"The Hard Hand of War on the Western Waters"
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The message from January 1863 was short and direct. Here it is in its entirety: "SIR: When you arrive at Greenville, or the place where the vessels are fired upon, haul your vessel close to the bank where the men can work securely under your guns, and cut the levee, so that the whole country may be overflowed. If that succeeds, go to the other side of the point and do the same. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, DAVID D. PORTER." Porter's order to James Prichett, commander of the timberclad *U.S.S. Tyler*, followed up a bundle of directives he had fired off earlier in the day. The first set of instructions was no less aggressive: drive Confederate guerrillas away from Greenville, protect transports "until past danger," fire on any white people congregating "at the point," don't tie up along the bank, and, if fired upon from the town, "try and set fire to it with your shells." The always controlling Porter added a proviso that Pritchett not waste any ammunition razing the town. The record is silent if Prichett's men set fire to Greenville (or if they were promiscuous in their use of shells) but it is almost certain that they pierced the levee.[1]

This small incident reveals much about a larger war. First, specific features of the natural and built environments became locations of particular violence. Confederate guerrillas gathered at "the point" because Union gunboats and transports were vulnerable as they slowed down to round the spit of land. But every good turn deserves another: puncturing the levee was a way to use natural forces against southern guerrillas and civilians. The landscape -- whether relatively natural or dramatically modified by humans -- became something to manipulate or to deploy against the enemy. Second, both sides tried to control access to, and the production and distribution of, the products of the land. For the Confederacy, sinking Union transports could

deprive northern soldiers of necessary calories. Northern boats destroyed key sections of the levee in order to flood valuable farmland and destroy southern crops. The Union navy also made huge efforts to tamp down the cross-Mississippi movement of supplies and shut down illegal trade along the western waters. Fourth, Confederate partisans provoked the Union Navy into reprisals that dragged civilians into the conflict. Setting fire to an entire town would certainly punish residents who did not support partisan activity and it's suggestive of how frustrated the navy had become by early 1863 in its attempt to sheer off support for partisans. Thus the Union's hard war was a consequence of this environmental struggle and the northern brownwater navy was crucial in making southern civilians feel the hard hand of war.[2]

The Union's advance along the western rivers -- and the subsequent Battles of Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, and Island No. 10 -- are too well known to recount here. Less well known is the logistical effort that supported these victories. Quartermasters moved supplies by wagon, rail, and steamboat, but our concern here is with the river traffic. The number of steamers that the Union pressed into service is unclear, but it was substantial. For example, 153 steamboat transports brought Ulysses S. Grant's army to Pittsburgh Landing in April of 1862. These transports were large: one Union officer estimated that a typical Ohio River steamboat carried enough materiel on one trip to supply an army of 40,000 men and 18,000 horses for nearly two days. The boats of the Mississippi Squadron -- a disparate collection of five commercial steamboats overlaid with iron plates, three timberclads, and seven city-class ironclads -- became responsible for protecting the gaggle of transports.[3]

Southerners tried to slow the Union advance by choking off the river supply line and harassing the Mississippi Squadron. In June of 1862 the commander of the Confederate's trans-Mississippi Department issued an order calling on all southern men to organize themselves into

military companies. Their duty, Brigadier General Thomas C. Hindman intoned, was to "cut off Federal pickets, scouts, foraging parties, and trains, and to kill pilots and others on gunboats and transports, attacking them day and night." So many men either heeded Hindman's orders or were motivated by their own desires that a Union officer complained that on the White River in Arkansas "the transports were fired at very often from the woods by guerrilla bands" between St. Charles and Clarendon. The situation was just as bad in Tennessee and Kentucky. In September of 1862, Alexander Pennock reported that the banks of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers were lined with guerrillas. The transport *Von Phul* barely survived a harrowing run to Cairo, Illinois, arriving with forty "shot holes" and its captain and clerk killed. The tinclads accompanying the *Von Phul* were also "badly cut up." Confederate attacks were a real threat to the Union war effort in other ways. Northern boat builders struggled to complete eight ironclads in 1862 because it was too dangerous to send the iron on the rivers.[4]

Along the lower Mississippi River, southern partisans were even more creative. They built gun platforms for artillery, sliced embrasures in the levees, and covered the openings with boards. Sharpshooters either stood on the levee or perched in trees. The commander of the *U.S.S. Sciota* described the levee as "a strong, safe, and ready-made breastwork for sharpshooters." When Union vessels or merchant ships steamed by, the attackers dropped the boards and started shooting. It seemed as if the very landscape came alive. "We are constantly now under fire of the covert kind as we pass up and down the river," noted the commander of one boat. When southern guerrillas attacked the *U.S.S. Kineo* near Donaldsonville, Louisiana, its commander ordered the boat to swing around and throw "shrapnel and grape" at the ambushers. The cannonade only succeeded in driving off the attackers, who hauled away their four artillery pieces in a mad dash that exposed "nothing except the tips of horses' ears running away." The Union Navy was drawn

into a deadly game of Whack-A-Mole: Confederate guerrillas would pop up from behind the levee in Louisiana or take potshots from a clump of trees in Tennessee and northern sailors would try, often in vain, to smite them.[5]

This Confederate guerrilla offensive depended on favorable environmental conditions. Abundant rains in the spring of 1862 unexpectedly gave way to a drought by early summer. Not only did crops wither, but the rivers in the west shrunk to mere trickles in some places. The Union's heavy timberclads and ironclads were poorly adapted to low water levels. Comparing the water levels of 1862 to 1863, LeRoy Fitch admitted that in the former year "the river could not be patrolled as thoroughly as desired owing to low water and the scarcity of boats." Inadequate patrols put the Union supply line at risk. At the unfortunately named "Duck River Sucks" in Tennessee, the transport *W. B. Terry* got stuck on a ledge of rocks when it misjudged how low the water had fallen. The boat remained in place overnight on August 30-31, 1862. The next morning about two hundred guerrillas riddled the boat with musket fire and forced it to surrender. By contrast, the spring rains of 1863 limited the Confederate guerrilla war. The commander of the *U.S.S. Conestoga* wrote in March that the "river banks are now so overflowed that the guerrillas can give us but little trouble." While weather conditions did not determine the success or failure of Confederate guerrilla efforts, they certainly shifted the odds.[6]

The partisan war was also rooted in identifying favorable environmental locations; southern guerrillas carefully chose places to stage their ambushes. The commander of the *U.S.S. Cincinnati* noted how "lurking bands" waited along the Mississippi River's tributaries, "which are narrow streams...with thick growth of timber on their borders." A peninsula jutting into the Mississippi River near its confluence with the Arkansas River became a "Very Bad Guerrilla Station" because boats had to slow down when they rounded the trouble spot. Winding rivers

also contributed to the boats' vulnerability. Guerrillas riding overland in more or less of a straight line could rouse dozens or hundreds of men who then attacked the slow moving boats. H. A Glassford of the tinclad *U.S.S. Reindeer* glumly reported how partisan bands attacked his boat at five different places as it steamed along the sinuous Cumberland River in Jackson County, Tennessee. Confederates also chose high ground to rain fire down on Union vessels. When the *U.S.S. Lexington* passed below Adams' Bluff on July 9, 1862, a guerrilla band opened up on the timberclad. Although better armored than a civilian transport, the *Lexington* was not invulnerable. Chief engineer Joseph Huber took a musket ball in the back that severed his aorta while a fireman was severely injured. Southern guerrillas studied the landscape and carefully chose ambush locations where they could use environmental conditions to turn the war in their favor, if at least for a short time.[7]

Such ambushes were so numerous, and serious, that they provoked a response from the Mississippi River Squadron. At first, individual commanders improvised. In July of 1862, for instance, the *U.S.S. Carondelet* shelled a number of houses that sheltered guerrillas. The lack of a coherent policy prompted Porter to set the rules of engagement and provide clarity as to what and who could become the target of Union guns. Should a vessel be fired upon, Porter insisted it was the captain's "duty" to "fire back in spirit, and to destroy everything in that neighborhood within reach of his guns." The only way to stop guerrilla warfare, he continued, was to destroy houses that gave shelter "to rebels." Should innocent people be harmed, so be it. Porter thought that such casualties would "teach others that it will be to their advantage to inform the Government authorities when guerrillas are about certain localities."[8]

Here we have one of the foundational documents for the Union's hard war strategy, and one that occurred as early, and probably even earlier, than the actions of the army. Mark

Grimsley has argued that the Union's hard war strategy emerged in the western theater in April of 1863 at the earliest. He characterizes the hard as having two main attributes: "actions against Southern civilians and property made expressly in order to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy" and "the allocation of substantial military resources to accomplish the job." What is striking, to me at least, about Grimsley's fine book is that it does not account for the actions of the Union navy. The Mississippi Squadron emerged in 1862 as one of the leaders of the hard war doctrine. In a letter to General William T. Sherman, perhaps the man best remembered for implementing the Union's hard war policy, Porter explained his rationale for carrying "the war into the heart of the [enemy's] country." Porter wanted the army and the navy to "give them (the rebels) a taste of devastation that may bring them to their senses."[9]

The navy needed a new class of gunboats to "suppress the active guerrilla movements on the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers," as Rear Admiral Charles H. Davis put it on August 19, 1862. The swarm of new boats -- the Union eventually converted seventy-four commercial riverboats -- were lightly armored, having one inch thick boiler plates riveted to the front portions of the casemates and around the engines. These tinclads drew about thirty inches of water, carried six to eight light cannons, and were intended to exert Union military power all across the western river system. They were the Union high command's response to low water levels and guerrilla attacks. As one historian has noted, tinclads were like Viking ships that could appear anywhere, anytime, causing panic amongst civilians. The land that had been most valuable before the war was now the most vulnerable.[10]

The Union tinclads went to work with a vengeance. Sometimes the navy confiscated only food that would be used to feed sailors, such as the time when Porter ordered the commander of

the *U.S.S. Tyler* to gather cattle, corn, chickens, turkeys, duck, geese, and eggs. Most often, though, sailors expanded their sphere of destruction. The *U.S.S. Fairplay* confiscated 939 bags of wheat, 13 kegs of lard, 35 barrels of whisky, 1 barrel of meat, 1 barrel of salt, 5 barrels of ale, and some boxes of groceries from the citizens of Caseyville, Kentucky, when someone in the vicinity attacked a mail steamer. Likewise, the *U.S.S. Forest Rose* landed at Buck Island, Arkansas, and destroyed a house, storehouses, and the slave quarters of a planter who was suspected of sheltering guerrillas. For good measure, the sailors also took 21 slaves, 2 horses, 2 mules, 500 pounds of bacon, 154 blankets, 40 shovels, 16 barrows, 1 barrel of molasses, and 4 sacks of corn. The *U.S.S. Rattler* and the *U.S.S. Cricket* visited Argyle's Landing in Mississippi as "retaliation for [the] destruction of steamers." While the boats provided protection for a line of skirmishers, ten "scorchers" razed the mansions, outhouses, gins, barns, and negro quarters on two plantations. The list of such actions is nearly endless.[11]

When the Union navy denuded riverside farms and plantations of food, it was not only punishing disloyal southerners, it was degrading the ability of guerrillas to sustain themselves. Confederate guerrillas were either local citizens or were transients who depended on local civilians for shelter or food. Each calorie from a riverside farm or plantation that found its way onto a Union boat was one less calorie that a southern guerrilla could consume. When Union sailors took this food, they tried to target known Confederate sympathizers. Symmes Browne, a sailor on the *U.S.S. Tyler*, described to his fiancée how he and men from his boat "helped ourselves to what sweet potatoes and corn meal we wanted and dressed a beef." They raided the plantation of a man named Diamond who had supposedly helped in the attack on a Union transport. When the same boat stopped at another plantation two weeks later with the expectation

of doing the same thing, the owner provided a "Certificate of Protection" from a Union general. As Browne explained it, "We disturbed nothing, of course."[12]

The Union's actions are perfectly comprehensible, but it became nearly impossible to restrain the sailors from inflicting vengeance on southerners, some of whom were loyal to the Union and others who had withdrawn their support from the Confederacy. After Porter authorized the hard war, one sailor on the *U.S.S. Tyler* seemed overjoyed. After shelling Ashley's Landing in Arkansas and burning a number of buildings there, Symmes E. Brown wrote, "we have opened the ball." What the Union had really opened was a can of worms, because it proved impossible to calibrate the violence or to differentiate between southerners who were hostile and those who were loyal. These tensions can be seen from the navy's attack on Palmyra, Tennessee, on April 6, 1863. After guerrillas crippled the *U.S.S. St. Clair*, Alexander Pennock sent five boats to find the perpetrators. Sailors landed at Palmyra -- "one of the worst secession places on the river" according to one captain. While sailors burned "every house in the place," they also had strict orders not "to pillage or remove the smallest article." In practice, it proved impossible to prevent theft. The Acting Master and an ensign on the *U.S.S. Mound City* were court martialed for pillaging houses and stealing china, boxes, trunks, and even an ivory crucifix. Things got so bad that Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles ordered an investigation to determine if the "sole object" of the Mississippi Squadron was plunder.[13]

For his part, Porter tried to reign in the thievery but he also redirected the allegations towards the Mississippi Marine Brigade. Originally created as a ram fleet, the Mississippi Marine Brigade was an independent unit that eventually became a counter-insurgency strike force. It was supposed to chase down Confederate guerrillas but by 1863 the brigades' men established a reputation for indiscriminate plunder. They threw a family carriage into the river,

stole furniture, looted food from slaves, plundered silver, broke fruit trees, tore up gardens, and took personal clothing from southern civilians. The actions of the Mississippi Marine Brigade became so egregious that eventually the navy deactivated the unit.[14]

A "cotton mania" broke down the discipline even more. Cotton had a legitimate military purpose -- sailors stuffed it into gunboats as a way to shore up weak spots and protect boilers -- and Porter envisioned that the confiscation and sale of cotton would not only hurt the Confederate war effort but help defray the war's costs. Sailors had a different idea; for them, it was a get rich quick scheme. Since they could share in the profits from confiscated cotton, sailors invented all sorts of methods to ensure that all cotton was deemed enemy property -- even if taken from southern unionists. Crewmen stenciled "C.S.A." on all cotton they seized and then promptly marked "U.S.N." on the reverse side of the bale. The rules on confiscation were so routinely flouted that one army colonel groused that C.S.A./U.S.N. stood for the Cotton Stealing Association of the United States Navy. This massive confiscation hindered naval operations. Sailors stuffed cotton in tinclad holds, sometimes making the boats too heavy to float. It is clear that the Red River campaign failed, in part, because of cotton mania. Things were so bad that the captain of the tinclad *U.S.S. Rattler* tried to sell his boat to the Confederates for $250,000 and 100 bales of cotton.[15]

Despite the plundering, poor discipline, and cotton mania, the Mississippi Squadron was able to carry out a hard war against southern civilians. In doing so, it complemented the activities of the Union land forces. Lisa Brady has argued that Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Tennessee tried to exert control over the environment during its campaign to take Vicksburg. Grant used a number of strategies, including a failed plan to reroute the Mississippi River and a successful series of raids that attacked the region's agricultural productivity. Brady is correct, but Union

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naval strategy was more than just controlling the land or turning it back into a wilderness. The Union navy tried to detach the Confederate war effort from the fruits of the land. The constant patrolling of tinclads along the western waters limited the Confederacy's ability to use agricultural produce from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas to feed its armies in the eastern and western theaters. Once the Union ran its gunboats past Vicksburg -- and before the city's surrender -- Confederate general John C. Pemberton concluded that "I regard the navigation of the Mississippi River as shut out from us now. No more supplies can be gotten from the trans-Mississippi department."[16]

Even before Pemberton wrote his glum words, the Union navy was tightening the noose around the Confederacy. Porter issued General Order No. 21 that explicitly outlined the Union strategy to deny the Confederacy the fruits of the land. He directed commanders of all vessels to prevent any unauthorized commerce and "break up the carrying of anything into rebel ports." Suddenly cotton, clothing, food, shoes, salt, saddles, medicines, and munitions were contraband. Union boats were, in the words of one Union commander, "Constantly scouring the river," looking for scofflaws. As we have seen, the Mississippi Squadron seized wheat, lard, whisky, and meat, captured herds of cattle, encouraged slaves to run away, and generally delighted in tormenting southern civilians. The crew of the *U.S.S. Benton* reveled in "throw[ing] some shells" above a herd of cattle and frightening the poor beasts, which, presumably, were intended to be converted into Confederate calories. Union gunboats contributed to the lack of supplies and low morale in southern armies in the last two years of the war.[17]

The navy also turned the environment against the Confederacy. The commander of the timberclad *U.S.S. Conestoga* neutralized the "Very Bad Guerrilla Station" mentioned earlier by digging a new channel for the Mississippi River. That the cut-off allowed Union boats to travel

quickly in a straight line for half a mile rather than a slow journey of ten miles meant that

Confederate guerrillas had fewer opportunities to take potshots at the navy. Ironclads also

wrecked the levee. In March of 1862 Captain Thomas Selfridge of the *U.S.S. Conestoga* steamed

to Bolivar, Mississippi, and cut fifty feet of the levee. His purpose: "drown out Mrs. Monley and

Old Topp." While the identity of Monley and Topp are unclear, it is obvious that Selfridge was

delighted that the water was "pouring through [the opening] very rapidly." The purpose here was

to restore the landscape to its condition prior to the levee system. The rushing waters would wash

away any fields, farms, or produce that stood in comparative safety behind the levees. By

altering the landscape, Union sailors were turning nature against the Confederacy and converting

the region into a swampy wilderness. In fact, they recognized that the waters coursing through a

hole in the levee possessed infinitely more power than one tinclad. Northern gunboats struck a

powerful blow against the southern agroecosystem (the new ecological system that humans

create when they "draw sustenance or profit from nature through agriculture and animal

husbandry.") Southern planters had worked for years -- or at least forced their slaves to work for

years -- to create a system that drew sustenance and wealth from the land. Union gunboats

interrupted or destroyed this complex system and thereby sapped the Confederate ability to

sustain war. Porter, in his usual direct fashion, summed it up this way: "Starvation only will

bring these people to their senses."[18]

 Although usually couched as an action of the army that gained momentum in 1863, the

hard war emerged as a result of the struggle to use the environment as a means of gaining an

advantage over the enemy. Southerners used the landscape as a shield and camouflage, striking

at Union soldiers and sailors in places where the environment gave an advantage to the

defenders. The vulnerable northern supply line along the western rivers forced the Union Navy

to be on the cutting edge of the "hard war" in 1862. In the western theater, at least, the navy was as important as the army in developing and implementing a strategy that made civilian property a legitimate target. Soldiers and sailors also struck at the countryside itself, turning the natural and built landscapes against the southern war effort. The inclusion of the environment and the navy are necessary for understanding the changes in the Union war effort.

Notes

[1] David D. Porter to James Prichett, January 26, 1863, *ORN*, 24:198. As alluded to in the text, Porter issued two sets of orders to James Prichett on January 26, 1863 and both are on the same page in the *ORN*. A timberclad was a commercial steamboat slathered with thick planks that provided a surprisingly effective amount of protection against musket fire and cannon balls. See Myron J. Smith , Jr., *The Timberclads in the Civil War: The* Lexington*,* Conestoga*, and* Tyler *on the Western Waters* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2008).

[2] Recently, an increasing number of scholars have begun to use an environmental perspective to examine the Civil War. A few titles include Lisa M. Brady, *War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes during the American Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Megan Kate Nelson, *Ruin Nation: Destruction and the American Civil War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Kathryn Shively Meier, *Nature's Civil War: Common Soldiers and the Environment in 1862 Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); and Andrew McIlwaine Bell, *Mosquito Soldiers: Malaria, Yellow Fever, and the Course of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010).

[3] Louis C. Hunter, *Steamboats on the Western Waters* (1949, reprint; Minneola, New York: Dover, 1977), 554-61; "The American Civil War (1861-1865)," U. S. Army Transportation Museum, http://www.transportation.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/civilwar.htm, accessed September 9, 2014. For a general history of the Mississippi Squadron, see Gary D. Joiner, *Mr. Lincoln's Brown Water Navy: The Mississippi Squadron* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). There are surprisingly few scholarly works on Union logistics and supply in

the Civil War's western theater. For overviews, see Earl J. Hess, *The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachian to the Mississippi* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 178-79, 208-12; David W. Miller, *Second only to Grant: Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs* (White Mane Publishing, 2001); and James Huston, "Logistical Support of Federal Armies in the Field," *Civil War History* 7 (March 1961): 36-47. The Mississippi Squadron was originally called the Western Gunboat Flotilla. The boats retrofitted with iron plates -- like siding on a modern-day house) were the *Essex*, *Benton*, *Eastport*, *Choctaw*, and *Lafayette*. James Eads designed the seven city-class boats, all of which were essentially the same (*Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburgh*, and *St. Louis* (renamed *Baron de Kalb*). They were built as ironclads and became the backbone of the Mississippi Squadron. The Union also constructed one-of-a-kind ironclads that performed poorly: the *Chillicothe*, *Indianola*, and *Tuscumbia*.

[4] General Orders No. 17 (Confederate), June 17, 1862, *ORN*, 23:186-87 (first quotation); James W. Shirk to Charles H. Davis, July 2, 1862, *ORN*, 23:188 (second quotation); A. M. Pennock to J. B. Hull, September 9, 1862, *ORN*, 23:346; David D. Porter to Ulysses S. Grant, December 15, 1862, *ORN*, 25:636 (final quotation); J. B. Hull to Gideon Welles, October 27, 1862, *ORN*, 23:453. There are a number of works on Confederate guerrillas, but the most helpful for this study were Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), esp. 147-52; and James A. Ramage, "Recent Historiography of Guerrilla Warfare in the Civil War." *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 3 (Summer 2005): 517-41.

[5] R. B. Lowry to D. G. Farragut, October 4, 1862, *ORN*, 9:250-51 (first quotation); "Extract from Diary of Lieutenant Roe, U. S. Navy," October 24, 1862, *ORN*, 19:776 (second

quotation); Lt. Commander George M. Ransum to David G. Farragut, October 23, 1862, *ORN*, 19:314 (remaining quotations); F. A. Roe to D. G. Farragut, September 19, 1862, *ORN*, 19:215.

[6] LeRoy Fitch to A. M. Pennock, June 4, 1863, *ORN*, 25: 160 (quotation); Report of Leonard G. Klinck, August 31, 1862, *ORN*, 23:332-33; Thomas O. Selfridge to David D. Porter, March 10, 1863, *ORN*, 24:466; Hess, *The Civil War in the West*, 204-205.

[7] J. A. Winslow to Charles H. Davis, June 28, 1862, *ORN*, 23:245 (first two quotations); "Map showing the New Cut-Off made by Lt. Com. T. O. Selfridge, U.S.N., 1863," *Report of the Secretary of the Navy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863), following page 460 (third quotation); H. A. Glassford to Le Roy Fitch, January 3, 1864, *ORN*, 25:648; James W. Shirk to Charles H. Davis, July 9, 1862, *ORN*, 23:191. Tinclads will be discussed later, but they were commercial steamboats overlaid with a light armor.

[8] Report of Henry Walke, July 30, 1862, *ORN*, 23:272; General Order No. 4, David D. Porter, October 18, 1862, *ORN*, 23:421 (quotations).

[9] Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3; David D. Porter to William T. Sherman, November 24, 1862, *ORN*, vol. 23:500-502.

[10] Charles H. Davis to Gideon Welles, August 19, 1862, *ORN*, 23:305 (quotation); Michael J. Bennett, *Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War* (Univ. of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2004), pp. 87-90. For an overview of the tinclads, see Myron J. Smith, Jr. *Tinclads in the Civil War: Union Light-Draught Gunboat Operations on Western Waters, 1862-1865* (McFarland: Jefferson, N.C., 2010). Davis was Porter's immediate predecessor in the Mississippi Squadron.

[11] Le Roy Fitch to David D. Porter, October 21, 1862, *ORN*, 23:434-37; Le Roy Fitch to David D. Porter, December 4, 1862, *ORN*, 23:500; David D. Porter to James M. Prichett, February 10, 1863, *ORN*, 24:339; Watson Smith to David D. Porter, February 18, 1863, *ORN*, 24:256; Joshua Bishop to Thomas O. Selfridge, May 10, 1863, *ORN*, 24:640 (quotations).

[12] Milligan, ed., *From the Freshwater Navy*, 142 (first quotation), 146 (second quotation).

[13] John D. Milligan, ed., *From the Fresh-Water Navy: 1861-64; The Letters of Acting Master's Mate Henry R. Browne and Acting Ensign Symmes E. Browne* (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1970), 123 (first quotation); LeRoy Fitch to David D. Porter, April 6, 1863, *ORN*, 24:71 (second and third quotations); General Order No. 158 of David D. Porter, January 18, 1864, *ORN*, 25:701; Gideon Welles to David D. Porter, *ORN*, 25:682 (final quotation).

[14] David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, October 21, 1862, *ORN*, 23:428; Ed Shaw to David D. Porter, July 14, 1863, *ORN*, 25:302; George W. Brown to David D. Porter, November 10, 1863, *ORN*, 25:511; James Greer to David D. Porter, December 21, 1863, *ORN*, 25:697; C. J. Field to David D. Porter, December 26, 1863, *ORN*, 25:697-98 Chester G. Hearn, *Ellet's Brigade: The Strangest Outfit of All* (Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 179-256. Both the ironclads and the tinclads had trouble when guerrillas fled to the interior. In one case, a detachment of twenty-six sailors from the *U.S.S. Baron De Kalb* pursued partisans for eight or nine miles (J. A. Winslow to David D. Porter, October 25, 1862, *ORN*, 23:447). Such chases could be harrowing, since the sailors might be riding into an ambush.

[15] David D. Porter to Ulysses S. Grant, February 14, 1863, *ORN*, 24:342 (quotation); Bennet, *Union Jacks*, 93-97. Porter gave specific orders not to take cotton from southern unionists. See David D. Porter to Alfred W. Ellet, March 26, 1863, *ORN*, 24:513.

[16] Brady, *War Upon the Land*, pp. 24-71; John C. Pemberton to Brigadier General James Chalmers, April 18, 1863, *ORN*, 24:716.

[17] "General Order of Acting Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy," December 2, 1862, *ORN*, 23:528 (first quotation); "Extract from Diary of Lieutenant Roe, U. S. Navy," October 24, 1862, ORN, 19:775 (second quotation); "Order of Acting Rear-Admiral Porter" June 3, 1863, ORN, 25:58-59 (final quotation); "Report of Lieutenant-Commander Fitch, U. S. Navy," December 4, 1862, ORN, 23:530-31; "Joint Expedition to Steele's Bayou, Miss.," March 26, 1863, ORN, 24:474-78; Milligan, ed., *From the Freshwater Navy*, pp. 145, 235, 245; Stephen E. Woodworth, *Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008), pp. 66-67.

[18] "Map showing the New Cut-Off made by Lt. Com. T. O. Selfridge, U.S.N., 1863," *Report of the Secretary of the Navy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863), following page 460; William N. Still, Jr., *What Finer Tradition: The Memoirs of Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N.* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 77-79. Selfridge's cut-off also had the effect of detaching Napoleon, Arkansas, detached from the Mississippi River; Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter to Lt. Pritchett, January 26, 1863, *ORN*, 24:198; Captain Thomas Selfridge to Lt. Bishop, March 12, 1862, *ORN*, 24:468 (first quotation); Report of Lt. Commander Selfridge, March 14, 1863, *ORN*, 24:472 (second quotation); Report of Lt. Commander Selfridge, April 4, 1863, *ORN*, 24:527-28; Brady, *War Upon the Land*, pp. 10 (third quotation), 97-98; David D. Porter to Gideon Welles, January 17, 1863, *ORN*, 24:208 (final quotation).