Deprive the Enemy, Defeat the Enemy: John Pope's Military Policies and Non-Combatants in Virginia and on the Frontier

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Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. Army played a central role in expanding the frontier for white Americans through conflicts with Native Americans. During the American Civil War, many historians may argue, the Army's role along the frontier became insignificant as they moved east to fight the rebelling Southerners. Yet, events in the summer and fall of 1862 explicitly linked the major fighting of the Civil War with the continued conflicts with the Plains Indians in the West.

In the summer of 1862, Union forces in Virginia were desperate for a victory after a number of setbacks. In the Shenandoah Valley, Confederate general Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson defeated three separate Union Armies and secured this vital region for the Confederacy. At the same time, Union general George B. McClellan's once seemingly successful Peninsula Campaign stalled five miles from the Confederate capital of Richmond. After Confederate general Robert E. Lee received the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, his forces successfully pushed McClellan's Army of the Potomac almost twenty miles from Richmond and onto the banks of the James River. With these failures in the Shenandoah Valley and outside of Richmond, the Northern populous grew tired of rising casualties with little result and started to lose support for the Union war effort. In July of that year, these problems led President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to appoint General John Pope to command a new makeshift army in an attempt to jumpstart the war effort. Although Pope would fail to reverse these Union misfortunes, his civil-military policies while commanding the Army of Virginia made a first step toward the hard war policies that eventually led to Union victory.[1]

While Pope focused on Lee's movements in Virginia, many northerners heard the shocking news of the Sioux Uprising that started along the Minnesota border on August 18, 1862. Facing drought and a subsequently weak harvest, the Sioux living along the banks of the Minnesota River looked to the federal government for assistance. Starving and agitated with continued white settlement and broken treaties, a group of Santee Sioux assaulted both white settlements and U.S. Army posts, resulting in the death of almost five hundred settlers in about two months time. After his failure in Virginia, Pope was assigned to the Department of the Northwest and given the task of bringing peace to the northern plains. With his arrival, the Indian policy of the United States came under close scrutiny. As the head of the Department of the Northwest, Pope attempted to instill his own Indian policies that would reverse the corruption and deviousness of the established ones.[2]

Despite taking place at the same time, few historians have explored the campaigns against the Sioux between 1862 and 1865 within the larger context of the American Civil War. In fact, many historians would argue that the U.S.-Dakota Conflict only lasted between August and September 1862. Yet, campaigns against the Sioux in the Department of the Northwest continued until early 1865, overlapping with many of the important campaigns in Virginia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia. The timing of the Sioux attacks, the fact that many Sioux bands retreated into British Canada, and the lack of resources for many U.S. soldiers in the Department were directly related to the American Civil War. Similarly, an examination of military policy under John Pope in both Virginia and on the plains between 1862 and 1865 show the relationship between the fighting East of the Mississippi and the continued conflicts on the frontier.[3]

When it came to civil-military and military-Indian policies, Pope implemented ones that contained similar hard war components—meaning the direct contact of the army with non-combatants—in Virginia, Minnesota, and the Dakota Territories. Although containing a number of major differences, one significant similarity emerged between them: deprivation. Pope believed that if he could deprive his enemies of key necessities, especially crops and livestock for food, he could bring the war, either with white Southerners or Natives, to a close quickly. Both examples also show that, although Pope initially supported extermination policies against the Sioux, something the white population had supported since Europeans first settled the Americas, the use of these hard war components relied on the actions of white Southerners or Native Americans. If the opposing population worked with the U.S. forces, then Pope would try to leave them be, if not, then they would receive the harsh terms set out by his policies. A comparison of Pope's General Orders nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, and 13 as commander of the Army of Virginia and his proposed military-Indian policies shows that the military policies of the Civil War carried over into the conflicts with Plains Indians while Pope commanded the Department of the Northwest.[4]

Such a comparative approach dealing with the U.S. Army during the Civil War era provides the opportunity to examine that institution, the conflict, and its leaders in four new ways. First, it lets historians place the Civil War into a larger context nationally. Few Civil War and Western historians have recognized the possibility of a relationship between the conflict east of the Mississippi and the wars with Native Americans along the frontier, but this cannot be ignored when examining John Pope's Civil War experience.[5] Second, it allows historians to question the extent to which the Civil War was truly a total war, as historians Mark Grimsley and Mark Neely Jr. have done. Third, as Neely points out, Civil War historians have never examined

the role race played in the conduct of warfare by the U.S. Army during that era.[6] Finally, it shows how a commander who had little experience commanding soldiers and creating policy prior to the conflict learned on the job and carried those lessons into other conflicts.[7] Pope's military career provides the perfect opportunity to build upon these areas.

After receiving his appointment to command the newly formed and demoralized Army of Virginia, three corps that Stonewall Jackson's forces had thoroughly beaten during his Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1862, Pope needed a way to both boost the soldiers' morale and to end the war quickly. For these purposes, Pope supported the idea of using hard war policies against Confederate civilians. By focusing on the harsher treatment of civilians through foraging and minor destruction, Pope hoped the war would end soon after.[8]

Following the lead of commanders in the Mississippi Valley, on July 18, 1862, Pope implemented General Orders, nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, and 13, introducing hard war policies to the Virginia theater. In General Orders, nos. 5 and 6, Pope ordered, "the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on." He added, "no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used unless so stated specifically in the order for the movement." The army would rely almost exclusively on local food sources for both the men and horses.[9] Pope's subsistence orders would both boost the Army's supplies during the campaign and deprive local Confederates of food to feed themselves, their families, and possibly their army. These orders also gave the Union forces in the region the opportunity to move at a quicker pace. Relying on supply trains would slow the army's movements and limit them to specific routes as they moved through the state. While depriving Confederate citizens and possibly the Confederate forces of food, foraging could have allowed Pope's forces to quickly overtake territory without necessarily needing to protect a long supply line.

The most contentious of his orders, however, were General Orders, nos. 7, 11, and 13. These orders provided a framework for dealing with guerrilla activity that could take place against the Army of Virginia. Pope declared that any person living in the region near his force was to be held responsible for any damage done to his logistical lines or for any attacks on his army. In response to damages to the roads and rail lines, Confederate civilians within 5 miles of the area would be coerced into repairing the damages and paying for the lost supplies. In addition, if any soldier or follower of the army was attacked during the march "from any house[,] the house shall be razed to the ground," and the inhabitants arrested. Any person known to have carried out the attacks "shall be shot, without awaiting civil process."[10] Following along the same vein, in General Orders, No. 11 Pope ordered his subordinate commanders to arrest "all disloyal male citizens" near the army unless they were willing to take an oath of allegiance. If one of these men then violated it, however, Pope ordered that the person "shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use." Additionally, this order gave officers the power to displace known Confederate civilians to places behind Confederate lines and those exiled faced execution if they returned to their homes. General Orders, no. 13 reversed George B. McClellan's practice of having Union soldiers guard the property of Confederate civilians.[11] By living off the land and no longer protecting the enemy's property, it appeared that Pope had finally brought the war to their opponents in a way that, he hoped, would end the fighting quickly.

On the one hand, the enlisted men in Pope's ranks applauded these new orders, believing it freed them to commit fully to the war effort. One of the Virginia army's soldiers wrote home that the orders were "objectionable only in so far as they are not literally and completely enforced." Another soldier wrote that General Orders No. 11 "gratified us exceedingly for a while," but General Orders No. 13 "called out a hearty amen in all our corps." One soldier from

the Seventy-Sixth New York Infantry noted that although the orders "brought blessings upon [Pope] from the Union army."[12]

On the other hand, high ranking Union officers and the Confederates despised these orders. Union Brig. Gen. Marsena Patrick called them "the Orders of a Demagogue." Another Union officer wrote, "Pope's orders are the last unabatable nuisance . . . It means that the poor, and the weak, and the helpless are at the mercy of the strong – and God help them!"[13] Confederates practically named Pope a war criminal. One North Carolina woman wrote the orders were a "cruelty which no despot has yet surpassed." Lee wrote he would "restrain as far as possible, the atrocities which [Pope] threatened to perpetuate upon our defenseless citizens."[14]

Despite this perceived harshness, Pope used loyalty as a motivation for Confederate civilians to avoid damages or receive reparations for them. For General Orders, No. 5, Pope included that civilians would receive a voucher for any provisions taken as long as they proved their loyalty since that date. In General Orders, No. 7, Pope wrote that people could assure the security of their property and their safety by cooperating with the Union forces. General Orders, No. 11, guaranteed that any person willing to take the oath of loyalty to the United States would be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue their "accustomed avocations." One colonel of the 82d Ohio Infantry noted that some Virginians accepted these terms, writing that seventy-one civilians had taken the loyalty oath over two days and that "about all that I have arrested have taken the oath."[15] Although the Army of Virginia's officers arrested many Virginians under the terms of General Order, No. 11, few Southerners were displaced to places behind the Confederate lines and no known executions took place.[16]

Additionally, General Orders, No. 18 laid out instructions for preventing soldiers from indiscriminately destroying property or attacking civilians. After receiving news of his soldiers

abusing the subsistence orders in General Orders, No. 5, Pope reprimanded his army for what he considered their disgraceful actions. Some of the men in the Army of Virginia also took it upon themselves to prevent others from committing these abuses. Some of the Union officers even attempted to provide provisions for Confederate civilians who faced food shortages. Despite continued looting, Pope and his officers also successfully prevented the indiscriminate burning of houses, with the exception of a few Confederate officers homes.[17] By having his men live off the land, Pope looked to motivate the Confederacy to end the war sooner by depriving Confederate civilians of the necessities for living. Pope's orders, however, also show the limits of hard war against white Southerners since he tried to prevent indiscriminate destruction and killing by his men, a luxury Native Americans never received from any U.S. commander during times of conflict.

Unfortunately for Pope, civil-military policies did not defeat Confederate armies on the battlefield. Although he had the opportunity to defeat a split Confederate force along the same fields where the Union lost the First Battle of Bull Run in 1861, Pope's mistakes during the fighting resulted in another Union rout from the plains of Manassas. The defeat ended his career in the East, but not on the frontier.[18]

As Pope's men spilled their blood in Virginia, the Santee Sioux, after a group of young men killed five white settlers, assaulted a number of settlements and military posts on the Minnesota frontier as a preemptive measure against white retaliation and out of a growing resentment against the new settlers. Once relieved of his command in the East, Pope was sent to deal with this uprising as commander of the Department of the Northwest. After Pope received his new appointment, Secretary of War Stanton ordered Pope to "employ whatever force may be necessary to suppress the hostilities, making your requisitions upon the proper departments for

whatever may be needed for that purpose."[19] Immediately, Pope wrote to his subordinate, Col. H. H. Sibley, ordering him to destroy crops and any Sioux property to deprive them of much needed material for fighting the U.S. Army. More importantly, Pope, still seething about his defeat at Bull Run, first believed that extermination was the ultimate force necessary to end the hostilities. "I think," Pope wrote to Sibley, "as we have the men and means now we had best put a final stop to Indian troubles by exterminating or ruining all the Indians engaged in the late outbreak."[20] Although the idea of extermination existed in the conflicts against Indians since Europeans first settled in the Americas, the size of the frontier army during the Civil War—over six times the manpower that the regular army possessed prior to 1861—would theoretically make extermination on the plains a realistic possibility.[21]

But a year later, as his debacle at Bull Run faded from memory and Pope became familiar with the situation in Minnesota in 1862, he revised his attitude toward policies against Indians, especially the Sioux. He saw the contemporary Indian policy as a complete failure for the U.S. government. It was, he believed, too expensive for the U.S. Army in cost of money and blood and never truly solved the problems that led to conflicts between Native and white Americans. In addition, Pope felt the white traders among the Sioux reservations took advantage of the Sioux receiving indemnities from the government, causing starvation throughout the reservations and anger toward white settlers. Sioux leaders similarly noted the failure of Indian policy as a motivation for their attacks against the Minnesota border. Jerome Big Eagle, a leader of the Mdewakanton Sioux and participant in the uprising, for example, noted that traders would constantly keep the Sioux indebted to them, forcing them to continually purchase goods on credit.[22] So, after gaining a better understanding of the conditions on the northern plains, Pope

examined the situation at hand as a military commander rather than an Indian agent by answering the question: how do you make peace?

He proposed that the answer lied in the U.S. Army once again taking control of Indian policy, as it had until 1849 when the Bureau of Indian Affairs joined the Department of the Interior. As historian Richard N. Ellis notes, to Pope's mind, two types of Native populations existed: semi-civilized, peaceful bands of Native Americans, and "wild tribes," hostile Natives which the U.S. Army would directly deal with. For the "wild tribes," Pope believed the frontier army would fight them until they submitted. Then the government would create treaties that permanently ended issues with white settlement and unfair trade. If the government was not ready to create fair treaties with the Indians, however, Pope argued these bands should be left alone.[23]

Yet while at war with the Sioux, he believed in implementing military policies similar to his ones in Virginia. In 1863 and 1864, Pope renewed the campaigns against the Sioux in the hopes of bringing peace to the northern plains. His plans included striking at the "heart of the Indians' homeland" to show the full power of the U.S. Army. To do so, however, Pope understood that the Sioux could not gain any supplies for fighting the U.S. Army and needed to weaken their efforts by depriving them of these necessities. During these campaigns, he planned on using a combination of direct conflict and deprivation of needs to push the Sioux into submission. Pope recognized that "constant military activity during the summer months, along with the destruction of [the Sioux's] winter supplies" caused the hostile groups to surrender in increasing numbers after making the "prospect of starvation" a reality.[24]

By the end of 1863, Generals Sibley and Alfred Sully followed through on Pope's plan. During their campaigns that summer, according to General Henry W. Halleck, despite having

failed to make a simultaneous movement, the two columns had pushed the Sioux further west or into Canada. Those who fled to the West felt the most direct impact of Pope's policies with Halleck reporting that the "2,200 to 2,500" Sioux "were completely routed" and suffered "a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and in the destruction of their provisions and means of transportation."[25] Having requested the BIA to delay the disbursement of annuity payments, supplies, arms, and ammunition to the Sioux until after the campaign, Pope hoped to push them far beyond the Minnesota border and into the Montana territory to prevent further contact with white settlers, which eventually Pope's forces succeeded in accomplishing. In contrast to the failure of the Army of Virginia to fully implement his policies, Sibley and Sully employed Pope's policies precisely and successfully destroyed much of the Sioux resources for fighting against the Army. As a result, unlike the majority of white Virginians in the summer of 1862, the majority of Sioux had been pushed out of their homelands in Minnesota. This displacement brings in a key difference between the conduct toward white Southerners and Native Americans.[26] After depriving the Sioux of their needs for the winter, Pope realized that this similarity in his policies from Virginia could prove effective in dealing with hostile Native Americans.

Once these two campaigns came to a close, Pope believed he finally found the solution to the hostilities with the Sioux. By 1865, Pope solidified his military policy based on the success of the two previous years. After the Sioux agreed to surrender, Pope made treaties with the surrendering bands to keep the peace. "The treaties I have directed," he wrote in 1865, " . . . are simply an explicit understanding with the Indians that so long as *they* keep the peace the United States will keep it." If the Sioux continued to resist, however, Pope wrote, "The military forces will attack them, march through their country . . . and as a natural consequence, their game will

be driven off."[27] After two years of depriving the Sioux of their needs, Pope saw this part of his policies as a possible way to end hostilities along the frontier.

Once they surrendered, however, Pope believed the government should help the newly peaceful tribes. From the beginning of his time as head of the Department of the Northwest, Pope and William P. Dole, the commissioner of Indian Affairs, promoted assistance for peaceful groups. For the Chippewa and Ojibwe in Minnesota who did not participate in the attacks on white settlements, for example, Dole promoted a treaty with the two groups that provided benefits for them and protection from the hostile Sioux.[28] Similarly, once the Sioux surrendered to the army, Pope argued that the surrendering bands should receive annuity payments, supplies, military assistance for protection against other hostile tribes, and fair trade with white settlers. Although his suggestions for policies in the aftermath of hostilities never fully developed, these show the carrot and stick motivations that Pope promoted through his policy-making. Similar to white Southerners, if the Sioux submitted to the federal authority, they would no longer be deprived of needs and actually receive some assistance.[29] But if they continued to resist, they could expect to face even more indiscriminately destructive policies than the ones Pope implemented in Virginia, including the use of scorched earth policies.

The thorough destruction of Sioux property and the employment of scorched earth show the main differences between Pope's policies in Virginia and in the Northwest. Against white Southerners, he wrote orders limiting his men from and chastising them for abusing the subsistence orders in General Orders Nos. 5 and 6. Although Union soldiers looted some of the Virginians' homes during the Second Bull Run Campaign, they rarely destroyed personal property on a mass basis and, primarily, the Union soldiers consumed the goods they found in Virginia—instead of destroying personal property like wagons, crops, saddles, and tools, the

Union soldiers took them for use in the field.[30] For the Sioux, on the other hand, the volunteers purposefully destroyed their property without considering using it for themselves. During the Battle of Stony Lake in Sibley's 1863 summer campaign, for example, the Sioux possessions, including "dried meat, tallow, . . . buffalo robes, [and] cooking utensils," were discovered and, under Sibley's direction, "collected and burned." By the end of the campaign, Sibley wrote that the Sioux forces had been "driven in confusion and dismay, with the sacrifice of vast quantities of subsistence, clothing, and means of transportation." As a result, he believed that "many, perhaps most of them," would "perish miserably in their utter destitution during the fall and winter."[31] This exemplifies another important difference between how Pope's men implemented his policies when in the field. Instead of consuming resources while in the field, other than forage for the horses, as the Union troops had done in Virginia, the men in the Department of the Northwest eliminated the resources completely.

Along a similar vein, scorched earth policies on the plains, as Mark Neely notes, "had genuine possibilities even early in 1862" and terrifying effects against the Sioux. "By 1864," Neely writes, "the army was indeed setting the prairies on fire."[32] For example, during the campaign in 1864, Col. Robert N. McLaren of the 2d Minnesota Cavalry wrote that after he had attacked a Sioux encampment and driven off the people, he deployed troops to protect working parties who commenced destroying "the vast quantities of goods left in the timber and ravines adjacent to the camp." This included buffalo meat, dried berries, buffalo robes, and riding saddles. "Finding that one day was too short a time to make the destruction complete," McLaren reported, "I ordered the men to gather only the lodge poles in heaps and burn them, and then deployed the men and fired the woods in every direction; the destruction was thus complete, and everywhere was manifest the rapid flight of the Indians."[33]

When hearing reports of scorched earth against the Sioux, Pope neither condemned nor promoted this tactic. This could indicate that the men in the field decided for themselves when to use fire against Native Americans. For the volunteer troops under Pope's command in the Northwest, the racial makeup of their enemy may have pushed them into inflicting indiscriminate destruction. Additionally, those soldiers, volunteers from Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin primarily, had personal connections with many of the settlements the Sioux attacked, possibly increasing their anger towards the Sioux. For Pope, believing in the effectiveness of depriving the enemy of their war making resources, the ending of hostilities quickly and the reduction of casualties for U.S. soldiers most likely motivated his policy making rather than racist ideology.[34] Yet the employment of fire as a weapon shows both the deprivation of Indian necessities by the U.S. Army and the indiscriminate destruction of Indian lands that never existed against white Southerners in the U.S. Civil War.

By 1865, Pope believed he had found a successful policy for the conflicts with Native Americans. Based on Pope's ideas for hard war against Confederate civilians, the Department of the Northwest employed attacks against the Sioux that reduced their abilities to make war against the U.S. Army, including destroying food and supplies. Although the policies in Virginia did not end the fighting there, it taught Pope how to close out the hostilities with the Sioux when he did not have to worry about reducing the amount of violence used against his opposition. In Virginia, Pope and his officers attempted to limit the extent of destruction and the suffering the locals felt in the process. Few Virginians were displaced or had their personal property destroyed. Although the population there faced a lack of food, few records indicate a high amount of starvation. For the plains, however, Pope, Sibley, and Sully employed policies that directly impacted the entire Sioux population. Due to the level of destruction in the region and the lack of resources along the

Minnesota border, the Sioux population was displaced from their homelands and faced a level of starvation that few in the South felt during the Civil War. Despite these major differences, Pope's role in the Civil War and the Indian Wars between 1861 and 1865 shows that these conflicts have a direct connection which historians can no longer ignore. In following the example of John Pope, it is clear that the Union commanders' experiences in the Civil War clearly influenced their thinking for the conflicts on the frontier.

All citations of the *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 70 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880–1901) are cited as *OR*, ser. no., vol. no., pt. no., p. no.

[1] For more on the situation prior to the Second Manassas Campaign, see John J. Hennessey, *Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas* (1993; repr., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 1–9.

[2] For more on the causes of the Sioux Uprising in August 1862, see Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan R. Woolworth, eds., *Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1988), 19–33.

[3] For studies on the conflict between the U.S. Army and the Sioux, see Robert Huhn Jones, *The Civil War in the Northwest: Nebraska, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960); Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (1967; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981); Richard N. Ellis, "After Bull Run: The Later Career of General John Pope," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 19 (Autumn 1969): 46–57; Ellis, "Political Pressures and Army Policies on the Northern Plains, 1862–1865," *Minnesota History* 42 (Summer 1970): 43–53; Scott W. Berg, *38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow, and the Beginning of the Frontier's End* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012); and Paul N. Beck, *Columns of Vengeance: Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863–1864* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013). Although many of these studies attempt to make connections between the Civil War and the concurrent Indian Wars, they tend to emphasize the tactical and logistical impacts the Civil War had on the situation. Few explore the policy making of John Pope in the context of the Civil War in the West.

[4] For studies examining parts of General John Pope's military career, see Peter Cozzens, *General John Pope: A Life for the Nation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); John J. Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas* (1993; repr., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (1967; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska

Press, 1981); and Richard N. Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970).

[5] When discussing the interconnection of the Civil War era in a larger national context, only Ari Kelman and Elliott West attempts to show the connection between the frontier conflicts in the 1860s and 1870s and the U.S. Civil War. See Elliott West, *The Last Indian War: The Nez Perce Story*, Pivotal Moments in American History series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Ari Kelman, *A Misplaced Massacre: Struggling over the Memory of Sand Creek* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013). Yet, both examine it in different contexts than the military actions of the U.S. Army. Elliott West in *The Last Indian War* explores the conflict between the Nez Perce and the U.S. Army between 1876 and 1877 as part of the social and political changes in, what he terms, the "Greater Reconstruction." Based on West's concept, Pope's career could contribute to the concept of a "Greater Civil War" through the focus on military conduct in the East and West between 1861 and 1865. Similarly, Ari Kelman in *A Misplaced Massacre* studies the memory of the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 to show the interrelationship between the military actions in the East and in Colorado specifically.

[6] For more on the questioning of the extent to which the Civil War was a total war, see Mark E. Neely Jr., "Was the Civil War a Total War?" *Civil War History* 37 (March 1991): 5–28; Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Mark E. Neely Jr., *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). For studies on the role of race in policy making, see Neely, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, 141; Mark Grimsley, "'Rebels' and 'Redskins': U.S. Military Conduct toward White Southerners and Native Americans in Comparative Perspective" in *Civilians in the Path of War*, eds. Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 137–162; and Michael Fellman, "At the Nihilist Edge: Reflections on Guerilla Warfare during the American Civil War" in *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, eds. Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 519–40.

[7] For Pope's early career, see Cozzens, *General John Pope*, 1–31.

[8] See Daniel E. Sutherland, "Abraham Lincoln, John Pope, and the Origins of Total War," *Journal of Military History* 56 (October 1992): 567–86; and Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*.

[9] General Orders, No. 5 and No. 6, 18 July 1862, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 2, p. 50.

[10] General Orders, No. 7, [10?] July 1862, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 2, p. 51.

[11] General Orders, No. 11, 23 July 1862, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 2, p. 52; and General Orders, No. 13 in Grimsley, *Hard Hand of War*, 88.

[12] Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run*, 15; Grimsley, *Hard Hand of War*, 88; and A. P. Smith, *History of the Seventy-Sixth New York Volunteers* (1867; repr., Gaithersburg, Md.: Ron R. Van Sickle Military Books, 1988), 83.

[13] Quoted in Grimsley, *Hard Hand of War*, 88.

[14] Quoted in Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run*, 21; and "The Changing Tone of War," Brawner Farm Wall Panel, Manassas National Battlefield Park, Manassas, Virginia.

[15] General Orders, No. 5, No. 7, and No. 11, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 2, pp. 50–52; and Col. James S. Robinson to L. T. Hunt, esq, 29 July 1862, James S. Robinson Papers, Military Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

[16] Daniel E. Sutherland, *Seasons of War: The Ordeal of a Confederate Community, 1861–1865* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 126; and Hennessey, *Return to Bull Run*, 17.

[17] General Orders, No. 5, and No. 18, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 2, pp. 50–53; General Orders, No. 19, August 14, 1862, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 573; William Wheeler, *Letters of William Wheeler of the Class of 1866, Y. C.* (Cambridge, Mass.: H. O. Houghton and Company, 1875), 344; Hennessey, *Return to Bull Run*, 17–18; and Sutherland, *Seasons of War*, 123.

[18] For more on the Second Battle of Bull Run, see Hennessy, *Return to Bull Run*.

[19] Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy*, 4; and Edwin M. Stanton to Maj. Gen. John Pope, 6 September 1862, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 617.

[20] Maj. Gen. John Pope to Col. H. H. Sibley, 17 September 1862, St. Paul, Minn., Letters Sent, vol. 1, Sept. 1862–July 1865, Headquarters, Department of the Northwest, General Records, Correspondence, Entry 3436, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Part 1, Record Group 393, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as, Letters Sent, vol. no., DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA]; and Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy*, 31.

[21] Prior to 1861, an U.S. Army expedition against the Brule Sioux in Northwestern Nebraska in 1854 consisted of 450 men. Shortly after the beginning of the hostilities in Minnesota, Pope planned on employing almost 3,000 soldiers for the first campaign and Sec. of War Edwin M. Stanton planned on sending 10,000 paroled Union troops to Minnesota. For the 1854 expedition, see Durwood Ball, *Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 1848–1861* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 44–47. For the force in the initial outbreak of the Sioux Uprising, see Pope to Sibley, 17 September 1862, St. Paul, Minn., Letters Sent, vol. 1, DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA; and Sec. of War Edwin M. Stanton to Maj. Gen. John Pope, 18 September 1862, Washington, D.C., Telegrams Sent, 1862–1865, Headquarter Records, Department of the Northwest, General Records, Correspondence, Entry 3444, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Part 1, Record Group 393, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. For an example of the forces' sizes during the

campaigns, see Brig. Gen. H. H. Sibley to Assist. Adj. Gen. J. F. Meline, 7 August 1863, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 1, p. 353.

[22] Pope to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, 23 September 1863, Milwaukee, Wisc.; Pope to Halleck, 30 March 1864, Miwaukee, Wisc., Letters Sent, vol. 2, DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA; and Jerome Big Eagle, "Big Eagle's Account" in *Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862*, Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan R. Woolworth, eds. (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1988), 24.

[23] Pope to Sec. of War Edwin M. Stanton, 6 February 1864, Milwaukee, Wisc., Letters Sent, vol. 2, DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA; and Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy*, 39, 41-42, 88.

[24] Pope to Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully, 31 August 1863, Milwaukee, Wisc., Letters Sent, vol. 1, DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA; and Ellis, *General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy*, 31, 33 (quote).

[25] Halleck to Stanton, 25 November 1863, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 1, p. 12.

[26] Cozzens, *General John Pope*, 240.

[27] John Pope, quoted in Utley. *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 310.

[28] Commissoner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole to Pope, 18 September 1862, Letters Received, September 1862–July 1865, Headquarter Records, Department of the Northwest, General Records, Correspondence, Entry 3446, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821 – 1920, Part 1, Record Group 393, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

[29] Pope to Sully, 20 February 1865, Milwaukee, Wisc., Letters Sent, vol. 2, DNW, Entry 3436, pt. 1, RG 393, NARA; and Cozzens, *General John Pope*, 240.

[30] For an example of Union troops consuming goods rather than destroying them, see Sutherland, *Seasons of War*, 126.

[31] Sibley to Meline, 7 August 1863, *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 1, p. 354–55, 357.

[32] Neely, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, 146–47.

[33] *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, p. 172.

[34] For more on the racial motivation behind the actions of the volunteers, see Paul N. Beck, *Columns of Vengeance: Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863–1864* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013); and Neely, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*. Pope, however, has been considered an "humanitarian general" who attempted to

help Indians in the West rather than promote extermination after 1862. See Richard N. Ellis, "The Humanitarian Generals," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 3 (April 1972): 169–78.