a trial.

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Colonel Krupski: That is true, but there should be a trial.

Colonel Morrow: I thought the Colonel said they should have a list from Chita.

Colonel Krupski: Yes, he gets lists from Chita, when he starts out from there, of all the Bolsheviks suspected, but if he gets any information from the station commandants he takes that also. First he must hold a trial, without a trial he cannot execute, he must have witnesses. Just now, the military organization in Chita is very poor, also there are very bad men, it is hard to control them, if Bogomoletz

Colonel Morrow: Bogomoletz could try, and did try and execute forty-four men between Chita and here - it did not take him ten minutes to try and execute, why should it take so long to try and execute Bogomoletz?

Colonel Krupski: Because we have not all the data, we do not know yet what was done, we want to find that out first. We have no authority to try this case without an order from Chita, we cannot do it here, just the Commander-in-Chief can do it.

Colonel Morrow: Let me read to you what the Commandant of the armored train said about the manner in which trials were made on the bronevik. -

Q. 'Did the man accused of being a Bolshevik have the right to introduce witnesses to testify for him?

A. No, only the man himself and the accusations against him are considered by the court.

Q. At Mogzon did you require any evidence or proof other than the word of the station commandant ?

A. No, that was enough.' ' '

Colonel Krupski: The commandant ought to prove to all that is a Bolshevik, why he is to be arrested or executed, he must state this and have the witnesses. It is very clear to me now that things have not been going right here.

Colonel Morrow: Colonel the worst enemy the Ataman has, worse than the Bolsheviks, is this murdering commander of his armored trains. I stopped the armored cars from coming in here and I have been the best friend that Ataman Semenov has because I kept this country peaceful. I kept his armored trains from coming in here, robbing, murdering and raping the people, if his armored trains had come in here the American sector would not only have disturbed, there would have been fighting all over it. This Bogomoletz and his armored trains have made more enemies for the Ataman than there is Bolsheviks in the whole country. Bogomoletz murdered, and and killed quickly, Bogomoletz had power to try, to kill, to execute, both men and women, quickly, in a minute, but you say there is no power, no authority to try him.

Colonel Krupski: As soon as we have enough evidence he will be tried and if found guilty he will be executed. The law does not permit cases to be tried so quickly. Just now the matter is not clear, there is not proof enough, there first must be an investigation. Bogomoletz may have ordered people executed, but he did not rob them, the soldiers did it, he did not do it himself.

Colonel Morrow: I know he didn't do it himself, but he is responsible for what his men do, is he not ?

Colonel Krupski: I am sure that he did not instruct his soldiers to rape people.

Colonel Morrow: He let them do it, didn't he?

Colonel Krupski: No, that cannot be - -

Colonel Morrow: How about the station master at Verkhne-Udinsk, you know that he robbed him.

Colonel Krupski: If it is proved that this station master was robbed with

with his permission, why of course he will have to answer for that. But his men may have done things he did not suspect. We thought Bogomoletz was a very good man, now it is very clear that we were not getting full information. I did not come to make an investigation myself, I just want to find out the cause of the fight between the Americans and the bolshevik.

Colonel Morrow: I want to tell you just how this court of Bogomoletz's worked:

Colonel Krupski: I imagine how it was.

Colonel Morrow: This is the testimony of an officer:

"Q. Did the station master at Nogzon submit any written statements about the woman who was executed?

A. No, just a list of the names of the prisoners with remarks made by himself.

Q. Did the station commandant appear at the trial of this woman.

A. No.

Q. Is this the way these courts usually try cases?

A. I do not know how they usually operate, at all the trials I have seen they operate in this way.'

Now I have full proof of robbery, murder and rapes against Bogomoletz, I have the pocketbooks, with the money in them, they took from the people they robbed - -

Colonel Krupski: But Bogomoletz himself did not do this.

Colonel Morrow: Colonel, do you mean to say, that murder, robbery, rapes, things like that, can go on when he is in command of the train and he not be responsible, is that possible?

Colonel Krupski: Of course he is responsible for his men, but he did not do these things himself, he gives orders to his men to try and to execute, but he does not know if they are robbed or how they are killed.

Colonel Morrow: All of these papers that I have show one thing clearly and plainly, that this was a case of robbery and murder, and even General Bogomoletz's testimony shows that he is a robber and a murderer, what the commander says shows it.

Colonel Krupski: I cannot understand this, because we knew the General as a good man, we know that he was very strict as an officer, that he was very strict with his officers, he was always on duty at seven o'clock in the morning, if his officers did anything wrong they were punished. I believe now that he is a robber, but nobody in Chita knows him like that.

Colonel Morrow: I intend that the world shall know of it, shall show the crimes that this case has committed. I am going to give a copy of this testimony to General Janin, to the English, to the Italians, to every mission I can get to if Semenov does not punish him quickly, before I get out of this country, and I must know that he has been punished. I have been a good friend of the Ataman, I have given him much good advice. And I will give it to him again; try this man quickly, Bogomoletz and his officers, try them and execute them, and save himself from this shame of robbery, and rape, and murder.'

Colonel Krupski: I am sure that he will be punished. I understand there will be a conference tomorrow with General Janin, General Suzuki and yourself. I would like to attend that conference, if there are no objections. General Suzuki has no

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Colonel Morrow: It is alright with me if it is alright with General Janin and General Suzuki. But this matter will not be discussed at that conference, this is between Semenoff and the Americans, the Japanese have nothing to do with this. In conclusion, Colonel, I want to tell you truly, that never in all my life have I ever heard of as much murder and robbery as this "Destroyer" has done. I know

Halmikoff, I know what he did, I know a man in Mexico named Villa, a great bandit and murderer, but they are just little murderers compared to this crowd.

Colonel Krupski: But the Bolsheviks do this, what would you say about the Bolsheviks now?

Colonel Morrow: This testimony will prove to the world that these people are much worse than Bolsheviks.

Colonel Krupski: No.

Colonel Morrow: This testimony will prove it. I know about a column of Mongolians that went into the country under General Levitsky, killing, burning, robbing the people, burning their bodies, burning them before they were dead, then the force mutinied and killed Levitsky himself and all of his Cossacks with him. When they killed people they cut their hands off, they cut their feet off, they burned them before they were dead. I know that, and we know that the people were not Bolsheviks, we have the evidence. Two French officers, two Japanese officers and two Americans went to the village of Bobkina about twenty-five versts southwest of Verkhne-Udinsk, where we heard these things were going on, there they found fifteen bodies with the hands cut off, their lips cut off, their bodies cut all to pieces and burned, burned before they were dead, we have pictures of it, we have testimony of it, these six officers have signed their names to it. That is why we sent for Suzuki to come here, to keep the Mongolians from murdering Russian women and children. I say to you that I am a friend of the Russian people. At another place where we sent an officer we found the same thing and we know it to be true, women and children ran up a mile to escape and they were shelled and killed, their dead bodies left lying in the snow. These are not rumors, these are facts. These Mongolians who committed these murders were under Russian troops, and they mutinied against them and killed their commander Levitsky.

Colonel Krupski: We know that they killed Levitsky. And they tied and burned him, why did they do that if they understood their actions, if they knew it was not good why did they do so to him?

Colonel Morrow: I do not know. I do not know why Levitsky took such troops against those people.

Colonel Krupski: I believe now that we have a bad situation here, we have only a small piece of territory now that is not occupied by Bolsheviks and we must work for improvement, all of this robbery and execution has made a different situation which must be improved, that is why I came out here, to improve this situation. Now that the Kolchak government has been turned over to Ataman Semenov we will try to make an improvement.

Colonel Morrow: There was no trouble in all this country until these Mongolians came here under General Levitsky, there were no Bolsheviks, now I tell you that everybody in the country is against Ataman Semenov, because of these Mongolians who robbed them and killed them, now they are organized and strong and powerful, they have got together, and I know and General Janin knows what turned them against Ataman Semenov. If you yourself lived in one of these little villages and these Mongolians came in and robbed and burned your people, what would you do?

Colonel Krupski: I know now that we must try and improve everything.

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Colonel Krupski: I know now that we must try and improve everything.

Colonel Morrow: It is too late now. I hoped, I wanted to believe that Ataman Semenov was trying to do something for the people of this country, I would believe it if I saw Bogomoletz and his officers executed.

Colonel Krupski: That is the question now, we must investigate these conditions, if we just executed Bogomoletz one man would not do much good, we must work together, we want you to help us improve these conditions.

Colonel Morrow: General Levitsky was a friend of mine. I told him not to go out there with the Mongolians, General Mysurra told him not to go, but he went. Details of the murder he was doing were brought in to me, the people from the villages came and told me, I didn't believe it until I sent my own officers out to find out, I did not believe it possible that anybody could kill and butcher and burn like the people told me Levitsky was doing. I sent my own officers and found it was true.

Colonel Krupski: I am very sorry that all this is true. It is clear that now we must reorganize our forces to go against the Bolsheviks, we must try to improve the present situation, to get a better organization. Now that Kolchak's officers have come over to Semenov's command they will try to organize different policies than before. I am a new man with this command. I came out to Chita on the 25th of December, and was sent out to find out what was going on. It is very disagreeable to hear of such things going on. However, I am very pleased to have met you, Colonel, I thank you.

Colonel Morrow: Please pardon me if I have said things too strongly for you, but all this murdering and robbery and killing has got into my heart, I cannot help it. I thank you sir, good night.

Note: Colonel Krupski did not attend the conference mentioned above.

JOHN JAMES,
1st. Lieut., Adjutant, 27th Infantry,
RECORDER."

On January 22nd the officers and men of the bronevik were turned over to General Myssura commanding the Russian garrison at Beresovka. General Myssura agreed that neither the officers nor the men would be released until after the departure of the last American echelon from Verkhne-Udinsk. The sum of 765,124,84 roubles in Russian currency, taken from the captured train was also turned over to General Myssura. (Receipt for the money and prisoners is hereto appended marked "J"). These prisoners could no longer be retained by the Americans as the garrison at Beresovka was completely evacuated and on the 23rd the entire command moved into its trains, which were then in the Intendencia warehouses where the 27th camped during the summer. One cannot pass by the incident of this armored train "Destroyer" without recalling that it was one of the armored trains which was driven from the American sector in June, 1919. Also and above everything else, that the testimony taken from the men of the bronevik itself and from its commander General Bogomoletz, revealed a record of robberies, murder, rapes and crimes, innumerable, surpassing anything in modern civilization. This testimony was given freely and without apparent realization of the vicious nature of atrocities disclosed. Also that General Bogomoletz commanded nine other armored trains which were engaged in the same fiendish practices is also unquestioned. The reign of terror which these armored trains created throughout every portion of the Zai-Baikal, save that guarded by American troops, is beyond belief. Their killings amount, beyond question, to three or four thousand people and perhaps more. They plundered the country at will, and sent their plunder, after taking full toll of it themselves, back to the warehouses of the master that sent them forth - Semenov, himself. These armored trains not only committed murders themselves but brought thousands of prisoners and innocent people to the slaughter houses of Makavyeyvo, Adrianovka, Oloviannaya and Borzia. Here the executions of the monster Colonel Stephanoff and his German Second in Command, Colonel Friburg, reached a total of perhaps 10,000 persons. These executions were in full operation when the Americans first came to the Zai-Baikal and continued in the territory under the command of Semenov until the Americans departed and are still in progress to this day.

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mitted to carry out their work of death and destruction there, is a matter of which the 27th Infantry will always be proud, and a fact that the people of the Zai-Baikal will long remember. The numbers of murders, robberies and atrocities committed from Karimskaya to Stretinsk and up the Amur River by Semenoff armored trains and officials can only be estimated as this was a closed country controlled by the Ataman of the Amur Cossacks and on to the country controlled at Habarovsk by the able murdering assistant of Semenoff, the Ataman Kalmikov, whose passion for crimes and murder has been previously reported from these headquarters. This extended the zone of Semenoff's murders from Lake Baikal to Karimskaya, thence up the Amur River to Habarovsk and on to Vladivostok itself, entirely covering Siberia from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok. (Partial list of testimony and affidavits relating to the armored trains is attached hereto marked "K" under the Head "Testimony relating to the armored trains of Ataman Semenoff.") The armored train "Destroyer" itself was so completely dismantled as to render its further use for death and destruction impossible, and when the last American echelon left Verkhne-Udinsk, it remained in the yards of the Intendencia, a "Destroyer" which was no longer able to destroy. That Ataman Semenoff never intended to try, and will never try, his bloodstained subordinate, General Bogomoletz, is believed by every American here. Not even General Myssura could keep his promise regarding Bogomoletz. On the afternoon of the 29th of January, just before the departure of the last American echelon, General Bogomoletz was seen riding in the streets of Verkhne-Udinsk in the official automobile of the Headquarters of the "Wild Division" in the fit and suitable company of other murders of Ataman Semenoff. On January 28th the following orders was issued and was published on the 29th of January:

"HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY
Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia, January 28, 1920.

RAILWAY GUARD

ORDERS NO. 5.

1. Due to the departure of the American troops from Verkhne-Udinsk and the Zai-Baikal sector, Major Don S. Colby, R.R.S.C., is relieved from duty as Military Station Commandant at Verkhne-Udinsk, Siberia. Effective on the departure of the two American echelons now at this station, Major Colby will deliver to the senior railroad official on duty in Verkhne-Udinsk such orders, seals and records as pertain to the office of the Military Commandant.

By order of Colonel Morrow:

JOHN JAMES,
1st. Lieut., 27th Infantry,
Acting Adjutant.

This brought to a close the American guarding of the sector of the Zai-Baikal railroad from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya. The American Commander of this sector feels that he must pay Major Don S. Colby, Lieutenant Byers, Lieutenant Farnsworth, Lieutenant Foster, and other R.R.S.C. men in this sector at least the reward of his thanks for the splendid services which they always so ably and so cheerfully rendered to the 27th Infantry. Major Colby has been recommended by the Commanding Officer for the Distinguished Service Medal. The splendid services which he rendered fully entitle him to this reward. The fact that from the time the Americans took over the guarding of this sector until the close of their guarding not one rail nor one tie was ever removed from the railroad, and that, except by the Semenoff bandit incident, not one out-guard was ever attacked must speak for the success with which the regiment

and officials can only be estimated as this was a closed country controlled by the Ataman of the Amur Cossacks and on to the country controlled at Habarovsk by the able murdering assistant of Semenov, the Ataman Kalmikov, whose passion for crimes and murder has been previously reported from these headquarters. This extended the zone of Semenov's murders from Lake Baikal to Karimskaya, thence up the Amur River to Habarovsk and on to Vladivostok itself, entirely covering Siberia from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok. (Partial list of testimony and affidavits relating to the armored trains is attached hereto marked "K" under the Head "Testimony relating to the armored trains of Ataman Semenov.") The armored train "Destroyer" itself was so completely dismantled as to render its further use for death and destruction impossible, and when the last American echelon left Verkhne-Udinsk, it remained in the yards of the Intendencia, a "Destroyer" which was no longer able to destroy. That Ataman Semenov never intended to try, and will never try, his bloodstained subordinate, General Bogomoletz, is believed by every American here. Not even General Mysura could keep his promise regarding Bogomoletz. On the afternoon of the 29th of January, just before the departure of the last American echelon, General Bogomoletz was seen riding in the streets of Verkhne-Udinsk in the official automobile of the Headquarters of the "Wild Division" in the fit and suitable company of other murders of Ataman Semenov. On January 28th the following orders was issued and was published on the 29th of January:

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sector had been continually attacked and continually interrupted. That no attack or no interruption of the railroad occurred in the American sector speaks for itself and requires no argument to establish the correctness and justness of the methods employed by the American Command to secure a safe and uninterrupted operation of the railroad.

The Evacuation of the American Forces from Verkhne-Udinsk.

25. On January 5th an order was received from the headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, directing the complete evacuation of all troops from the American sector at the earliest possible date. This order found the command in garrison at Beresovka and two companies with their out-guards at various stations from Beresovka to Mysovaya, a distance of 110 miles. The forces to be evacuated consisted of 1,871 men and 284 animals. The Zai-Baikal railroad at this time had almost ceased to function as a railroad, due largely to the crimes committed against the employees by the armored trains of Ataman Semenov and continual interference by Semenov's military commandants with any reasonable or sensible operation of the railroad. The American Command, in order to get wood for itself, was forced to give wood to the railroad and several times before the evacuation was completed gave from 15 to 25 carloads to save a complete shutdown in power. The railroad yards at Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka were completely blocked. To transport the American Command required 380 cars which were arranged in 8 echelons of approximately 47 cars each. It was in the middle of the Siberian winter, and before the evacuation was completed, the thermometer registered at Verkhne-Udinsk $62\frac{1}{2}$ degrees below zero. The cars for the transportation of the men of the command had to be double-walled and double floored as they were nothing but common Russian or American box cars which could not for a moment be expected to stand such intense cold. Stoves had to be provided for each car and wood racked high on the top of every car to provide fuel on a railroad already struggling against a most serious fuel shortage. Also extra cars loaded with wood had to be carried on each echelon as a reserve supply. Every echelon took 90 days rations and forage as the conditions of the railroad and the situation from a military standpoint did not warrant a movement of troops with less supplies or rations, and it is to be remembered that the distance from Mysovaya to Vladivostok is 1820 miles. The first echelon consisting of Field Hospital No. 4, and 60 sick, Company "B" and 14 Red Cross nurses, left Verkhne-Udinsk January 16th; second echelon, Companies "I" and "L", January 17th; third echelon, Headquarters Company and Company "A"; January 24th; fourth echelon, Supply Section, January 24th; fifth echelon, Supply Section, January 25th; sixth echelon, Companies "K" and "M", January 26th; seventh echelon, Supply train and Military police, January 26th. On January 23rd it was found that an American Red Cross echelon from the west was at Mysovaya and could not get through the blockade at that place, and on January 25th it was learned that still another echelon containing Red Cross personnel had also arrived at Mysovaya. It was determined to hold up the evacuation of the troops until these two echelons could be brought to Verkhne-Udinsk, combined and run as one echelon, preceding the last American troop echelon. Two large decapitated engines were sent from Verkhne-Udinsk to Mysovaya for this purpose and the first Red Cross echelon was brought into the Intendencia yards on the morning of the 26th, the second echelon, mixed British and red cross, arrived on the night of the 27th. The Red Cross echelons were then switched together and formed into a single echelon and departed for Vladivostok on the afternoon of January 29th. The last and remaining echelon, Colonel Morrow Commanding, departed from Verkhne-Udinsk at 10:40 P.M. January 29th. This echelon carried Regimental Headquarters, Machine Gun Company and the one-pounder platoon of the Headquarters Company.

The Evacuation of the American Forces from Verkhne-Udinsk.

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26. To the very last the American Command retained its control of the city and the railroad and the evacuation of the American troops, as well as all the Red Cross units and the R. R.S.C., was complete, save for Major Solby and three other officers of the R.R.S.C., who remained behind at the direct request of General Janin to assist the Czecho-Slovaks in their evacuation from the west.

27. The Regimental Commander desires to express the thanks of the officers

and men of the regiment to Mr. Chan Wallace of the American Red Cross for his splendid assistance to the regiment which was always most cheerfully rendered and which greatly added to the comfort and welfare of the command. By his unflinching kindness and ready sympathy he endeared himself to the Russian people throughout the American sector, as well as to the officers and men of the regiment. And to Mr. Marmaduke Clarke of the U.M.C.A., for his splendid services rendered to the regiment throughout its stay in Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka; for the erection in the camp at Verkhne-Udinsk of a splendid outdoor theater; for the construction and maintenance at Beresovka of the most beautiful Y.M.C.A. buildings in Siberia or in any other place occupied by American troops during the war; for efficient and able service rendered in athletics and for an untiring and unceasing work on behalf of the enlisted men of the regiment.

28. Despite the insidious and heavily financed propaganda conducted against the Americans prior to their arrival at Verkhne-Udinsk, the Russian population very soon learned to know and appreciate the Americans as friends. During the summer months they filled the American camp, and every night from a thousand to fifteen hundred men, women and children attended the open-air theatre and moving picture show established by the Americans in the camp at Verkhne-Udinsk. The general feeling of the people can be judged from the following letter:

Verkhne-Udinsk,
City Hall,
Jan. 16, 1920.
No. 191.
Verkhne-Udinsk.

C. H. Morrow,
Colonel, 27th U.S. Infantry.

Much respected Colonel:

There is spread all over the city a very sad news, that you and the trusted to you 27th U. S. Infantry, are going to leave our city for a new station of service.

Under the influence of this news, the Verkhne-Udinsk City Administration as an institution trusted with the confidence of the citizens cannot deny itself the pleasure to express frankly and straight all the sentiments (feelings) which disturbs our minds at present in connection with your departure.

The sincere desire to help our much suffering country in its hard times with all means and ways at your disposal, your warm and friendly interest in the needs of the poor and hard-favored and to the last the constant desire to preserve order and right - these were the most striking points, which accompanied all your untiring and energetic activity in the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. Following firmly that policy, you made your brave men and officers follow that same policy, beginning from the highest ranking officer to the private inclusive.

No wonder that the local citizens were quickly in sympathy with you and your regiment and became accustomed to see in every American soldier a real defender, protector and sincere friend. No wonder, that, when in trouble, all of us, without hesitation, went to you for help, knowing that we would not receive a cold refusal. Now, no wonder, that the parting with you fills our hearts with sorrow. But together with this sorrow, there burns a glowing flame of deep gratitude to you for all the good and fine things you have done for us.

And the Verkhne-Udinsk City Administration in name of all citizens cordially request you, much respected Colonel, to accept this gratitude and thanks and also a farewell regard with the best and most good wishes.

The name of Colonel C. H. Morrow will remain in the memory forever of the

kindness and ready sympathy he endeared himself to the Russian people throughout the American sector, as well as to the officers and men of the regiment. And to Mr. Marmaduke Clarke of the U.M.C.A., for his splendid services rendered to the regiment throughout its stay in Verkhne-Udinsk and Beresovka; for the erection in the camp at Verkhne-Udinsk of a splendid outdoor theater; for the construction and maintenance at Beresovka of the most beautiful U.M.C.A. buildings in Siberia or in any other place occupied by American troops during the war; for efficient and able service rendered in athletics and for an untiring and unceasing work on behalf of the enlisted men of the regiment.

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The name of Colonel C. H. Morrow will remain in the memory forever of the Verkhne-Udinsk citizens. They will also never forget the glorious 27th U. S. Infantry.

City Mayor Nocolski.

Members of the City Administration.

T. Starcoff,

C. Nodelman.

Secretary O. Pustyn."

and the following letter of the Zemstvo:

"Minutes of Protocol No. 3, Conference of Verkhne-Udinsk County, Zemskaya, City Hall, January 16th, 1920.

Present: Chairman R. V. Ksenjopolski,
Members V. P. Girchenko,
A. L. Zrajevski,
Sec'y I. A. Anikyn.

Reported: 1. Report of the Chairman about the transfer of the American Hospital No. 1 to the Zemstvo as a gift.

Decided: To express in the name of the county population its thanks for the valuable gift of American people in the person of their representatives: Chief of the Siberian Delegation Major Eversole and Colonel Morrow, Commanding the American Troops. To inform the entire population of the county of the gift. To request Major Eversole and Colonel Morrow to leave at Zemstvo for the hospital their pictures and their own hand written signatures. To name the Verkhne-Udinsk Zemskaya Hospital Red Cross Hospital, and to be used for the poor population of the county. A copy of the following decision to be sent to the American Government and people for information through Major Eversole and Colonel Morrow. The original with the proper signature.

True Copy.

County Zemskaya City Hall

Secretary's Signature. "

and the order from the Second Military District of the Zai-Baikal Province:

"ORDER

To the 2nd Military District of Zai-Baikal Province.

Verkhne-Udinsk.

No. 11.

October 14th, 1919.

October 9th, 1919, I together with members of the bureau, the Committee to help the sick and wounded, visited the Verkhne-Udinsk Hospital of the American Red Cross, which is at the Main Street in the building formerly occupied by Vtorov & Sons' Store.

With a surprising rapidity and attention together with a friendly and co-operative spirit almost in one week was established out of this store a wonderful hospital.

Questioning the sick in the hospital not one had any claims nor hints for any dissatisfaction nor complaints whatsoever. The sick are perfectly satisfied with the regime and rules of the hospital. The sick are well taken care of, everywhere is most wonderful order, plenty of medicaments, underwear and immense depot of provisions. Excellent food - Next to the hospital is established a free dispensary for sick people, where daily come hundreds of people to get medical treatment, the sick are also furnished free with medicines.

It is very pleasant to see such hearty and friendly relations towards us, therefore I consider it a pleasant duty to note the above said and sincerely thank the representatives of the American people in the person of; the inspirer of all good heartiness, Colonel Morrow, under whose leadership...

Present: Chairman N. V. Ksanjopolski,
Members V. P. Girchenco,
A. L. Zrajevski,
Sec'y I. A. Anikyn.

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It is very pleasant to see such hearty and friendly relations towards us, therefore I consider it a pleasant duty to note the above said and sincerely thank the representatives of the American people in the person of; the inspirer of all good beginnings, Colonel Morrow, under whose immediate supervision and personal instructions, with his so natural energy, the hospital was built. Also Doctor Bucher, Miss McIntire and the entire hospital personnel, who work so hard for the good of the hospital and for their sympathy to the needs of the sick and wounded.

Military Governor;

Major General Mejack,

City Commandant;

Colonel Ivashkevitz."

That this protection and good feeling extended to the people of all races is shown by the following letter:

"Colonel G. H. Morrow,
27th U. S. Infantry,
Expeditionary Forces in Siberia.

The Verkhne-Udinsk Branch of the East-Siberian Chinese National Union hereby brings to you, dear Colonel, the most sincere thanks for the protection offered to subjects of the Chinese Republic, residing at Verkhne-Udinsk and its suburbs, who were all the time without an official representative. Expressing its gratitude to you for the protection, the Union sincerely believes that in the future, you, dear Colonel, will offer as well, protection to subjects of China.

Verkhne-Udinsk, January 14th, 1930.

President: Tin-lan-ven; Vice-President: Pin-vilay; Members of the Administration, Pin-zin-lin, Un-hoshyn, Fu-cei-tsai, Ko-si-ho, Kan-ho-nish, Un-tai-hesh, Tan-han-cin, Tam-sun-chan, Kun-hosh, U-shen-ho, Cin-li-u, Dzi-fya-hin, Ich-cen, Can-i-un."

28. The Commanding Officer desires to express to Mr. Chanan Silverman his high appreciation of a splendid service always cheerfully and accurately rendered. Mr. Silverman as the Russian English interpreter of the Headquarters was called upon at all hours of the day and night. His splendid attainments as an interpreter, his sterling honesty, his devotion to America and America's cause and ideals, won for him the respect, confidence and admiration of all. In any success that might have failed to the regiment, Mr. Silverman certainly is entitled to a large share of the credit.

29. In June Red Cross echelons began to pass through Verkhne-Udinsk bound for the west. Late in July three Red Cross echelons reached Irkutsk and were lying in the yards at that place unable to secure quarters for the female personnel. The Red Cross reported the situation to the American Commander and requested that he provide quarters for 5 Red Cross officers and 25 Red Cross nurses in the camp at Verkhne-Udinsk. This was gladly done. A complete camp was established for the nurses with mess hall, kitchen, bath-house, etc., near the main camp. The officers were furnished tents on the Staff line. A large building on the main street of Verkhne-Udinsk which had formerly been used as a wholesale and retail department store was secured for the use of the Red Cross as a hospital. This building was rapidly placed in excellent shape for hospital purposes. Sixty Austrian war prisoners were secured by the Commanding Officer, placed under guard of American soldiers, and turned over to the Red Cross for their various purposes. The Army in every way assisted the Red Cross, giving them rolling kitchens, cots, mattresses and mattress covers, as well as selling to them all necessities they required. When the weather became cold enough to require their use, fur caps and gloves, sheepskin coats and artic overshoes were also furnished. On August 28th the following telegram was received:

"Irkutsk, Siberia, Colonel Morrow, Verkhne-Udinsk.
Have decided to evacuate to the eastward of the tunnel sector all female personnel now west of Baikal. Am sending thirty-one nurses to Verkhne-Udinsk tonight. Please inform Bucher requesting that he provide quarters at hospital. Also of the probability of the early arrival of an additional thirty female personnel. If impracticable to send additional personnel to Verkhne-Udinsk kindly advise me immediately. Conditions to west critical. Greatly appreciate your valuable assistance and hearty cooperation.

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Manget".

Major Manget was immediately telegraphed to send the thirty-one nurses and the additional thirty nurses and that they would be accommodated in the camp and the regiment would make them comfortable. On August 29th the first thirty-one nurses arrived and early in September the remaining thirty nurses reached the camp. The camp had already been enlarged to accommodate them and everything possible was done for their comfort. The effect of having these nurses in the camp was most excellent

and they did much to raise the morale of the regiment. Additional buildings were secured in the city by the Commanding Officer for hospitals and quarters for the nurses. However, they were not utilized at this time as in a few days the policy of the Red Cross changed and by far the larger part of the female personnel was returned to Irkutsk and the west. They were later sent back Verkhne-Udinsk, then returned to Irkutsk and then finally returned to Verkhne-Udinsk in December, some thirty being left in Irkutsk to be caught in the revolution on December 24th at that place. This last unit arrived at Verkhne-Udinsk in the early part of January and was finally evacuated from that point. It can but be admitted that the continual moving backwards and forwards by the Red Cross caused the greatest confusion and resulted in a great loss of efficiency, and in a large way prevented this noble and efficient body of women from performing the great work they were so capable of, and so greatly desired to perform.

30. In October 1919, cases of influenza began to appear in the regiment and in November the disease became epidemic. The disease was at and just prior to this time epidemic in the Japanese garrison which immediately joined the American garrison. Every preventative measure known to the Surgeon or to the Commanding Officer was at once put into effect. The post exchange restaurant and the Y.M.C.A. were closed; men were prohibited from assembling in groups and from entering public places; no man was permitted to leave the garrison unless on official business; shelter halves were hung between the cots of the men, thus making a cubicle for each man; cutrains were hung through the center of the tables during mess; the throats of officers and men were sprayed three times daily; argyrol was dropped in the eyes of all officers and men three times daily; double timing and other violent exercises out of doors were stopped; mess kits were plunged into boiling water before and after meals; this latter precaution had been in effect since the arrival of the regiment at Verkhne-Udinsk. In spite of these precautions and the efforts of the medical officers, the disease spread and many men were lost. Just a short time prior to this most of the experienced men of the Medical Department on duty with the regiment had been relieved and sent to the United States; they were replaced by recruits having no knowledge of their duties and totally unfit to be trusted with serious cases of any nature. As it was known that at this time there were more American trained nurses in the Red Cross hospital at Verkhne-Udinsk than could be used and the medical officers had found it impossible to effectively combat the disease with the untrained medical personnel under their command, the Commanding Officer requested that twelve nurses be sent to the Regimental hospital (Field Hospital No. 4) for duty. These nurses were promptly furnished and at once entered upon their duties. The effect of their work and their presence was almost immediately apparent and within a month the epidemic was over. The services of these American girls can not be too highly commended; without their highly trained services many of the men now living would undoubtedly have died of the influenza.

31. Immediately after the attack on the American detachment at Posolskaya by the armored train "Destroyer", it was strongly rumored that the local Semenov forces had received orders to attack the American forces and take from the captured armored train and also that large reinforcements would be sent from Chita. The Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war at Baresovka had a very friendly feeling towards the American command these rumors alarmed them greatly. They therefore held a secret conference to decide what action, if any, they would take in case the American force was attacked. The following day, and as a result of the conference, the senior officer of the war prisoners called on the Commanding Officer at the American Headquarters and offered to the American Commander, for any duty whatsoever, the services of himself and a thousand volunteers, each man being a fully trained soldier, and a veteran of the

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50. In October 1919, cases of influenza began to appear in the regiment and in November the disease became epidemic. The disease was at and just prior to this time epidemic in the Japanese garrison which immediately joined the American garrison. Every preventitive measure known to the Surgeon or to the Commanding Officer was at once put into effect. The post exchange restaurant and the Y.M.C.A. were closed; men were prohibited from assembling in groups and from entering public places; no man was permitted to leave the garrison unless on official business; shelter halves were hung between the cots of the men, thus making a cubicle for each man; outrains were hung through the center of the tables during mess; the throats of officers and men were sprayed three times daily; argyrol was dropped in the eyes of all officers and men three times daily; double timing and other violent exercises out of doors were stopped; mess kits were plunged into boiling water before and after meals; this latter precaution had been in effect since the arrival of the regiment at Verkhne-Udinsk. In spite of these precautions and the efforts of the medical officers, the disease spread and many men were lost. Just a short time prior to this most of the experienced men of the Medical Department on duty with the regiment had been relieved and sent to the United States; they were replaced by recruits having no knowledge of their duties and totally unfit to be trusted with serious cases of any nature. As it was known that at this time there were more American trained nurses in the Red Cross hospital at Verkhne-Udinsk than could be used and the medical officers had found it impossible to effectively combat the disease with the untrained medical personnel under their command, the Commanding Officer requested that twelve nurses be sent to the Regimental hospital (Field Hospital No. 4) for duty. These nurses were promptly furnished and at once entered upon their duties. The effect of their work and their presence was almost immediately apparent and within a month the epidemic was over. The services of these American girls can not be too highly commended; without their highly trained services many of the men now living would undoubtedly have died of the influenza.

31. Immediately after the attack on the American detachment at Posolskaya by the armored train "Destroyer", it was strongly rumored that the local Semenov forces had received orders to attack the American forces and take from the captured armored train and also that large reenforcements would be sent from Chita. The Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war at Beresovka had a very friendly feeling towards the American command these rumors alarmed them greatly. They therefore held a secret conference to decide what action, if any, they would take in case the American force was attacked. The following day, and as a result of the conference, the senior officer of the war prisoners called on the Commanding Officer at the American Headquarters and offered to the American Commander, for any duty whatsoever, the services of himself and a thousand volunteers, each man being a fully trained soldier, and a veteran of the

war. This offer was unconditionally; nothing was asked, apparently nothing was expected. These men had their lives to lose and nothing to gain; a greater tribute could hardly be paid to any country. The necessity for the acceptance of this offer did not arise, but should it have arisen the Commanding Officer would have had no hesitancy in arming these men and relying on them fully for any service whatsoever.

(Signed) C. H. MORROW,

12 Incls.

Colonel, 27th Infantry.

LIST OF INCLOSURES:

Inclsure	No. 1.	Exhibit	"A"
"	No. 2.	"	"A-1044 R
"	No. 3.	"	"B" —
"	No. 4.	"	"C" —
"	No. 5.	"	"D" — 1044 R
"	No. 6.	"	"E" —
"	No. 7.	"	"F" —
"	No. 8.	"	"G" Atrocities and Petitions.
"	No. 9.	"	"H" — 1044 R
"	No. 10.	Exhibits	"I", "J" & "K" Bronevik "Destroyer".
"	No. 11.	Atrocities	of Semenov's Armored Trains.
"	No. 12.	Commendations	of the people of Zai-Baikal.
"			

AG 095 Bogomoletz, A.
(8-24-35) Misc.

1st Ind.

WFP:MMS

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1935. To Colonel Charles H. Morrow, 28th Infantry, Fort Niagara, New York AND Captain Paul W. Kendall, Inf., Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, IN TURN.

For comment by indorsement hereon as requested.

By order of the Secretary of War.

WILLIAM F. PEARSON
Adjutant General

AG 095 Bogomoletz, A.
(8-24-35) Misc.

1st Ind.

WFP/mms

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1935. To Colonel Charles H. Morrow, 28th Infantry, Fort Niagara, New York AND Captain Paul W. Kendall, Inf., Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, IN TURN.

3. On January 9th, the heavily armed armored train "Destroyer" came to Verkhno-dinsk, Siberia. Verkhno-dinsk was then the headquarters, Baikal Sector of the American Army. It was the duty of the American Forces to guard the railroad in that sector.

4. The "Destroyer" was commanded by Major General Bogomoletz who represented that he commanded, and that representations were correct, the armored train division of General Benesoff.

5. Three armored trains had previously been permitted to pass through the American Sector in the special agreement made with General Benesoff. This agreement covered their movements through the American Sector from Verkhno and on to Irkutsk, and obliged these trains to the strict observance of the rules and regulations governing the operation by the American Forces of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which agreement clearly prohibited the interference of the State armored trains or their crews with the Railroad, its operation or interference with the Railroad or the employees of the Railroad.

6. Upon the entrance of the armored train "Destroyer" into the City of Verkhno, they proceeded to arrest the Railroad Station Master who was taken aboard the armored train, and it was announced by the crew of the train that they supposed to execute him. These facts were reported to me at Zaretskoye, which is about five miles from Verkhno, which was the headquarters of the American Command, at which point I had my headquarters and most of the American Forces under my command.